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WHEN FOLLOWING THE motivation for this study back to its origin, I should proba-bly start with the Master's thesis I completed 8 years ago, when I was a student in
Electrical Engineering at Twente University. Under the stimulating supervision of Leo
Veelenturf I was trying to set up a formal framework to compare and analyse various
forms of behaviour that was referred to as 'learning from examples'. It was not without
reservations that I took up this work, since 'reasoning by induction' seemed such a mythi-
cal and unmechanisable process to me; yet, I remember a distinct feeling of disappoint-
ment when I became aware that there might be, after all, some rules of the game.
The theme of induction kept intriguing me, and I reworked my Master's thesis into an
article which I submitted to the Artificial Intelligence journal. When I picked up the
subject again in Tilburg I soon discovered that there was quite a bit of similar (and better)
work going on, so the rejection of that submission did not come as a great surprise. Even
if my early efforts were a scientific failure, they brought me in contact with Ranan Banerji
who, since I based my work ori his, acted as a referee for the paper. Ranan's warm
personality and scholarly attitude has been a continuing stimulus ever since.
Two scientific events that helped to shape my thoughts occurred in early 1991. In
January I attended a workshop on non-monotonic reasoning in Amsterdam, organised by
Wiebe van der Hoek, John-Jules Meyer and Yao-Hua Tan, where I learned about the work
of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor, that plays such a central role in this thesis. In March I
witnessed the genesis of the inductive logic programming community at a workshop
organised by Steve Muggleton and Pavel Brazdil in Viana do Castelo (Portugal). Many
forms of close scientific co-operation have sprung from that first meeting.
In the meantime, Robert Meersman gave me all the freedom to work on research topics
of my choosing. My work on inferring attribute dependencies in relational databases was
an attempt to connect to the work on conceptual database design carried out in the Infolab
group. The fact that this work is not the main concern of the thesis (although it is treated
in some detail in chapter 8) is a result, both of my own esoteric foundational interests and
of the liberty provided by my environment, which I hereby gratefully acknowledge.
Another essential ingredient of that environment was embodied in the Institute for
Language Technology & Artificial Intelligence (ITK), a collaborative effort of the Compu-
tational Linguistics group at the Faculty of Linguistics on the one hand, and the Infolab
group at the Faculty of Economics on the other. By way of sad coincidence, not only the
start of my thesis work in Tilburg but also its completion more or less coincides with
that of ITK as a separate and independent entity. It is in appreciation of ITK's unfortu-
nately short life that this thesis is published in the distinguished ITK dissertation series.
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I would like to thank my promotors and the other members of the reading committee
(Prof. dr. H.C. Bunt (KUB), Dr. L. De Raedt (Leuven), Prof.dr. H. de Swart (KUB), and
Prof.dr. K. Schlechta (Marseille)) for their efforts. I would especially like to thank John-
Jules Meyer for his unfailing enthusiasm and encouragement, and for his careful proof-
reading. I had several stimulating discussions with Luc De Raedt, Harrie de Swart, and
Karl Schlechta, and thank them for the many improvements they suggested. Elias Thijsse
provided partial help with some of the stuff in chapter 7.
Part of the work was done while I was visiting the Jozef Stefan Institute in Ljubljana
and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. I thank my hosts, Nada Lavrae and Luc De Raedt
for making my stays enjoyable and productive. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial
support of the European Union, through the Basic Research Action Inductive Logic
Programming (6020), the PECO network ILPnet (CIPA35100CT920044), and the
Networks of Excellence Compulog and MLnet.
I would like to thank my colleagues for being patient with me while I was writing;
Hennie Daniels, Robert Meersman and Leo Remijn for taking over a few of my lectures;
Tineke Kleine and Alice Kloosterhuis for secretarial assistance; and Egon Verharen for
providing technical assistance way beyond the call of duty (although MicroSoft products
sometimes resist even him ... ).
Finally, I would like to say 'thank you' to all the people who were important for me
during the last year (you know who you are), and to my wife Nada who, despite all the




- in which the motivation for this study will be given, its
scope will be delineated, preliminary concepts and notation
will be defined, and an overview will be provided of what is
still to come -
§1. MOTIVATIONANDSCOPEOFTHETHESIS
THIS THESIS GIVES an account of my investigations into the logical foundations ofinductive reasoning. Roughly speaking, induction consists in identifying the
similarities between observed objects or events, and hypothetically extending those
similarities to unobserved objects or future events. It constitutes a mode of reasoning
which plays a role in the acquisition of scientific theories, as well as the acquisition of the
descriptive vocabulary needed to reason about the objects and events encountered in
everyday life, although, it must be added, philosophers (and psychologists) disagree about
the importance of induction in these processes. In recent years researchers in artificial
intelligence have explored the realisation of inductive procedures by means of computer
programs, not only with the purpose to automate the formation of scientific theories and
concept taxonomies, but also aiming at extending inductive techniques to new tasks, such
as the construction of computer programs from examples of their intended behaviour (like
in inductive logic programming). The initial motivation for the present study grew out of
a perceived need for a formal framework in which the various inductive techniques that are
used in practice can be precisely characterised and related to each other. As such, it should
be viewed as a methodological investigation into the formal aspects of inductive methods
as used in computer science in general, and artificial intelligence in particular.
The field of artificial intelligence seeks to implement aspects of human cognitive
behaviour by means of computer programs. By its very nature, the field has a strong
inclination towards epistemological subjects, as they were traditionally studied by
philosophers and logicians I. Clearly, researchers in each of these fields study the same
subjects with quite different aims. For instance, philosophers are interested in such issues
as the scope and justification of human knowledge; logicians are interested in formalising
reasoning processes; and computer scientists may use techniques similar to human
reasoning methods to solve particular problems. Despite these different aims, methods and
results from one of these fields may be relevant for the others. For instance, Godel's proof
of the incompleteness of first-order predicate logic as soon as it includes fundamental
IThe psychological aspects of induction fall outside the scope of this thesis.
I. Introduction and overview
number theory has some serious philosophical implications; and the computer scientist's
pursuit for an efficiently implementable deduction strategy has spawned an innumerable
amount of logical investigations. Many problems in artificial intelligence would therefore
benefit from an approach that is not completely ignorant of related views, and inductive
reasoning is no exception in this respect. In this thesis inductive reasoning is studied in a
multidisciplinary context, combining perspectives from philosophy, logic, and artificial
intelligence.
Philosophy
Philosophical investigations of inductive reasoning have concentrated on the justification
of inductively acquired knowledge: the infamous 'Problem of Induction'. Not only is this
a very complex problem, philosophers disagree about what exactly should be understood
as a justification. Many scholars tend to believe that this requires, in some form or
another, an assessment of the truth of the inductive conclusion, given the truth of the
premisses. Other philosophers claim that describing the inferential patterns underlying
induction suffices. For instance, Nelson Goodman states that 'the basic task in justifying
an inductive inference is to show that it conforms to the general rules of induction'
(Goodman, 1954, p.374). Such rules of induction delimit what kind of argument we are
prepared to accept as inductive argument - they cannot have, and do not need, any further
justification than their compliance with common practice. Furthermore, as Goodman
notes, this renders the inductive justification problem completely analogous to the
justification of deduction: there, also, a deductive argument is valid if it is in accordance
with the rules of the game '- rules that come very close to formalising our intuitions
about deduction, it is true, but which nevertheless can also only be justified by an appeal
to intuition.
It would be, I believe, a mistake to think that the 'Problem of Induction' can be
completely reduced to the problem of devising a proper set, or proper sets, of rules of
induction, because a solution to the latter problem leaves unanswered the question how to
assess the truth of the inductive conclusion. The two problems - justifying inductive
reasoning and describing inductive reasoning - are, in the view developed in this thesis,
relatively unrelated. Furthermore, I think that the justification problem is not reserved for
induction, but manifests itself in any form of non-deductive reasoning. In this thesis I will
concentrate on the description problem rather than the justification problem, although I
will also spend some words on the latter.
Logic
As a separate branch of science, logic has emerged only relatively recently. Until the
twentieth century questions regarding the patterns underlying human reasoning were
considered to belong to philosophy. This century has seen a tremendous breakthrough in
the formalisation of mathematical reasoning, and as a result logical investigations have
become more technical and less philosophical. Logic, as we know it today, is a technical
discipline with the mathematics of deductive logic as its main subject.
Without questioning the worth of current-day logical investigations, I consider it
regrettable that the original, general question regarding the patterns underlying human
2.
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reasoning has been overpowered by a rather more specific question concerning the logical
patterns of deductive reasoning. It is true that non-deductive forms of reasoning can never
be formalised to the same extent as deductive reasoning, for the simple reason that the
latter has a built-in notion of 'correct' reasoning which the former lack. However, I
believe that some present-day logical tools can be successfully used to obtain a deeper
understanding of non-deductive forms of reasoning, and this thesis is meant as a
contribution in this direction.
Artificial intelligence
If logic is a young field, artificial intelligence is still in its infancy. Artificial intelligence
can be described as the field that aims to automate human cognitive abilities, in order to
improve the usefulness of cornputers-, Artificial intelligence research sheds a new light on
many old philosophical problems by taking a computational viewpoint. For instance,
many philosophers, including Peirce and Popper, think that scientific hypotheses come to
us in a 'flash of insight', and not by an algorithmic process consisting of small reasoning
steps. There is however, as Peirce noted, a certain relation between the hypothesis and the
observations preceding it, parts of which can be logically formalised, and such a formal
relation can be computed.'. While the tendency in philosophy has been 'humans do not do
this algorithmically, so don't bother about the logical relation', the artificial intelligence
attitude is 'but I want my computer to do it algorithmically, so I need the exact logical
relation as a specification for the computer program' .
We could say that artificial intelligence researchers are philosophical programmers (or
that philosophers are artificial intelligence designers). The interplay between the two
disciplines is likely to produce new insights, and this thesis is hoped to contribute in that
respect.
§2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section I will introduce the most important concepts, notation and terminology
used throughout the thesis. A summary of many of these terms can be found in an
appendix.
Terminology
If it were possible, at this stage, to give a precise, coherent and undisputed definition of
the terms used in the following chapters, this thesis wouldn't have been written. For
instance, there is no well-established definition of induction, and the interpretation of the
term 'abduction' is a battlefield. The following discussion of the terminology I use in this
thesis is therefore partly premature and subjective.
21 regard artificial intelligence as a subfield of computer science rather than cognitive science
- for a collection of views on this subject see (Flach & Meersman, 1991).
31t may have to be approximated, or limited to special cases, because of undecidability or
complexity problems, but this leaves the main point unaffected.
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Reasoning is an informal term denoting the process of forming arguments, i.e.
drawing conclusions from premisses, and logic is the formal study of that process. It is
taken for granted that different reasoning forms can be identified, such as inductive
reasoning, deductive reasoning, plausible reasoning, and so forth; again, this term will be
used informally. The formalisation of different reasoning forms and their relations is seen
as the main goal of logic, resulting in a catalogue of reasoning forms; such a catalogue, or
a coherent part of it, will be referred to as a descriptive logical theory".
My definition of the deductive reasoning form is rather generous. An argument is
deductive if the conclusion cannot be contradicted by new knowledge without contradicting
the premisses also; a form of reasoning is deductive if it only allows deductive arguments.
Another way to say the same thing is: deduction is the logic of non-defeasible reasoning.
This is not meant to say that there is a single deductive logic, and that it is clear which
arguments are deductively valid and which are not. On the contrary: the argument 'two
plus two equals four; therefore, if the moon is made of green cheese, then two plus two
equals four' will be rejected by those who favour a causal or relevance interpretation of if-
then rather than a truth-functional interpretation. However. as soon as such an argument is
accepted as deductively valid, the only way to defeat the conclusion is by denying that two
plus two equals four, and this defeats the premisses also. Note that I didn't talk about the
logical language, or about the proposed semantics: modal, temporal, relevance, and
intuitionistic logics are all formalisations. sometimes conflicting, of certain aspects of
deductive reasoning.
Non-deductive reasoning forms are defeasible: a conclusion may be defeated by new
knowledge, even if the premisses on which the conclusion was based are not defeated. For
instance, the argument 'birds typically fly; Tweety is a bird; therefore, Tweety flies' is
non-deductive, since Tweety might be an ostrich, hence non-typical. The argument 'every
day during my life the sun rose; I don't know of any trustworthy report of the sun not
rising one day in the past; therefore, the sun will rise every future day' is non-deductive,
since if the sun would not rise tomorrow, this would invalidate the conclusion but not the
premisses.
The Tweety-argument is a well-known example of what I call plausible reasoning:
reasoning with general cases and exceptions. This terminology is not generally accepted:
this form of reasoning is normally referred to as non-monotonic reasoning-'. A reasoning
form is monotonic if, given an argument, adding a premiss cannot defeat the conclusion.
In fact, this is the same property as what I called non-defeasibility above; since any non-
deductive reasoning form is defeasible, it follows that any non-deductive reasoning form is
non-monotonic. In other words, the property of non-monotonicity is of limited use in
41 don't think that the field of logic, in its current state, has developed very well towards this
goal. Most of the logics around, such as modal, temporal, partial and relevance logics, are
mostly variations upon a theme, the theme of deductive reasoning, and thus represent only a
tiny subspectrum of the huge range of possible reasoning forms. Like algebra has generalised
the properties of numbers into such abstract concepts as groups, rings and fields, logic should
investigate what properties of deductive logic are contingent and could be different, and what
properties are tied to the nature of logic. expressing an inherent quality of reasoning. Such
investigations belong to the discipline of descriptive logic.
SDefault reasoning would be a good term, but this seems too strongly connected to a
particular logic, i.e. default logic.
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classifying reasoning forms; for this reason I prefer a different (and more meaningful)
term. Typically, plausible reasoning encompasses deductive reasoning, but also tries to
draw, in the absence of crucial information, conclusions that are not deductively justified.
In this sense plausible reasoning is 'supra-deductive' or, as I will call it, quasi-deductive.
The second argument above, concerning the prediction of sunrise, is an example of
induction, which is commonly defined as reasoning from specific observations (also caIled
evidence) to general rules or hypotheses. As a first attempt this is an acceptable definition,
but note that it leaves the logical relation between observations and inductive hypothesis
unspecified. After all, after observing 100 white swans we might conclude that swans may
have any colour. Few people would accept this inductive conclusion, but why is this so?
Like with deductive reasoning this should be based on some notion of 'inductive validity'.
This is exactly the subject of this thesis, although I will eschew the term 'validity'
because of its strong deductive connotation. Note that inductive reasoning does not
comprehend all deductively valid arguments and is therefore not quasi-deductive; I will call
reasoning forms that do not aim at approximating deduction a-deductive.
Abduction is a term originally introduced by C.S. Peirce to denote the process of
forming an explanatory hypothesis given some observations (a hypothesis from which the
observations can be deduced). According to the view defended in this thesis, inferring a
general explanation of observations is one possible form of inductive reasoning, so we
might say that abduction is a special case of induction. However, in recent years a different
notion of abduction has emerged in the logic programming field, according to which the
general explanation is known, but one of its premisses is not known to be true; abduction
is then seen as hypothesising this missing premiss. As a consequence, abduction and
induction are viewed as complementary: induction infers the general rule, given that its
premisses and its conclusion hold in specific cases; abduction infers specific premisses,
given the general rule, and specific instances of its conclusion and some of its premisses.
In this thesis I will stick to the former interpretation of abduction, as originaIly intended
by Peirce; in order to minimise confusion I will mostly avoid the term abduction in
favour of the term explanatory reasoning.
Explanatory reasoning is meant to formalise one aspect of inductive reasoning, namely
that inductive hypotheses should be able to explain the observations. Confirmatory
reasoning formalises another intuitive aspect of induction, that is, the idea that the
inductive conclusion should be confirmed by the hypothesis. One might expect that the
ideal inductive hypothesis is both explanatory and confirmed; however, straightforward
logical formalisations of both aspects turn out to interfere in such a way that they have
been developed separately in this study. Neither of these formalisations is intended to fully
capture the essence of inductive reasoning; therefore, I tend to avoid the term induction in
the more formal parts of the thesis, and adopt the more neutral term conjecturaL reasoning;
the term conjecture is used synonymously with 'hypothesis' in the sense of 'defeasible
general rule'.
LogicaL preliminaries
Throughout the thesis I assume that a logical language L is fixed. Except for chapter 7,
whose completeness results only hold if L is a (first-order) propositional language, I will
5
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normally assume that L is a (first-order) predicate-logical language, unless indicated
otherwise. Formally, such a language is defined by a denumerable set of predicate symbols
with arity 0,1,2, ... , a denumerable set of variable symbols, a denumerable set of constant
symbols, and a denumerable set of function symbols with arity 1,2, .... Terms and well-
formed formulas (wff's) are defined in the usual recursive way, by means of the
connectives +t, /\, V, ~, and H, and the quantifiers V and 3:
lao a constant symbol is a term;
lb. a variable symbol is a term;
lc. iffis a function symbol with arity n, and tl> ... Jn is a sequence of n
terms, thenfi:tl> ... ,tn) is a term;
ld. nothing else is a term.
2a. true and false are wff's;
2b. if P is a predicate symbol with arity n, and tl'" .,tn is a sequence of n
terms, then P(tl,' .. ,tn) is a wff, also referred to as an atomic formula,
or briefly, an atom;
2c. if FI and F2 are wffs, then (-,FI), (FI/\F2)' (FIVF2)' (FI~F2)' and
(FIHF2) are wff's;
2d. if x is a variable and F is a wff, then (Vx: F) and (3x: F) are wff's;
2e. nothing else is a wff.
Brackets will usually be dropped as much as possible without causing confusion. A
propositional language is a special case of a predicate-logical language, built only from
predicate symbols with arity 0, referred to as proposition symbols or propositional atoms,
and connectives; the set of propositional wff's is defined by clauses Za-c and 2e.
The scope of a quantifier Vx (resp. 3x) in Vx: F (resp. 3x: F) is F. An occurrence of a
variable in a formula is bound if it immediately follows a quantifier, or if it occurs in the
scope of a quantifier with the same variable. Any other occurrence of a variable in a
formula is free. Although the same variable can have both bound and free occurrences
within a formula, this is usually avoided by renaming; in that case we simply refer to free
and bound variables. A closed formula is a formula without free occurrences of any
variable; otherwise the formula is open. For any formula, V(F) denotes the universal
closure of F, which is the closed formula obtained by adding a universal quantifier for
every variable with a free occurrence in F.
IfA is an atom, then -,A is a negative literal; an atom is also referred to as a positive
literal. A clause is the universal closure of a disjunction of positive and negative literals.
We adopt the usual notation for clauses: a clause like A I ; A2: - B I I B2 stands for the
formula V(AlvA2v-,Blv-,B2 ); the part preceding the symbol': -' is called the head of
the clause, the part succeeding it is called the body. A clause is a denial if it has no
positive literal, definite if it has one positive literal, and indefinite if it has more than one
positive literal. A non-definite clause is also called an integrity constraint. Afact is a
definite clause without negative literals; the ': -' symbol is omitted for facts. A normal
clause is obtained from an indefinite clause by moving all but one positive literals to the
body, preceded by a negation symbol. A logic program is a set (conjunction) of definite
and normal clauses.
We conform to the Prolog notation (see Flach, 1994): predicate symbols, function
symbols and constant symbols start with a lowercase letter, while variable symbols start
6
§2. Prelim inaries
with an uppercase letter. A functor is a function symbol occurring in a clause. The term
. (X, Y) , where' . ' is the list functor, is usually written [X I y 1; the empty list constant
is [1, and for lists of fixed length such as . (a, . (b, . (c, [1 ) ) ) we employ the linear
notation and write [a, b, c 1 . A substitution is a function mapping variables to terms;
applying a substitution to a clause replaces all occurrences of the variables in the domain
of the substitution with the corresponding term. A ground term (clause) is a term (clause)
without variables. The Herbrand universe of a language or a program is the set of ground
terms. The Herbrand base of a language or a program is the set of ground atoms.
A predicate-logical interpretation is a pair {D,i}, where D is a non-empty domain of
individuals, and i is a function assigning to every constant symbol an element of D, to
every function symbol with arity n a mapping from D" to D, and to every predicate
symbol with arity n a mapping from D'' to the set of truthvalues {true,false}6. A
valuation is a function v assigning to every variable an element of D. Given an
interpretation 1= {D,i} and a valuation v a mapping iv from terms to individuals and from
formulas to truthvalues is defined as follows:
la. if t is a constant symbol, iv(t) = i(t);
1b. if t is a variable symbol, iv(t) = vet);
lc. if t is a termf(tl>" .,tn), iv(t) = i(f)(iv(t,),·· .,iv(tn»·
2a. iv(true) = true; iv(false) = false;
2b. if F is an atom Ptt, ... ,tn), iv(F) = i(P) (iv(t,),· .. ,iv(tn»;
2c. iv(-,F) = true if iv(F) = false, and false otherwise;





2d. ivC\lx: F) = true if ivx~d(F) = true for all de D, and false
otherwise, where VX-7d is v except that x is assigned d;
iv(3x: F) = iv(-,Vx: -,F).
An interpretation I satisfies a formula F, notation IFF, if iv(F) = true for all valua-
tions v; we usually say that I is a model of F. Models are usually denoted by the letter m,
and occasionally treated as functions assigning truthvalues to formulas. A formula is
satisfiable if it is satisfied by some interpretation, unsatisfiable otherwise. If all models of
a set of formulas L are also models of <p, we say that L logically entails <p or <p is a
logical consequence of L, and write L F <p7. If L is empty, <p is called a tautology; instead
of 0 F <p, we write F<p. A formula 0/ is a contradiction if -,0/ is a tautology. In chapter 7
the following compactness property of first-order predicate logic will be used: a set of
formulas L is satisfiable iff every finite subset of L is satisfiable.
61 will not distinguish between the symbol in the language denoting a truth value and the
truth value itself. Note that in §28 we consider partial or three-valued interpretations; the main
differences with two-valued interpretations will be explained there.
7Conforming to standard logical practice the symbol 1= denotes both the satisfaction relation
between interpretations and formulas, and the entailment relation between sets of formulas and
formulas. Wherever this might cause confusion the intended meaning is indicated in words.
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A Herbrand interpretation is an interpretation (D,i) in which the domain D is the
Herbrand universe H of ground terms, while i maps every constant symbol to itself, and
every function symbolfwith arity n to a function from H" mapping a sequence of ground
terms (tl, ... ,tn) tof(tl, ... ,tn). Thus, Herbrand interpretations only differ in their truthvalue
assignments to predicate symbols; consequently, any Herbrand interpretation is completely
defined by, and usually identified with, the set of ground atoms it assigns the truthvalue
true (i.e. a subset of the Herbrand base)8. The main differences between Herbrand
interpretations and the general case are:
the treatment of equality: syntactically different ground terms denote
different individuals, and
• quantification, which is only over the known individuals: e.g. if the
Herbrand universe is {a}, then {Pea), 3x: .....,P(x)} does not have a
Herbrand model (although it is satisfiable).
For clauses, which don't contain existential quantifiers, Herbrand interpretations are
sufficient, in the following sense: a set of clauses is unsatisfiable iff it does not have a
Herbrand model.
A proof procedure consists of a set of (logical) axioms and a set of inference rules. Given a
proof procedure P, we say that cp is provable from L and write L l-pCP if there exists a
finite sequence of formulas CPI,CP2'... , CPn which is obtained by successive applications of
inference rules to axioms, premisses in L, or previous formulas in the sequence, or
combinations of these, while CPn is the conclusion cp. Such a sequence of formulas, if it
exists, is called a proof of cP from L. A proof procedure P is sound, with respect to the
semantics established by predicate-logical interpretations, if L 1= cP whenever L I-p cP; it is
complete if L I-pcP whenever L 1= cpo For a sound and complete proof procedure for first-
order predicate logic, see e.g. (Turner, 1984, p.15). A set of formulas L is consistent, with
respect to a proof procedure P, if not both L I-p cP and L I-p """CPfor some formula cP; two
sets of formulas are compatible if their union is consistent. I will usually omit the
reference to a particular proof procedure, and write I- for some provability relation that
coincides with 1=. Likewise, if a set of formulas is called consistent, a sound and complete
proof procedure is understood; consequently, a set of formulas is consistent iff it is
satisfiable.
In chapter 8 I will make use of the proof procedure of resolution in clausal logic. In
clausal logic no interaction occurs between the connectives due to the normal form in
which clauses are written, and thus the set of axioms is empty. The single inference rule
of resolution allows one to infer, from two clauses FlvLI and F2v.....,L2, the clause
(FlvF2)9, where 9 is the most general unifier of LI and Lz (the minimal substitution such
that LI9 = L29). In terms of definite clauses this amounts to matching the head of one
clause with a literal in the body of another. The resolution proof procedure is not
complete, but it is refutation-complete, i.e. if a set of clauses is inconsistent resolution is
able to derive the unsatisfiable empty clause D. Therefore, proofs of L I- cP, where cp is a
conjunction of positi ve literals, are transformed to refutation proofs LV {.....,cp} l- D, where
.....,cp is a denial called a query and written? -B I' ... ,Bn. As we saw earlier, Herbrand
8The same observation can be made for propositional interpretations.
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interpretations are sufficient to characterise such a refutation proof procedure in clausal
logic. SLD resolution is a particular resolution proof procedure specifically tailored for
definite logic programs; SLDNF resoLution is an extension of SLD resolution that is able
to deal with normal clauses by negation as failure.
§3. OVERVIEWOFTHETHESIS
The thesis consists of three parts: Backgrounds, Foundations, and Practice. A brief
overview of the chapters in each of these parts follows.
Backgrounds
In the first part work in philosophy, logic, and artificial intelligence that is relevant for
the present investigations is reviewed. The choice of works is subjective, and no claim is
made as to the completeness of these overviews. On the contrary, I often concentrate on
one or two authors whose work has inspired mine. Apart from some minor terminological
adjustments'', which I have permitted myself with a view to overall consistency, I have
tried to remain as faithful as possible to the original author's views and intentions. Where
I have felt the need to comment on or voice disagreement with those views I have done so
in a separate discussion section at the end of the chapter.
In the first chapter in this part, The philosophy of induction, I discuss the
philosophical backgrounds of this study. I concentrate on philosophers who have studied
induction from a logical perspective, most notably Peirce and Hempel. The work of
Carnap on confirmation measures is briefly reviewed in the discussion section, since it
provokes some reflections on the aims and scope of logic (further dealt with in chapter 5).
However, his numerical approach is not seen as fundamental to the subject of this thesis,
since it does not provide any insight into the logic of induction. The main conclusion
drawn from this chapter is that the dichotomy between explanatory and confirmatory
induction proposed and defended in this thesis is already present, albeit implicit, in the
work of Peirce and Hempel.
The next chapter is called Approaches to computational induction. It draws upon work
in machine learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) on inductively learning concepts,
logic programs, and logical theories from examples. I indicate how the latter two
problems can be reformulated as problems of explanatory and confirmatory induction,
respectively.
The third and final chapter in the first part, The analysis of non-deductive reasoning, is
mainly devoted to one article by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor that provided the main
inspiration for my approach. In that article the authors set out to "study general patterns of
non monotonic reasoning". The main tool they used for that study is the notion of a
consequence relation, which is a set of pairs of premiss and conclusion, originally
proposed by Gabbay. By formulating and combining properties of such consequence
relations, such as (Cautious) Monotonicity and Transitivity, they succeeded in providing a
systematic and precise overview of different forms of plausible reasoning, that is, a
9all of which are indicated in footnotes.
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descriptive theory of plausible reasoning. In this thesis I have set out to do the same for
inductive reasoning.
Foundations
The second part makes up the core of this thesis. It consists of three, increasingly
technical, chapters. The first chapter, Outline of a descriptive theory of induction, is
probably the most speculative among them, challenging some established dogmas of
logic. Specifically, I take issue with the idea that a logical semantics is necessarily based
on the notion of truth. In my view, any quality worth preserving in an argument may give
rise to a logic formalising some useful form of reasoning. Two of the qualities that may
be preserved in inductive arguments are explanatory power and regularity of
interpretations!". Since the preservation of such qualities may not be reserved for inductive
reasoning, nor characterise it completely, I introduce the term 'conjectural reasoning' for
any form of reasoning involving uncertain hypotheses, including induction.
In the next chapter, Properties of conjectural consequence relations, I commence my
study of general patterns of conjectural reasoning in the spirit of Kraus et at. Starting with
the adequacy conditions for a material definition of the relation of confirmation formulated
by Hempel, I propose a number of rules for explanatory and confirmatory reasoning, and
some rules that are meaningful in both cases. Systems of such rules are studied and
semanticaIly characterised in the final chapter in this part, Rule systems for conjectural
reasoning.
Practice
Of the two forms of induction studied in this thesis, explanatory induction and
confirmatory reasoning, the latter is certainly much less understood than the former. In the
third and last part of this thesis I illustrate the practice of confirmatory induction in the
context of relational databases. This chapter also illustrates my claim that in confirmatory
induction one needs an additional goal which the inductive hypothesis is meant to fulfil,
since 'being confirmed' is not an end in itself. Those readers who wish to have a concrete
idea of confirmatory induction could read this chapter before diving into the formalities of
the Foundations part.
The thesis is ended with a chapter recapitulating the main achievements and conclusions,
and with a few appendices including a glossary of terms and logical rules.
*




In the three following chapters work in philosophy, artificial
intelligence, and logic that is relevant for the present
investigations is reviewed. In the first chapter, The
philosophy of induction, I discuss the philosophical
backgrounds of this study. I concentrate on philosophers who
have studied induction from a logical perspective, most
notably Peirce and Hempel. The main conclusion drawn from
this chapter is that the dichotomy between explanatory and
confirmatory induction proposed and defended in this thesis is
already present, albeit implicit, in the work of Peirce and
Hempel. The next chapter is called Approaches to
computational induction. It draws upon work in machine
learning (a subfield of artificial intelligence) on inductively
learning concepts, logic programs, and logical theories from
examples. I indicate how the latter two problems can be
reformulated as problems of explanatory and confirmatory
induction, respectively. The third chapter, The analysis of
non-deductive reasoning, is mainly devoted to one article by
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor that provided the main
inspiration for my work. In that article the authors set out to
"study general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning"; in this
thesis I have set out to do the same for induction.

CHAPTER 2
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION
- in which the philosophical backgrounds of this study are
discussed, leading to the conclusion that the dichotomy
between explanatory and confirmatory induction proposed and
defended in this thesis is already present, albeit implicitly, in
the work of Peirce and Hempel-
THE TIME THAT philosophy was considered the Mother of Science is long gone, anddisciplines, such as logic, that were once among the central concerns of philosophers,
have gained a separate identity. However, foundational studies like the present one cannot
afford to ignore the reflections of philosophers of all time. I therefore start my
investigations by considering the philosophy of induction.
I do not claim to give an overview of this subject that can be called complete in any
sense. While hard in general, this task is even more formidable in the case of induction,
which has always been a philosophical battlefield. Instead, I will concentrate on those
philosophers whose work provides some of the foundations upon which this thesis will
be built: Charles Sanders Peirce and Carl G. Hempel. Before considering their work in
more detail, however, I will give a brief historical overview of parts of the battlefield. The
second half of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of various issues that are especially
significant in the context of this thesis.
§4. THE 'PROBLEM OF INDUCTION'
Induction has been studied by philosophers of all times, but there appears to be little
agreement about a general theory of inductive reasoning, or even about what the questions
are which such a theory is designed to answer. As a result, there exists a lot of confusion
and disagreement about what the so-called 'Problem of Induction' actually is (which is
why I will surround the term by quotes). In this section, I will give a - necessarily brief
and subjective - historical overview of the aspects most relevant to the present
discussion.
Induction was recognised already by Aristotle as a distinguished mode of reasoning in
his Analytica Posteriora. He gives a syllogistic account of what is nowadays called
complete or mathematical induction, a proof strategy in mathematics used to prove
theorems involving the infinite set of all natural numbers. However, complete induction
is actually a deductively valid form of reasoning, and is therefore not relevant for the
present discussion.
2. The philosophy of induction
Scientific method, as we know it today, started to take shape during the Renaissance.
Francis Bacon was one of the first philosophers to stress the importance of induction as a
method of scientific theory formation, in his Novum Organum (1620). An inductive
scientific methodology was further worked out by John Stuart Mill in his System of
Logic (1843). Mill identifies four 'Methods of Experimental Enquiry', and he formulates
five 'Canons' or principles underlying and justifying those methods. After the methods
and canons have been formulated, Mill gives a particularly pregnant formulation of what
remains to be done:
'Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete
induction, while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a
single exception known or presumed, go such a very little way towards
establishing an universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question
knows more of the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and
has solved the problem of induction.'
(Mill, 1843, Book ill, Chapter VIII, p.314)
A century earlier, 'the greatest of modem philosophers' I I had shone his light upon
this problem. It was generally conceived that the scientific method was concerned with
explicating the necessary causal relations that exist between physical objects in the world.
Likewise, induction was seen as reasoning from observations to logically necessary causal
laws. However, in his Treatise on Human Nature (1739), the Scottish philosopher David
Hume concluded that the idea of a causal law is something that exists solely in the mind,
a mental image provoked by observing a number of occasions in which events of a certain
kind are consistently followed by events of another kind. In other words, there is no
logical necessity inherent to causal laws, and any attempt to formulate a firm logical basis
for induction is doomed to fail.
Hume's scepsis, directed at metaphysical notions such as substance and causality, did
not lead him to a radical solipsism. He was keenly aware of the practicality of induction
as a systematic method to derive new knowledge, and his argument should be seen as
refuting the logical status of necessity commonly ascribed, in his times, to inductive
conclusions, and not, as it is sometimes perceived, as denouncing the inductive method
itself. Hume was the first to formulate the logical status of inductive conclusions in terms
of probability rather than necessity. However, this inductive probability does not refer to
states of affairs in the world in terms of relative frequencies, as stochastic probability
does, but it expresses the degree to which we are willing to accept the hypothesis on the
basis of available evidence - in other words, it is subjective. The concept of inductive
probability, which has been worked out in considerable detail by twentieth-century
philosophers such as Keynes and Camap, will not be our major concern in this thesis.12
The American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce noted that the view of induction as
assessing inductive probabilities presupposes the inductive hypothesis as given, and
leaves the question as to where these hypotheses come from unanswered. Peirce introduced
11According to (Goodman, 1954).
12For a discussion of the philosophical aspects of inductive probabilities, see the chapter
with the same name as the present one in (Keuzenkamp, 1994).
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the term abduction to denote the process of forming explanatory hypotheses, and claimed
that it is a process of logical inference - not because humans actually form inductive
hypotheses by means of some inductive proof procedure (on the contrary, the hypothesis
'comes to us like a flash', and is 'an act of insight'; Peirce compares it to knowledge
obtained through direct perception), but rather because it has 'a perfectly definite logical
form'. We will find ample opportunity to discuss this logical form in this thesis.
The ideas of Peirce seem to have gone unnoticed for a long time, especially because at
the time of his writings (the turn of the nineteenth century) the formalisation of logic was
still insufficient for his needs. The term 'abduction' for the process of forming
explanatory hypotheses has not been widely accepted in philosophy (it has been introduced
recently in computer science, although there it usually receives a much more restricted
interpretation). On the other hand, the inclination towards taking logic as the basis of
scientific reasoning was yet to reach its peak, in the writings of the so-called Wiener Kreis
(around 1930).
The Wiener Kreis, which included the philosophers and logicians Rudolf Carnap and
Carl G. Hempel, advocated a doctrine known as logical positivism, a radical form of
empiricism and anti-metaphysicism. Being heavily influenced by the early Wittgenstein
and his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, they believed that most of the traditional
philosophical problems are in fact pseudo-problems, arising from imprecise or incorrect
use of language. The hallmark of real knowledge, they argued, is verifiability, and the
scientific method is the only way to achieve such knowledge. A different position was
taken by the Austrian philosopher Karl R. Popper, who proposed another criterion to
distinguish between scientific and non-scientific knowledge- ': the criterion of
falsifiability. Popper drew attention, like Hume had done before him, to the fact that
scientific hypotheses can never be conclusively verified - however, they can be
conclusively falsified.
Although many of its views are now considered too radical, the Wiener Kreis has had
an enormous influence on philosophy of science, in that many of the main questions have
been reformulated into logical terms. Clearly, Popper has been much more influential
than any member of the Wiener Kreis when it comes to methodological issues in science;
but it must be added that his famous slogan 'conjectures and refutations' is worked out
rather sketchy as far as the first conjunct is concerned!". Members of the Wiener Kreis,
most notably Hempel and Carnap, have investigated, in considerable detail, the question
what it means to say that certain conjectures are suggested or confirmed by the evidence,
while others are not. Hempel's analysis is qualitative, while Carnap's is quantitative.
Although Carnap seems to think that a qualitative analysis is a rather thin extract of the
real thing, it is Hempel's analysis that provides a foundation upon which much of my
subsequent investigations will be built.
13Unlike the Wiener Kreis, Popper did not consider non-scientific knowledge to be
nonsensical.
14'Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psycho-
logical fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure. The actual procedure of
science is to operate with conjectures: to jump to conclusions' (Popper, 1963, p.53). However,
the term 'conjecture' is not described or defined any further - it does not even occur in the
index of Conjectures and Refutations.
2. The philosophy of induction
After having identified the intellectual treasurers to whom I can be held tributary, I
will now proceed to present their work in somewhat more detail. My intention is to be as
faithful as possible to their original writings, leaving my own subjective interpretations
and criticisms for the subsequent discussion (§7).
§5. THE LOGIC OF ABDUCTION
In a series of lectures on Pragmatism delivered in 1903, Peirce distinguishes three types of
reasoning: deduction, induction, and abduction. Induction 'consists in starting from a
theory, deducing from it predictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena in
order to see how nearly they agree with the theory'. Furthermore,
'The justification for believing that an experiental theory which has been
subjected to a number of experimental tests will be in the near future
sustained about as well by further such tests as it has hitherto been, is that
by steadily pursuing that method we must in the long run find out how the
matter really stands.' (CP 5.170) 15
Note that Peirce claims that 'induction consists in starting from a theory' - that is, it
aims at assessing the plausibility of a given theory, rather than constructing that
theory from observations.
However, inductive hypotheses do not come out of the blue, and this is where
abduction comes into play: .
'Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the
only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does
nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary
consequences of a pure hypothesis.
Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that
something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something
may be.
Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a
prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn
anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that
this is to be brought about.
No reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can discover; and it
needs no reason, since it merely offers suggestions.' (CP 5.171)
In other words, abduction is the process of conjecturing inductive hypotheses, constrained
by the requirement that they should comply with the available observations. Abduction
represents the purely logical part of inductive reasoning.
Peirce proceeds by defining the logical form of abduction. 'It must be remembered' , he
writes, 'that abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless is
15References with the prefix 'CP' refer to Hartshorne, Weiss & Burks (eds.), Collected Papers
of Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-58).
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logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or conjecturally, it is true,
but nevertheless having a perfectly definite logical form.' Peirce then defines this logical
form, as follows.
'Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by
logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis -
which is just what abduction is - was subject to certain conditions.
Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it
be supposed that it would account for the facts or some of them. The form
of inference, therefore, is this:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
Thus, A cannot be abductively inferred, or if you prefer the expression,
cannot be abductively conjectured until its entire content is already present
in the premiss, "If A were true, C would be a matter of course." ,
(CP5.188)
In short, the view of induction that Peirce offers in these marvellously lucid citations
is this. Inductive reasoning l'' consists of two steps: (i) formulating a conjecture, and (ii)
evaluating the conjecture. Both steps take the available evidence into account, but in quite
different ways and with different goals. The first step, abduction, requires that the
conjectured hypothesis explains the observations; having a definite logical form, it
represents a form of inference. The second step, induction, evaluates how well predictions
offered by the hypothesis agree with reality; it is not inference, but assigns a numerical
value to a hypothesis.
We can paraphrase this model, to which I will refer as Peirce's model, as follows: 'the
goal of inductive reasoning is to find an explanation for some observations, the
predictions of which comply with other observations'. Although the notion of an
explanation is not explicitly defined, we can abduce from the last citation above that A
explains C whenever 'if A were true, C would be a matter of course'. I will argue in §7
that, although there is room for various interpretations here, this should be interpreted as
'A deductively entails C.
Given this paraphrase, we can summarise the main claims defended in this thesis as
follows:
(i) the notion of explanation is actually a parameter in Peirce's model,
that can be instantiated to deductive entailment but also to, for
instance, plausible entailment;
(ii) at a higher level of abstraction, the goal of inductive reasoning is also
a parameter, that can be instantiated to 'finding a hypothesis that
explains some observations', but also to 'finding a hypothesis that is
confirmed by some observations'.
Although not the main motivation, the way the second claim is substantiated in this
16{ will use the term 'inductive reasoning' for the combined process of abductive or
conjectural reasoning and inductive validation.
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thesis has been influenced by work of Hempel on the concept of confirmation, which I
will discuss now.
§6. THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION
How shall we decide whether certain observational evidence confirms a scientific theory?
Several options come to mind, one being to define a binary relation Cf between two
logical formulas, such that Cf(E,H} formalises the proposition 'E confirms H'. Another
option is to define instead a function assigning a number between 0 and 1to H given E.
The first option, leading to a qualitative concept of confirmation, has been worked out by
Hempel in a paper published in 1943; a less technical account, which concentrates on the
philosophical issues involved, can be found in (Hempel, 1945). The second option,
leading to a quantitative concept of degree of confirmation, has been elaborated by Camap.
I will now concentrate on the qualitative concept, and discuss its relation with the
quantitative concept in §7.
Adequacy conditions
Before considering possible definitions of this relation of confirmation, Hempel presents a
number of logical conditions of adequacy, to be satisfied by any such definition. These
logical conditions, which are represented below, are not independent:
'The logical requirements are stated in three groups. In each group, the
fulfillment of the first condition entails that of all others. Those other
conditions are mentioned for two reasons; first, because most of them
represent important characteristics which would generally be sought in an
adequately defined concept of confirmation; and secondly, because some
apparently reasonable alternative definitions which we shall examine, turn
out to satisfy some of those weaker conditions, but not the strongest of
each group. Confrontation with the different requirements explicitly stated
will thus provide a yardstick for the appraisal of what might be termed the
degree of adequacy of a proposed definition of confirmation.'
(Hempel, 1943, p.127)
There are some differences in presentation of the adequacy conditions in the two papers -
the exposition below can be found in (1945, pp.103-106)17. Note that an observation
report is a formula without variables. Furthermore, a formula is compatible with a c1assls
of formulas if their conjunction is consistent.
(HI) Entailment condition: any sentence which is entailed by an
observation report is confirmed by it.
(H l.l) Any observation report is confirmed by itselfl9.
17Condition (H4) is added on p.ll 0, note 1.
ISHempel uses the word 'class'; I will consider it synonymous with 'set'.
19This condition was not explicitly mentioned by Hempel, but is added to facilitate later
discussions.
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(H2) Consequence condition: if an observation report confirms every one
of a class K of sentences, then it also confirms any sentence which
is a logical consequence of K.
(H2.1) Special consequence condition: if an observation report
confirms a hypothesis H, then it also confirms every
consequence of H.
(H2.2) Equivalence condition: if an observation report confirms a
hypothesis H, then it also confirms every hypothesis which
is logically equivalent with H.
(H2.3) Conjunction condition: if an observation report confirms
each of two hypotheses, then it also confirms their
conjunction-v.
(H3) Consistency condition: every logically consistent observation report
is logically compatible with the class of all the hypotheses which it
confirms.
(H3.1) Unless an observation report is self-contradictory-I, it does
not confirm any hypothesis with which it is not logically
compatible.
(H3.2) Unless an observation report is self-contradictory, it does
not confirm any hypotheses which contradict each other.
(H4) Equivalence condition for observations: if an observation report B
confirms a hypothesis H, then any observation report logically
equivalent with B also confirms H.
These adequacy conditions are intended to formalise certain intuitions about the concept of
confirmation. Whether we find them acceptable or not depends on whether our intuitions
about that concept are the same as Hempel's. Let us, therefore, investigate the motivation
offered by Hempel for the main adequacy conditions.
The entailment condition is motivated by noting that 'entailment is a special case of
confirmation' (1945, p.l02). Elsewhere, Hempel remarks that entailment 'might be
referred to as the special case of conclusive confirmation' (p.107). These are important
remarks, because they offer some insight in what Hempel has in mind when he talks
about confirmation. Furthermore, they will be a starting point for the logical
formalisation of the concept of confirmation in chapters 6 and 7.
The consequence conditions (H2) and (H2.l) state that the relation of confirmation is
closed under weakening of the hypothesis or set of hypotheses (HI is weaker than H2 iff it
is logically entailed by the latter). Hempel justifies this condition as follows (1945,
p.103): 'an observation report which confirms certain hypotheses would invariably be
qualified as confirming any consequence of those hypotheses. Indeed: any such
20This condition is considered on p.106.
21By the entailment condition, a contradictory observation report confirms every
hypothesis. As Hempel notes, 'it is possible to exclude the possibility of contradictory
observation reports altogether (00')' There is, however, no important reason to do so.'
(p.103, note 1). In chapters 6 and 7 I will choose to exclude them.
2. The philosophy of induction
consequence is but an assertion of all or part of the combined content of the original
hypotheses and has therefore to be regarded as confirmed by any evidence which confirms
the original hypotheses.'
The consistency condition (H3) seems to be more problematic. Hempel does not really
give a motivation for this condition, but immediately remarks that it 'will perhaps be felt
to embody a too severe restriction'. He considers to possibility of dropping (H3) while
retaining (H3.1) and (H3.2) (p.106). However, combination of (H3.1) with the
conjunction condition (H2.3) implies (H3); consequently, if we drop (H3) while keeping
(H3.1), we should drop (H2.3), and afortiori (H2), as well. Hempel decides to keep them
all - without, it must be added, a very clear justification.
The confirmation paradox
The adequacy conditions (Hl-4) are mutually compatible, in the sense that their
combination does not lead to counterintuitive results. This might be taken to indicate that
each of them indeed formalises some aspect of a single intuitive notion. There is,
however, a fifth rule, with considerable intuitive appeal, which is incompatible with (HI-
4). This problem is known as the confirmation paradox. While there are various
formulations of this paradox, we will follow here Hempel's original treatment; the reader
is referred to (Hesse, 1974) for a more elaborate discussion.
Let HI and H2 be two theories such that the latter includes the former, in the sense
that everything entailed by HI is also entailed by H2. Suppose E is confirming evidence
for HI; shouldn't we conclude that it confirms H2 as well? To borrow an example of
Hempel: 'Is it not true, for example, that those experimental findings which confirm
Galileo's law, or Kepler's laws, are considered also as confirming Newton's law of
gravitation?' (1945, p.104). This intuition is formalised by the following condition:
(H5) Converse consequence condition: if an observation report confirms a
hypothesis H, then it also confirms every formula logically
entailing H.
The problem is, however, that this rule is incompatible with consequence conditions (H2)
and (H2.l). This can be seen as follows: in order to demonstrate that E confirms H for
arbitrary E and H, we note that E confirms E by (Hl.l), so by the converse consequence
condition E confirms ErR; but then E confirms H by (H2.1). Thus, we see that the
combination of two intuitively acceptable conditions leads to a collapse of the system
into triviality, a clearly paradoxical situation.
Hempel solves the problem on the formal level by dropping the converse consequence
condition in favour of the consequence conditions. However, on the intuitive level the
paradox remains, since Hempel does not provide a clear justification of his choice. I will
argue at the end of the present chapter that the confirmation paradox can be fully dissolved
by making a clear distinction between a confirmed hypothesis and an explanatory
hypothesis. For instance, the converse consequence condition does make sense for
hypotheses that are required to be explanatory (in the sense of Peirce) rather than
confmned. The duality between explanatory and confirmatory reasoning we encounter here
for the first time will be a leading theme throughout the thesis.
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The satisfaction criterion of confirmation
I will now proceed to explain Hempel's proposal for a definition of confirmation
satisfying the above adequacy conditions, following the less technical exposition in
(Hempel, 1945). The basic idea is simple and elegant:
'Consider the simple case of the hypothesis H: 'Vx: Raven(x)~Black(x)',
where 'Raven' and 'Black' are supposed to be terms of our observational
vocabulary. Let B be an observation report to the effect that
Raven(a)ABlack(a) /\ -.Raven(c)ABlack(c) /\ -.Raven(d)/\-,Black(d). Then B
may be said to confirm H in the following sense: There are three objects
altogether mentioned in B, namely a, c, and d; and as far as these are
concerned, B informs us that all those which are ravens (i.e. just the object a)
are also black. In other words, from the information contained in B we can
infer that the hypothesis H does hold true within the finite class of those
objects which are mentioned in B.' (Hempel, 1945, p.108; with slight
modifications regarding the logical symbols)
To formalise the notion of 'a hypothesis being true within a class of objects', Hempel
introduces the concept of the development of a hypothesis H for a finite set of individuals
C, which 'states what H would assert if there existed exclusively those objects which are
elements of C' (p.109). The formal definition can be found in (Hempel, 1943, p.131); I
will introduce the concept by means of a few examples. The development of the
hypothesis
HJ = 'IIx: P(x)vQ(x)
for the set {a, b} is (P(a)vQ(a»/\(P(b)vQ(b»; the development of
H2 = 3x: P(x)
for the same set is P(a)vP(b); and the development of a formula without variables, such as
H3 = P(c)vQ(c)
is that formula itself, regardless of the set of individuals. In perhaps more familiar
terminology we might say that the development of H for a set C is the set of ground
instances of H over the Herbrand universe ('22. It should be noted that Hempel does not
include function symbols in his language.
For reasons which will be exhibited shortly, the relation of confirmation is defined in
terms of a narrower relation of direct confirmation:
An observation report E directly confirms a hypothesis H if E entails the
development of H for the class of those objects which are mentioned in E.
Here, an observation report is a formula without variables, such as E = P(a)AP(b). Thus,
E directly confirms HI and H2, but not H3. However, the relation of direct confirmation
22Assuming that H is a set of formulas in clausal form (without existential quantifiers).
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does not satisfy the equivalence condition (H2.2), since E does not directly confirm
H4 = HI /\ H3 = (Vx: P(x)vQ(x» /\ (P(c)vQ(c»
although this formula is logically equivalent with HI. This problem is overcome in the
following definition:
An observation report E confirms a hypothesis H if H is entailed by a class
of formulas each of which is directly confirmed by E.
So, P(a)/\P(b) confirms each of HI-H4•
Hempel calls this definition the satisfaction criterion of confirmation 'because its basic
idea consists in construing a hypothesis as confirmed by a given observation report if the
hypothesis is satisfied in the finite class of those individuals which are mentioned in the
report' (1945, pp.109-11O). This idea suggests an alternative formalisation of this
criterion, namely in terms of satisfaction by a specially constructed model. This will be
considered in the next section.
Hempel rounds off his 1945 paper with the following considerations:
'A general definition of confirmation, couched in purely logical terms, was
developed for scientific languages of a specified and relatively simple
logical character. The logical model thus obtained appeared to be
satisfactory in the sense of the formal and material standards of adequacy
that had been set up previously.
( ... ) Among the open questions which seem to deserve careful
consideration, I should like to mention the exploration of concepts of
confirmation which fail to satisfy the general consistency condition; the
extension of the definition of confirmation to the case where even
observation sentences containing quantifiers are permitted; and finally the
development of a definition of confirmation for languages of a more
complex logical structure than that incorporated in our model.
(Hempel, 1945, pp.120-121)
I will return to these issues below as well.
§7. DISCUSSION
I will now relate the issues raised above to each other and to the rest of this thesis.
Specifically, I will investigate the significance of Hempel's adequacy conditions for
characterising the logical form of abduction as put forward by Peirce. I will then briefly
discuss the confirmation paradox and what I consider as the cause of it. Furthermore, I
will reformulate Hempel's satisfaction criterion of confirmation in the terminology of
clausal logic. Finally, I will discuss the relation between a qualitative notion of
confirmation as put forward by Hempel, and the quantitative concept of degree of
confirmation studied by Carnap.
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The logical form of abduction
Recall that Peirce defined the logical form of an abductive argument as follows:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
The problem with this definition is that it contains a few nonlogical phrases, viz. C being
a 'surprising fact' and 'there is reason to suspect' that A is true. The first phrase can be
made precise by introducing a background theory T, and stipulating that T should not
logically entail C. Thus, if C is known to be true by virtue of T, it will not allow for any
abductive explanation. On the other hand, the reader will probably agree that this
represents a nonessential borderline case, not unlike the treatment of inconsistent theories
in deductive logic: such a theory entails anything, yet one could make a case for not
inferring anything from such a theory. For the moment, I will choose the option of
allowing any abductive explanation if C is already known.
The phrase 'there is reason to suspect that A is true' requires some careful
consideration. Clearly, Peirce couldn't have used the phrase 'A is true' instead, since some
of the possible abductive explanations of C will probably be false. However, there seems
to be a mixture of syntactic and semantic issues here. Consider, as an illustration, the




This scheme can be paraphrased in several ways. One possibility is
If A is true,
and 'if A then B' is true,
then B is true.
However, the validity of modus ponens does not depend on the truth of any of the
propositions involved - the following argument is still deductively valid:
If the moon is made of green cheese,
and, if the moon is made of green cheese then 2+2=4
then 2+2=4.
although the first premise is false.
This illustrates that a scheme like modus ponens should be construed so as to describe
the beliefs held by a particular deductive reasoner X:
If X holds A,
and X holds A~B,
then X holds B.
23The conclusion sign :. separates the premises from the conclusion.
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Whether the beliefs held by X are actually true is a completely different issue. Tarskian
semantics proves that if we start from true propositions, modus ponens will never derive a
false proposition, but it is clear that this cannot hold for any abductive scheme. I thus
propose to paraphrase Peirce's scheme in terms of an abductive reasoner Y:
If Y observes C,
and 'if A were true, C would be a matter of course',
then Y conjectures A.
I write 'Y conjectures A' rather than 'Y holds A' in order to indicate that Y will not be
inclined to adopt each and every one of the abductive explanations she conceives as
possible.
It remains to decide upon the interpretation of the second premise of this scheme. Let
us try 'Y holds A--tC' first. Now, if Yobserves C, it seems likely that Y will believe
that C is true - but then, by definition of material implication, Y necessarily believes
that A --t C is true for any A, implying that Y is ready to conjecture any proposition
whatsoever. A more appropriate interpretation is that A should logically entail C rather
than materially, i.e. FA--tC24. We thus arrive at the following paraphrase:
If Yobserves C,
and FA--tC,
then Y conjectures A.
For convenience we will abbreviate 'if Yobserves C, then Y conjectures A' to 'Y holds
that C is abductively explained by A'; usually the reference to the abductive reasoner Y
will be omitted, leading to the final scheme:
If FA--tC,
then Cis abductively explained by A.
Note that Peirce presented his scheme as a definition of the logical form of abduction,
i.e. C is abductively explained by A if, and only if, A logically entails C. In this thesis I
will also consider more liberal forms of abduction, such that the above scheme represents
an adequacy condition which is to be satisfied (in one direction only) by any form of
abduction, rather than a logical equivalence.
Adequacy conditions for abduction
Having thus clarified Peirce's proposed definition of the relation 'is abductively explained
by', we can investigate which of the adequacy conditions considered by Hempel it
satisfies. These conditions are reproduced below, with phrases like 'confirms' replaced by
'is explained by'. The conditions are renumbered (Pl-5); (Pl ) denotes that this condition
is invalid for Peirce's definition.
241.e. A materially implies C in every possible interpretation; this condition may be
considered too strong, but note that it will be treated in the sequel as a sufficient rather than a
necessary condition.
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(pt) Entailment condition: any sentence which is entailed by an
observation report explains it.
(Pl.l) Any observation report explains itself.
(Jq) Consequence condition: if an observation report is explained by
every one of a class K of sentences, then it is also explained by any
sentence which is a logical consequence of K.
(n:-t) Special consequence condition: if an observation report is
explained by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by
every consequence of H.
(P2.2) Equivalence condition: if an observation report is explained
by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by every
hypothesis which is logically equivalent with H.
(P2.3) Conjunction condition: if an observation report is explained
by each of two hypotheses, then it is also explained by their
conjunction.
(P3) Consistency condition: every logically consistent observation report
is logically compatible with the class of all the hypotheses by
which it is explained.
(P3-:-t) Unless an observation report is self-contradictory, it is not
explained by any hypothesis with which it is not logically
compatible.
(P:r.2) Unless an observation report is self-contradictory, it is not
explained by any hypotheses which contradict each other.
(P4) Equivalence condition for observations: if an observation report B is
explained by a hypothesis H, then any observation report logically
equivalent with B is also explained by H.
(P5) Converse consequence condition: if an observation report is
explained by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by every
formula logically entailing H.
The entailment condition (PI) is clearly invalid - entailment is not a special case of
'is explained by'. However, (PU) is valid, and we will see shortly that it can be used to
derive a replacement for the entailment condition. Clearly, the consequence conditions
(P2) and (P2.I) are invalid as well: explanations cannot be arbitrarily weakened.
Equivalence condition (P2.2) remains valid. Conjunction condition (P2.3) is valid only by
virtue of the fact that inconsistent explanations are allowed - which is also the reason
why (P3.1) is invalid. The other consistency conditions (P3) and (P3.2) are clearly
invalid. The equivalence condition for observations (P4) is trivially valid.
Finally, and most interestingly, the converse consequence condition (P5) is valid: a
given explanation can be arbitrarily strengthened. Furthermore, since every observation
report is explained by itself by (Pl .J), we can use the converse consequence condition to
derive the following:
(PI) Converse entailment condition: an observation report is explained
by every formula logically entailing it.
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In other words: converse entailment is a special case of 'is explained by'; (Pl ) represents
one half of Peirce's definition of abduction. As already indicated, I will consider several
alternative definitions, but each of them satisfies the converse entailment condition (PI)
- with a minor modification, since I will require that any observation report and any
explanation be compatible. Note that this also means that the conjunction condition
(P2.3) becomes invalid, and (P3.l) becomes valid. The exact list of adequacy conditions
for abductive or, as I will caIl it, explanatory reasoning is given at the end of the chapter.
The confirmation paradox
A question we did not yet address is whether these adequacy conditions for 'is explained
by' are mutually compatible. For instance, doesn't the converse consequence condition
(P5) reintroduce the confirmation paradox? This latter question is easily answered: it does
not, since the consequence conditions (P2) have been disabled. The more general question
is left for chapter 7, where a formal analysis demonstrates that they are indeed compatible.
This, then, is the solution I propose to get rid of the confirmation paradox: to make a
clear distinction between the statements 'these observations confirm this hypothesis' and
'these observations are explained by this hypothesis'. The fundamental difference between
the property of being a confirmed hypothesis, and the property of being an explanatory
hypothesis, is that the former property is passed on to logical consequences, as expressed
by the consequence condition, and the latter is passed on to logically stronger
explanations, as expressed by the converse consequence condition. If the consequence
condition seems intuitively valid, it is because we think of confirmed hypotheses; if the
converse consequence conditions seems intuitively valid, it is because we think of
explanatory hypotheses. The 'confirmation paradox' is not a paradox at all, but
demonstrates rather convincingly that 'confirms' and 'is explained by' are quite different
relations.
This being said, it may seem natural to study the combination of these two relations
- that is, to investigate a formalisation of the statement 'these observations confirm and
are explained by this hypothesis'. Since this statement is a simple conjunction of the two
statements previously mentioned, the resulting binary relation is the intersection of the
relations 'confirms' and 'is explained by'. This approach would avoid paradoxes such as
the confirmation paradox, since the two concepts of confirmation and explanation are not
confused, but clearly separated before they are combined. However, I believe that the
compound concept can only be successfully studied after a sufficient understanding of its
parts has been obtained. It is this understanding that is primarily pursued in this thesis.
Furthermore, and more importantly, inductive reasoning can also be successfully
applied to infer hypotheses that do not have explanatory power, but exhibit certain
regularities implicit in the observations. That is, the goal for which inductive hypotheses
are sought influences the logical relation between evidence and hypothesis. Therefore, I
think that it makes sense to speak about two genuinely distinct forms of inductive
reasoning: the 'Peircean' form of induction, which I will call explanatory induction, and
which is aimed at finding explanations of the observations; and the 'Hernpelian' form,
which I will call confirmatory induction, the primary aim of which is to find other
generalisations, with no or limited explanatory power. In order to stress the fact that I am
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mostly concerned with the first step of inductive hypothesis formation, I will usually
speak of explanatory and confirmatory reasoning rather than induction. I will use the term
conjectural reasoning whenever the question whether it is explanatory or confirmatory is
immaterial.
The satisfaction criterion of confirmation
I will now demonstrate that Hempel's ideas, which led him to the formulation of the
satisfaction criterion of confirmation, can also be used to derive a slightly different but
very similar criterion, which seems to be more faithful both to his original ideas and to
the notion of a satisfaction criterion.
Consider Hempel's original example, cited above: the observations
Raven(a)ABlack(a) 1\ -oRaven(c)ABlack(c) 1\ -oRaven(d)I\-.Black(d)
confirm the hypothesis Vx: Ravenrxj-e Blacktx), since the latter is true as far as the
objects a, c and d are concerned. Hempel formalises this by reconstructing what the
hypothesis has to say about each of these objects. Alternatively, we can reconstruct what
the observations have to say if a, c and d are the only (relevant) objects. This can be
effected by switching from a formula expressing the observations to a designated
interpretation. Basically, there is only one interpretation over the domain {a, c, d}
satisfying the observations. We can then say that any formula that is satisfied by this
designated interpretation is confirmed by the observations.
This raises a number of issues. What if the knowledge that d is not a raven is missing
from the observations? Clearly, in that case there are two interpretations over the domain
{a, c, d} satisfying the observations, one in which d is a raven, and one in which d is not.
Should we require a confirmed hypothesis to be satisfied by both interpretations? If so, the
above hypothesis is not confirmed. Alternatively, we could require that a confirmed
hypothesis be satisfied by at least one of these interpretations, or we could select one of
them as the designated interpretation (for instance by stipulating that if d is not known to
be a raven, it is expected not to be).
Another problem arises if the hypothesis talks about objects not present in the
observations. Recall that, according to Hempel's criterion, the observations P(a)I\P(b)
confirm Vx: P(x)vQ(x), but also (Vx: P(x)vQ(x» 1\ (P(c)vQ(c» and hence P(c)vQ(c).
Should we map c to one of the observed objects a and b? Should we say that, since it is
not known whether c is a P or a Q, it is expected to be neither? Or should we restrict
attention to hypotheses that talk only about objects present in the observations?
Clearly, the current proposal falls short of being a precise definition, but an
improvement will have to wait until chapter 7. What I want to demonstrate here is that
there is, at least intuitively, quite a close connection between Hempel's criterion of
confirmation and so-called designated or preferred model semantics. In fact, I think that
defining confirmation in terms of a designated model or models reflects more closely the
intuitions about confirmation, including the intuitions given by Hempel.
I should add that the idea of applying preferred model semantics to formalise inductive
hypothesis formation is not new. As will be described in chapter 3, similar ideas have
been proposed by (Helft, 1989) and (De Raedt, 1993). These authors did not formulate
their work in terms of the concept of a confirmed hypothesis, however.
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Degree of confirmation and its relation to the qualitative concept
There is one remaining issue we need to discuss here, which is the supposed quantitative
nature of confirmation. Indeed, it seems very natural to ask, when a body of evidence is
said to confirm a hypothesis, to which degree this is so. In this section I intend to address
this issue by spending a few words on the work of Rudolf Carnap, who has proposed a
rather elaborated system of what he calls 'inductive logic'.
Before investigating his proposal, I should like to remark that Carnap's writings are
classic cases of the scientific precision advocated by the Wiener Kreis. Consider, as a case
in point, his notion of explication:
'The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less
inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the
second. We call the given concept (or the term used for it) the
explicandum, and the exact concept proposed to take the place of the first
(or the term proposed for it) the explicatum. The explicandum may
belong to everyday language or to a previous stage in the development of
scientific language. The explicatum must be given by explicit rules for its
use, for example, by a definition which incorporates it into a well-
constructed system of scientific either logicomathematical or empirical
concepts.' (Carnap, 1950, p.3)
Carnap then proceeds by stating the requirements for an explicatum: similarity to the
explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity. The reason that I chose this citation
is that it nicely characterises what I have set out to do in this thesis: explicating the
logical aspects of inductive reasoning.
In his Logical Foundations of Probability (1950) Carnap develops a system of
inductive logic based on a quantitative notion of degree of confirmation or c-function,
which is a function c(H,£) assigning a number between 0 and 1 to a hypothesis H on the
basis of evidence E. Such c-functions should be regular, in the sense that they obey some
general adequacy conditions for probability measures. As has been remarked in §4, such a
degree of confirmation is not a statistical fact about the world in terms of relative
frequency - in fact, according to Carnap it should be interpreted as an 'estimate of the
relative frequency' (§41D, p.168). Carnap formulates his conception of an inductive logic
as follows:
'What we call inductive logic is often called the theory of non demonstrative
or nondeductive inference. Since we use the term 'inductive' in the wide
sense of 'nondeductive' , we might call it the theory of inductive inference ...
However, it should be noticed that the term 'inference' must here, in
inductive logic, not be understood in the same sense as in deductive logic.
Deductive and inductive logic are analogous in one respect: both investigate
logical relations between sentences; the first studies the relation of
[entailment], the second that of degree of confirmation which may be
regarded as a numerical measure for a partial [entailment] ... The term
'inference' in its customary use implies a transition from given sentences
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to new sentences or an acquisition of a new sentence on the basis of
sentences already possessed. However, only deductive inference is inference
in this sense.' (§44B, pp.205-6)
Thus, in Carnap's view an inductive logic is based on a notion of 'partial' entailment,
expressing how well a conclusion is confirmed by the premisses: the higher the degree of
confirmation, the more plausible the conclusion becomes.
I should like to stress that I disagree with Carnap in two, quite crucial respects. First
of all, in this thesis I do not interpret inductive as 'nondeductive' - on the contrary, the
main motivation for my research has always been that induction should (and can) be
defined in its own right, and not negatively in terms of something else. Secondly, I
disagree with Carnap on the conception of a logic. As will be elaborated in chapter 5,
what Carnap calls 'inductive logic' is in fact a semantics for estimating the plausibility of
a formula given the truth of others. Although certainly useful, such a semantics does not
induce a notion of proof (as noted by Carnap). However, there exists an alternative notion
of semantics which does have a natural proof-theoretical counterpart, and which I call
preservation semantics. It is the combination of preservation semantics, proof procedure,
and metatheory which I will call a logical system.
What should interest us, however, is what Carnap has to say about the qualitative
concept of confirmation and the work of Hempel. Carnap notes in §86 that a qualitative
relation of confirmation can be defined by c(H,E»c(H,true)25. It should be noted that
until this point no particular c-function has been fixed26; this translation merely serves to
transform the adequacy conditions for regular c-functions into adequacy conditions for
qualitative confirmation and vice versa. Carnap critically examines Hempel's adequacy
conditions, and finds that quite a few of them don't correspond to the regularity of c-
functions. While Carnap accepts the equivalence conditions (H2.2) and (H4), as well as (a
qualified form of) the entailment condition (HI), the remaining conditions are invalidated
by certain regular c-functions. Specifically, Carnap rejects both the consequence condition
and the converse consequence condition, and remarks about the consistency condition (H3)
that 'it seems to me not even plausible' (§87, p.476), which seems to be mainly caused
by the perceived implausibility of the derived condition (H3.2). On the other hand, (H3.l),
which basically states that evidence and hypothesis are compatible, is accepted.
Finally, Carnap considers Hempel's definition of confirmation. It is clear from the
foregoing discussion of the adequacy conditions, some of which are rejected by Carnap,
that this definition cannot be unconditionally accepted by Carnap either. In an interesting
analysis, he shows that Hempel's definition is overly restrictive in the following sense: it
'holds only in the special case where the evidence ascribes to all individuals essentially
occurring in it the property in question' (§88, pA8I). The reason that this is considered
overly restrictive is that, in Carnap's view, the main function of a qualitative notion of
confirmation is that it reflects the qualitative aspects of a quantitative measure:
251n fact, Camap also takes background knowledge B into account by requiring that
C(H,BAE»c(H,B); however, in order to retain the parallel with Hempel's work B is set
to true.
26The degree of confirmation suggested by Camap is, in modem terminology, the
fraction of Herbrand models of E in which H is also true (§ 110).
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'Some years ago those who worked on these problems expected that, if and
when a definition of degree of confirmation were to be constructed, it would
be based on a definition of a nonquantitative concept of confirming
evidence. However, today it is seen that this is not the case either for de [a
quantitative concept put forward by Hempel] nor for my definition of c*,
and it is not regarded as probable that it will be the case for other
definitions which will be proposed. It appears at present more promising to
proceed in the opposite direction, that is, to define a quantitative form of
the concept of confmning evidence on the basis of an explicatum for degree
of confirmation ...' (§88, p.48t)
In summary, the observed discrepancies between Carnap's desiderata for a quantitative
measure of confirmation and Hempel's desiderata of a qualitative relation of confirmation
lead Carnap to the conclusion that the latter notion, as perceived by Hempel, is inadequate
to model the qualitative aspects of the former notion, as perceived by Carnap. This
conclusion seems correct to me - but then, why should we want to develop an
independent qualitative notion if it can be derived from the quantitative measure? This
point is noted by Carnap as well:
'The task of finding an adequate explicatum for the classificatory concept of
confirmation defined in purely classificatory, that is, nonquantitative terms
is certainly an interesting problem; but it is chiefly of importance for those
who do not believe that an adequate explicatum for the quantitative concept
of confirmation can be found.' (§86, p.467)
Thus, Carnap considers the qualitative concept of confirmation as a rather poor, and in fact
superfluous, surrogate for the real thing: a quantitative concept.
However, in my view the two concepts are conceived for quite different reasons, and
the relation between them is less transparent than Carnap seems to think. I will not have
space to defend this here - in a way, this whole thesis serves as an illustration of this
point. To reiterate some remarks I made earlier: it will be shown in chapter 7 that the
qualitative concept of confirmation does give rise to a full-fledged logical system,
including a proof procedure, while the quantitative concept does not do so, even if we
would only derive conclusions that are maximally confirmed by the evidence. In the words
of Popper:
'Those who identify confirmation with probability must believe that a high
degree of probability is desirable. They implicitly accept the rule: 'Always
choose the most probable hypothesis!' Now it can be easily shown that
this rule is equivalent to the following rule: 'Always choose the hypothesis
which goes as little beyond the evidence as possible!'
(Popper, 1963, pp.289-90)
In fact, Carnap has recognised this problem, but dissolves it by stating that inductive
logic has a different goal:
'Inductive logic alone does not and cannot determine the best hypothesis on
a given evidence ... This preference is determined by factors of many
different kinds ...' (§46, p.221)
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What I want to argue here is that Carnap's conception of an 'inductive logic' is actually a
procedure which, given some logical system, can be used to estimate the plausibility of
the formulas derived by that logical system-". That is, such a truth-estimating procedure
is subordinate to, and only useful in conjunction with, some other logical system (see
chapter 5 for a further discussion of this subject). In this thesis my primary interest lies
with such a logical system for induction, and not with a truth-estimating procedure which
takes the hypothesis as an input.
§8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have outlined the main philosophical aspects of induction relevant for the
subject of this thesis. I have put special emphasis on the work of Peirce and Hempel,
which I will take as a starting point for my subsequent investigations. From Peirce I
borrow the idea of taking explanation as the central notion of inductive hypothesis
formation. From Hempel I borrow the idea of taking confirmation as an alternative
notion. Furthermore, I will use and formalise Hempel's tool of adequacy conditions.
However, unlike Hempel and Carnap, I consider it necessary to develop several,
alternative sets of adequacy conditions or systems, each of them designed to formalise a
distinguished kind of induction. I will distinguish two main families of systems, one
formalising explanatory induction, the other formalising confirmatory induction. This
distinction is justified by the idea that any formal theory of induction should take into
account the purpose which the inductive conclusion is intended to fulfil. In explanatory
induction this purpose is explaining the observations, while in confirmatory induction the
purpose is to find non-explanatory but confirmed theories expressing regularities implicit
in the observations.
This distinction also provides a solution to the confirmation paradox, which results
from combining the consequence condition and its converse. I have argued that, while the
consequence condition formalises an intuition about confirmatory reasoning, the converse
consequence condition belongs to the realm of explanatory reasoning. We thus obtain two
sets of adequacy conditions: (C 1-4) for confirmatory reasoning, and (E 1-4) for
explanatory reasoning.
(CI) Entailment condition: any sentence which is entailed by a consistent
observation report is confirmed by it.
(Cl.I) Any consistent observation report is confirmed by itself.
(C2) Consequence condition: if an observation report confirms every one
of a set K of sentences, then it also confirms any sentence which is
a logical consequence of K.
(C2.1) Special consequence condition: if an observation report
confirms a hypothesis H, then it also confirms every
consequence of H.
27Camap's work is closely related with so-caUed Bayesian methods for dealing with
uncertainty in a numerical way (Pearl, 1987).
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(C2.2) Equivalence condition: if an observation report confirms a
hypothesis H, then it also confirms every hypothesis which
is logically equivalent with H.
(C2.3) Conjunction condition: if an observation report confirms
each of two hypotheses, then it also confirms their
conjunction.
(C3) Consistency condition: every consistent observation report is
compatible with the set of all the hypotheses which it confirms.
(C3.1) Special consistency condition: an observation report is
compatible with any hypothesis which it confirms.
(C3.2) An observation report does not confirm any hypotheses
which contradict each other.
(C4) Equivalence condition for observations: if an observation report B
confirms a hypothesis H, then any observation report logically
equivalent with B also confirms H.
Insofar there are differences with Hempel's conditions, these are caused by the fact that
Hempel allows contradictory observation reports (which confirm any hypothesis), while I
don't.
The adequacy conditions for abductive or, as I will call it in this thesis, explanatory
reasoning are as follows.
(EI) Converse entailment condition: an observation report is explained
by every consistent hypothesis entailing it.
(E 1.1) Any consistent observation report explains itself.
(E2) Converse consequence condition: if an observation report is
explained by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by every
consistent formula entailing H.
(E2.1) Equivalence condition: if an observation report is explained
by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by every
hypothesis which is logically equivalent with H.
(E3) Special consistency condition: an observation report is compatible
with every hypothesis by which it is explained.
(E4) Equivalence condition for observations: if an observation report B is
explained by a hypothesis H, then any observation report logically
equivalent with B is also explained by H.
Notice that the converse consequence condition (E2) is not valid for a set K of hypotheses,
in the manner of the consequence condition (C2): most likely, alternative explanatory
hypotheses will be incompatible.
I have also raised some points that merely serve as a preview of claims made further
on in this thesis. I have suggested that an alternative formalisation of Hempel's
satisfaction criterion of confirmation can be based on the notion of a designated or
preferred model semantics, as will be elaborated in chapter 7. Furthermore, I have argued
§8. Summary and conclusions
that a relation of confirmation is more than just a qualitative plaster cast of a function
assigning degrees of confirmation, since the former, unlike the latter, gives way to a full-
fledged logical system. This raises the question as to what constitutes a logical system, a







- in which it is demonstrated how problems from machine
learning can be reformulated as problems of explanatory and
confirmatory induction -
INTHIS CHAPTER I will review and discuss some of the approaches to computationalinduction that can be found in the machine learning and knowledge representation
literature. Broadly speaking, each of these approaches falls in one of two categories: the
induction of logic programs (roughly corresponding to explanatory induction), and the
induction of integrity constraints that are not primarily intended to explain the
classification of the supplied examples. Many aspects of these approaches also occur in
the context of the conceptually simpler problem of learning concepts from examples.
I will start with a discussion of the latter problem, and indicate how it can be
reformulated in logical terms. In this way it becomes clear that concept learning can be
viewed as a special case of induction of logic programs, which is discussed next. After
that I turn to the problem of inducing non-classificatory logical theories. The chapter is
ended with a discussion of the relations between these two forms of computational
induction and the two forms of reasoning introduced in the previous chapter.
§9. CONCEPTLEARNINGFROM EXAMPLES
Traditionally, the problem of concept learning from examples has occupied a central
position among computational approaches to induction. Informally, a concept is a
description of a certain set of objects or instances, and an example is a description of an
instance together with a classification (positive if the instance belongs to the concept,
negative if it does not). Concept learning from examples is the problem of inferring an
unknown concept from given positive and negative examples. This inference is inductive,
since it proceeds from specific facts about a concept to a general definition of the concept.
The Version Space model
Various formalisations of the problem of learning concepts from examples exist. The
following formalisation was proposed by Mitchell (1982, p.204)28:
28For the purposes of the present discussion, Mitchell's terminology has been adapted
(Mitchell used generalization for concept, training instance for example, and matching for
covering).
3. Approaches to computational induction
Concept learning from examples.
A language in which to describe instances.
A language in which to describe concepts.
A covering predicate that matches concepts to instances.
A set of positive and negative examples of a target concept to
be learned.
Concepts within the provided language that are consistent with
the presented examples (i.e., plausible descriptions of the target
concept).
A concept is considered to be consistent with a set of examples if and only if it covers
every positively classified instance and no negatively classified instance.
This problem can be reformulated in set-theoretical terms as follows. If the set of
instances of a concept is called the extension of that concept, then a concept is consistent
with a set of examples if the extension of the concept is a superset of the set of positively
classified instances, while its intersection with the set of negatively classified instances is
empty. Furthermore, concepts can be ordered by their extensions (Mitchell, 1982, p.206):
a concept C1 is said to be (extensionally) more specific than another concept C2 if the
extension of C I is a proper subset of the extension of C 2; we also say that C 2 is
(extensionally) more general than C1. Clearly this relation is transitive - we usually
refer to the reflexive (i.e. non-proper) version of this relation as the (extensional)
generality ordering, and say that C1 is as specific as C2 (or C2 is as general as C1). Note
that the generality ordering is not, in general, antisymrnetric, since different concepts may
be extensionally equal (e.g., the concept 'square circle', and the concept 'unicorn').
However, it can be turned into a partial order by considering equivalence sets of
extensionally equivalent concepts.
In fact, most of the regularities exhibited by concept extensions do not carry over to
the set of concepts. For instance, the powerset of the set of instances forms a Boolean
algebra, which means that there are well-defined operations to construct the smallest set of
instances that contains two given sets of instances, and the largest set of instances that is
contained in two given sets of instances (i.e., set-union and set-intersection). However,
the corresponding operations on concepts (i.e. least general generalisation (LGG) and most
general specialisation (MGS» are usually not uniquely defined, which is a consequence of
the circumstance that not every instance set is the extension of a concept, and that not
every expression of the concept language has an extension. Thus, the complexity of
concept learning is, to a large extent, determined by the languages involved.
Depending on the concept language LC, it mayor may not be possible to define a
relation 2=~ LCxLC of intensional generality or subsumption, which coincides with the
extensional generality ordering. If C I 2=C2 implies that C I is as general as C2, the
subsumption ordering may be called sound; if C1 2=C2 whenever C1 is as general as C2,







LEMMA 3.1. If the subsumption ordering ~ is sound, then the set of all
concepts consistent with a given set of examples is convex wrt. ~.
Proof We have to prove that if C1 and C2 are consistent concepts with
CI2=CZ, then so is any C such that CI2=QC2.
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By the soundness of ~, C 1~C implies that if C 1 does not cover any
negatively classified instance, neither does C. Likewise, QC2 implies that
if C2 covers every positively classified instance, so does C. We conclude
that C is consistent. •
Mitchell calls the set of all concepts that are consistent with the examples the Version
Space, 'because it contains all plausible versions of the emerging concept' (Mitchell,
1982, p.212). He notes that the convexity of the Version Space allows for a compact
representation in terms of the following two sets:
S = {Ce LC I C is a concept that is consistent with the examples, and there
is no concept which is both more specific than C and
consistent with the examples}
G = {Ce LC I C is a concept that is consistent with the examples, and there
is no concept which is both more general than C and
consistent with the examples}
The sets Sand G contain the most specific and most general concepts consistent with the
examples. A concept C is consistent with the examples if and only if it subsumes some
member of S, and is subsumed by some member of G (fig. 3.1).
I will refer to the view of a hypothesis space as a partially ordered convex set with
lower and upper bounds as the Version Space model. Every computational approach to
induction exploits, in one way or the other, the subsumption ordering when searching the
space of possible hypotheses. The Version Space model is therefore an important
conceptual tool for describing such approaches.
Figure 3.1. The Version Space model. S and G are the lower and upper
boundaries of the set of concepts consistent with given examples: every
consistent concept C subsumes at least one member of S, and subsumed by
at least one member of G (the arrows point from the subsuming concept to
the subsumed concept). The grey areas contain the inconsistent concepts.
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Attribute-value languages
In his general definition of the concept learning problem, Mitchell distinguished between
an instance language and a concept language. Indeed, the distinction between expressions
describing instances and expressions describing sets of instances seems a crucial one, an
observation which would suggest the use of a predicate-logical language. However, many
approaches to concept learning employ in fact the same language for describing instances
and concepts, a strategy that has been referred to as the Single Representation Trick
(Dietterich et al., 1982). This is, logically speaking, a non-obvious step that deserves
some further attention.
The most frequently employed languages in computational approaches to concept
learning belong to the class of attribute-value languages. These are propositional
languages in which propositions are attribute-value pairs. Each attribute, such as colour,
has a designated set of possible values, e.g. {red, yellow, blue}. Attribute-value pairs may
be combined into expressions by means of the usual logical connectives, leading to
expressions like
colour=red A (shape=square v shape=triangle) (I)
Descriptions of instances may be restricted to conjunctions of attribute-value pairs, but
this restriction is not essential.
What is important here is that the covering relation, which tests whether a concept
covers an instance, is now equivalent to the subsumption relation, which tests whether a
concept is more general than another concept. For instance, expression (1) subsumes the
following expression
colour=red A shape=square A size=srnall (2)
If expression (2) describes an instance, we may conclude that this instance belongs to the
concept described by (1). Alternatively, if (2) describes a concept, then this concept is
more specific than the concept described by (1).
We may furthermore note that if attribute-value pairs are considered as propositions
that may take on a truth value, every truth-assignment satisfying formula (2) also satisfies
formula (1) - in other words, (2) logically entails (1). More generally, subsumption in
attribute-value languages can be seen as a special case of logical entailment in
propositional logic. It should be noted, however, that in some cases additional background
knowledge is needed. For instance, consider the following expression:
colour=red A ~(shape=round v size=big) (3)
Intuitively, the concept described by (3) subsumes the concept described by (2). However,
(2) only logically entails (3) if we know that s hap e=s qua.re-e-e (shape=round)
and si z e=sma LLe-e-« (size=big) are logically valid (true in every interpretation).
Axioms to this effect should be included for all attributes, and for all pairs of values.j?
29By employing a higher-order logic, one could take care of all attributes at once - see
(Flach, 1992a).
§9. Concept learning from examples
What has been demonstrated here is that, even if concept learning from examples
proceeds from instances to sets of instances, it can be formalised by employing a simple
propositional language that fails to recognise the difference. However, it should be made
clear that something is lost along the way. For instance, consider a situation in which
some of the examples are incomplete: the values of some attributes are left unspecified. It
may happen that one of the missing attributes is crucial for explaining the classification
of those instances - in fact, it is possible that two instances receive the same incomplete
description, while one is classified positively and the other negatively! Clearly, in the
above setting this would immediately result in logical inconsistency, because the two
instances are described by syntactically equal expressions. Such inconsistencies can be
avoided by employing a predicate-logical language, since such a language allows us to
mention the instance explicitly.
Concept learning in predicate logic
In predicate logic instances are denoted by constants, and sets of instances are denoted by
free variables. Following this observation, the concept denoted by attribute-value
expression (l) could be represented in predicate logic as
colour-red (X) 1\ (shape-square (X) v shape-triangle (X)) (4)
where colour-red, shape-square and shape-triangle are unary predicates. In
general, a formula can have any number of free variables, describing concepts whose
extensions contain tuples of instances - another advantage offered by predicate logic over
propositional logic. The idea of representing concepts by open formulas can be traced back
to Gottlob Frege (1893), and is extensively discussed in (Console & Saitta, 1994).
An instance, like the one expressed by attribute-value expression (2), could be
represented by a variable-free formula, thereby naming the instance:
colour-redia) 1\ shape-square (a) 1\ size-small (a) (5)
Instance a can be shown to belong to the concept defined by (4) by substituting a for X,
and showing that the resulting formula is logically implied by (5). Similarly, one concept
can be shown to subsume another by substituting an arbitrary constant for the variable in
both formulas, and to show that the latter logically entails the former.
The expressiveness of predicate logic can be further exploited by including a designated
predicate expressing the classification of instances. For instance, the following formula
expresses that b is a positive example of the concept 'pretty things':
colour-red (b) 1\ size-small (b) ~ pretty(b) (6)
The following formula gives a definition of that concept:
\IX: (colour-red(X) v colour-blue (X)) H pretty(X) (7)
This definition is consistent with positive example (6), since the latter is logically
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entailed by the former, or equivalently, the consequent of implication (6) is logically
entailed by its antecedent combined with (7).
Another definition that is consistent with example (6) is the following:
~X: colour-red{X) ~ pretty{X) (8)
Clearly, the concept defined by (8) is more specific than the one defined by (7) -
however, neither of them logically entails the other. The usual solution to this problem is
to replace the equivalences ~ with implications ~, expressing sufficient conditions for
concept membership:
~X: (colour-red{X) v colour-blue (X)) ~ pretty{X) (7')
~X: colour-red{X) ~ pretty{X) (8')
It is now obvious that (7') logically entails (8'), hence the former defines a more general
concept than the latter.30 Representing a concept definition by sufficient conditions only
means that a negative classification follows from a failure to prove a positive
classification, similar to negation as failure in logic programming. Alternatively, one
could add explicit necessary conditions - if these are different from the sufficient
conditions, one would effectively obtained a three-valued concept.
I have indicated several ways in which the problem of concept learning from examples
can be reformulated in predicate logic. One possibility is to represent concepts by open
formulas with free variables. An alternative to this 'open formula' approach is to represent
sufficient and necessary conditions by closed formulas, by introducing a designated
predicate naming the concept to be learned. This 'closed formula' approach has the distinct
advantage that a more general concept corresponds to a logically stronger formula, which
is intuitively more appealing.
As for the examples, in the open formula approach these are represented by variable-
free descriptions, while in the closed formula approach there are again two alternatives.
Consider formula (6) above, which describes an instance b as belonging to the concept
pret ty. One alternative is to consider the complete implication as the example, which
should be entailed by the concept definition (the 'examples as implications' approach).
Another option is to split the implication in two parts, the description of the object (here:
colour-red (b) Asize-small (b), and its classification (here: pretty (b), and
to consider only the latter as constituting the example, while the former is part of the
background knowledge. This 'examples as classifications' approach has the additional
advantage that instances need not be described by variable-free formulas only: their
properties could be deduced from a general background theory.
Combining the 'closed formula' and 'examples as classifications' approaches, we
obtain the following predicate logical paraphrase of the concept learning problem:
30Under this representation, reasoning from specific to genera] corresponds to reasoning
from logically weaker to logically stronger, which seems very natural. However, notice that
this is at variance with the attribute-value and open formula representations of concepts, where
the more specific concept entails the more general one. This has been a source of much
confusion and debate - see e.g. (Niblett, 1988; Flach, 1992b; Console & Saitta, 1994).





Concept learning from examples in predicate logic.
A predicate-logical language.
A predicate representing the target concept.
A set of ground positive and negative literals of this predicate,
representing the positive and negative examples.
(4) A background theory from which descriptions of instances can
be deduced.
Concepts within the provided language that are consistent with
the presented examples.
Determine:
A concept is consistent with the examples if, together with the background theory, it
entails every positive example, without misclassifying any of the negative examples.
This presupposes that concepts are represented as sufficient conditions only, which is
usually the case.
Note that such a sufficient condition corresponds to a definite clause in logic
programming, and a concept definition corresponds to a definite program. Thus, the above
problem statement is general enough so as to cover the problem of inferring a logic
program from examples. The latter problem constitutes a considerably more difficult
induction task, since in general both background theory and target program may be
recursive. Furthermore, if function symbols are involved, the universe of instances is
infinite.
§lO. INDUCTION OF LOGIC PROGRAMS
I should like to stress that representing an inductive hypothesis as a logic program, i.e. a
set of definite or normal clauses, does not necessarily imply that the inductive hypothesis
is meant to be used as a computer program. For instance, a medical doctor might be
interested in a definition of the concept 'symptoms indicating a rheumatoid disease'
without intending to execute it as a Prolog program. The choice for logic programs as
description formalism is a matter of representation rather than pragmatics. On the other
hand, the synthesis of Prolog programs is one possible application of what has come to
be called inductive logic programming (Lavrac & Dzeroski, 1984).
If a concept is represented by a logic program consisting of clauses with the target
predicate in the head, its extension is represented by the minimal Herbrand model of the
program plus the background theory, restricted to the ground atoms of the target predicate.
In other words, the extension of such a predicate definition consists of the set of ground
instances of the target predicate logically entailed by that definition. It follows that the
extensional generality ordering is a special case of logical entailment between predicate
definitions, relative to the background theory. However. a subsumption relation between
sets of clauses is computationally expensive, and many approaches to induction of logic
programs employ a subsumption relation between single clauses instead.
In the case of non-recursive clauses, there is a very elegant intensional generality
relation exactly matching extensional generality, which is called 8-subsumption. If C1 and
C2 are two clauses, C1 8-subsumes C2 if and only if there exists a substitution that can
be applied to C1, such that every literal in the resulting clause occurs in C2. For instance,
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consider the following two clauses:
e 1ement (X, [YIZ] ) .
element (V, [VIW]) : -list (W).
The first clause states that X is an element of any non-empty list; the second clause states
that the head of the list is an element, provided the tail is a list. The first clause can be
made equal to the head of the second by applying the substitution {x~V,Y-W,z~W};
thus, the first clause 8-subsumes the second. One could say that in the first clause the
head and the tail of the list are more constrained: the head by unifying it with the first
argument, the tail by the literal in the body.
For recursive clauses, however, 8-subsumption is sound but incomplete. For instance,
consider the following two clauses:
list ([X, YIZ]) : -list (Z) .
list( [vIW]) :-list(W).
If P is a predicate definition of list containing the first clause, and P' is obtained from
P by replacing the first clause with the second, it is clear that P' is extensionally more
general than P. However, the first clause is not 8-subsumed by the second.
On the other hand, the intensional generality ordering of 8-subsumption has the
advantage that it behaves more regularly than its extensional counterpart. This is
illustrated by the following two clauses:
list([A,BIC]) :-list(C).
list( [p,Q,RIS]) :-list(S).
Under B-subsumption, there is a unique least general clause subsuming both of these
clauses:
list ([X, YIZ]) : -list (V) .
However, the following clause is also extensionally more general than the first two,
without 8-subsuming them:
list ( [XIY] ) : -list (Y) .
Thus, under B-subsumption the operation of forming a least general generalisation or
LGG is uniquely defined, which is a clear computational advantage. An extensive analysis
of the relation between 8-subsumption and logical implication can be found in (Idestam-
Almquist, 1994).
There are basically two approaches to induction of logic programs from examples, that
can be understood in terms of the Version Space model. The so-called top-down methods
search the generality ordering from the top downwards, constructing a most general
program that is consistent with the examples, gradually specialising the program when
more examples become available. Such methods rely heavily on the availability of
negative examples, in order to prevent overgeneralisation. Bottom-up methods, on the
other hand, construct a most specific program that implies the positive examples. Both
methods will be briefly reviewed below.
§JO. Induction of logic programs
Top-down induction
Shapiro's Model Inference System (MIS) was the first system to infer logic programs
consisting of definite clauses from examples (Shapiro, 1981; 1983). It was mainly
intended for incrementally synthesising Prolog programs. MIS performs a breadth-first
search of the space of possible clauses, ordered by 8-subsumption. I will describe the
operation of MIS by means of an example. Suppose we are learning the e 1 emen t
predicate, then MIS starts with the most general clause element (X, Y). Upon receipt of
the first negative example, this clause is retracted and a list of possible specialisations
(called refinements by Shapiro) is added to the search agenda. Under 8-subsumption, a
clause can be specialised in two ways:
(i) by adding a literal to the clause;
(ii) by applying a substitution to the clause.
One possible specialisation of element (X, Y) is element (X, [V I W] ), obtained by
applying the substitution {Y~ [V I W] }. Somewhere in the search process this clause will
be considered; if it is still too general, it can subsequently be specialised to
element (X, [X] ) by applying the substitution {V~X, W~ [] }. This clause is true in
the intended interpretation, so it will never be refuted by a negative example. However,
this single-clause program will be incomplete with respect to most positive examples
concerning longer lists, so the search for an additional clause continues. Another
specialisation of e 1 emen t (X I [V I W] ) , obtained by adding a literal to the body, is
element (X I [V I W]) : -element (X I W). This clause is also true in the intended
interpretation; together, the two constructed clauses form a correct predicate definition of
element.
The main drawback of the MIS system was its inefficiency, mostly due to the
employment of a breadth-first search strategy. FOIL is a much more efficient top-down
induction algorithm, that operates in function-free definite clause logic, employing a hill-
climbing search using an information-gain heuristic (Quinlan, 1990). Below we will
consider De Raedt's extension of MIS to the problem of inducing integrity constraints.
Bottom-up induction
One approach to bottom-up induction applies operators that invert the deductive inference
rule of resolution, and is called inverse resolution (Muggleton & Buntine, 1988). One
inverse resolution operator constructs a clause which, together with a given clause,
produces a given resolvent. The main problem that has to be solved is to prevent trivial
solutions that can be constructed by inverting propositional resolution with empty
substitutions. To this end, the CIGOL system hypothesises inverse substitutions, which
turn non-variable terms at specific positions into variables.
Due to the soundness of resolution as a deductive inference rule, the hypothesised
clause logically entails the resolvent at the root of the tree, given the other clauses. Since
resolution is refutation-complete, it seems that a full inversion of resolution is capable of
constructing every clause that entails a given resolvent, given a number of other
clauses+'. However, notice that some of these clauses may have to be used several times
3! See (Nienhuys-Cheng & Flach, 1991) for a discussion of the completeness of inverse
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in order to derive the given resolvent. The CIGOL system, on the other hand, constructs
inverse proof trees in which the hypothesised clause occurs only once; it was proved by
Gottlob (1987) that the resulting generality relation is 9-subsumption (relative to the
given clauses) rather than logical entailment. (Muggleton, 1992b) discusses techniques to
invert logical entailment.
The GOLEM system (Muggleton & Feng, 1990) embodies a different approach to
bottom-up induction. Rather than constructing clauses completing an inverse proof tree,
they construct minimal generalisations of pairs of positive examples by means of relative
least general generalisation (RLGG). Briefly, such an RLGG is the LGG under 9-
subsumption of two ground clauses with the positive examples in the head, and literals
from a ground background theory in the body. Syntactical restrictions, such as
determinacy of variables in the body of the hypothesised clause, are applied in order to
restrict the size of candidate clauses. Upon construction of a clause, the positive examples
it covers are removed, and search proceeds in order to cover the remaining examples.
§11. INDUCTION OF INTEGRITY CONSTRAINTS
Both concept learning and induction of logic programs are classification-oriented forms of
induction. Their main goal is to induce a theory that is capable of partitioning a universe
of instances (or tuples of instances) into positive and negative instances. By introducing a
classification predicate, such classification theories naturally correspond to a definite logic
program. However, not every logical theory is intended to perform classification - for
instance, integrity constraints, i.e. indefinite clauses (having more than one positive
literal) and denials (having no positive literal), do not unequivocally define a classification
predicate. In order to induce such non-classificatory logical theories one needs a
perspective that differs from the traditional concept learning setting.
Induction as nonmonotonic inference
Such an alternative perspective was provided by Helft (1989). He noted that 'upon
observing a number of birds and their ability to fly, people might generate the rule that all
birds fly simply as a conclusion of the observations, grounded on their similarities, rather
than as an explanation of the fact that, for example, Tweety flies knowing that it is a bird'
(p.149). Furthermore, Helft observed that
'induction assumes that the similarities between the observed data are
representative of the rules governing them ( ... ). This assumption is like the
one underlying default reasoning in that a priority is given to the
information present in the database. In both cases, some form of "closing-
off' the world is needed. However, there is a difference between these:
loosely speaking, while in default reasoning the assumption is "what you
are not told is false", in similarity-based induction it is "what you are not
told looks like what you are told".' (Helft, 1989, p.149)
resolution operators.
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On the basis of these observations, Helft arrives at the following problem definition:
Induction of generalisations (Helft).
A predicate-logical language.
A set 6. of formulas.
A set of generalisations r within the provided language such
that 6.1= IND F, where I=IND is a certain rule of inference that
embodies the assumptions underlying induction.
Essentially, the solution provided by Helft runs as follows. Given evidence 6. the set of
generalisations r consists of those clauses that are true in every truth-minimal model32 of
6. (the 'strong' generalisations), and those clauses that are true in some truth-minimal
model of 6. (the 'weak' generalisations). Additional requirements guarantee that none of
the clauses in r can be deduced from 6., and that I'contains no clauses tbat can be deduced
from other generalisations in r.
The 'rule of inference' I=IND has a certain resemblance to what I call a conjectural
consequence relation in this thesis. However, when defining this logical relation between
evidence and generalisations Helft is concerned first and foremost with practical issues.
For instance, 6. is restricted to a set of (possibly indefinite) clauses having certain
properties, ensuring that every such 6. has a finite set of finite truth-minimal models.
Furthermore, I' is limited to (possibly indefinite) clauses having a certain 'injectivity'
property, ensuring that there are no infinite descending chains of such clauses under 9-





Discovery of clausal theories
De Raedt has implemented the system CLAUDIEN, which is capable of constructing a
general theory consisting of clauses (including integrity constraints) from a given database
consisting of range-restricted normal clauses+' (De Raedt & Bruynooghe, 1993). Such a
theory is complete in the sense that it entails every clause in the language that is satisfied
by the given database.
Induction of a clausal theory (De Raedt).
A predicate-logical language.
A database D of range-restricted normal clauses.
A theory T within the provided language such that:
(i) Comp(D) 1= T;
(ii) for all formulas fin the language, if Comp(D) 1=fthen TI=f.
In addition, T is required to be minimal (i.e., no clause can be removed from T without
giving up the completeness property).
In this problem setting Comp(D) denotes the predicate completion of D (Clark, 1978),





32These are not necessarily Herbrand models.
33A normal clause is a clause with a single literal in the head, possibly including negated
literals in the body. A range-restricted clause is a clause in which every variable in the head also
occurs in the body.
45
3. Approaches to computational induction
sufficient conditions for the predicates in D. Predicate completion establishes a semantics
for normal logic programs, for which SLDNF resolution (SLD resolution with negation
as failure) provides a sound proof procedure. Typically the completion of a normal
program results in a single model (restricted to the vocabulary of the program); as De
Raedt notes, the completion semantics might be replaced by another semantics for logic
programs selecting a particular model. All such semantics coincide when the given
program is definite, and result in the unique truth-minimal model of the program, which
assigns false to all ground atoms of which the truthvalue is unknown.
The main algorithm of the CLAUDIEN system is very similar to MIS, and operates by
searching the space of possible clauses in a top-down manner, applying refinement
operators to specialise clauses that are violated by the given database.
Induction of attribute dependencies
My own approach to inducing attribute dependencies in databases also falls in the non-
classificatory category. Since it will be fully elaborated in chapter 8, I will only make a
few brief remarks here. Two different kinds of attribute dependencies are distinguished:
functional dependencies, and multi valued dependencies. A functional dependency states that
the value a tuple takes on for a certain attribute is completely determined by the value it
takes on for other attributes. Consequently, if two tuples in a relation satisfying the
functional dependency have identical values for the latter attributes, they also have an
identical value for the determined attribute. The induction problem is to determine the set
of functional dependencies that hold for a given relation.
Induction of functional dependencies.
A relation scheme R.
A set E of tuples over R.
A set H of functional dependencies over R such that:
(i) for all hE H: h is satisfied by E;
(ii) for every functional dependency g satisfied by E: H
logically entails g.
Note that the phrase 'h is satisfied by E' takes on its standard logical meaning: functional
dependencies correspond to definite clauses, and relations correspond to sets of ground
facts, such that a relation satisfies a functional dependency if and only if the corresponding
set of ground facts is a Herbrand model of the corresponding definite clause. Similarly,
logical entailment in condition (ii) denotes entailment between definite clauses.
Multivalued dependencies generalise functional dependencies by stipulating that the
function governing the determined attributes is set-valued. The details need not concern us
here; suffice it to say that the problem statement for induction of multi valued
dependencies is analogous to the one for functional dependencies above. However, the
situation changes if tuples are processed one at a time: in such an incremental setting,
dependencies should possibly be refuted by known examples only, and not by means of
making possibly unwarranted assumptions about unseen instances. This will be further







I will now analyse the computational approaches to induction presented in this chapter
from the point of view of this thesis. In particular, I will categorise these approaches
according to the two forms of induction distinguished in chapter 2: explanatory reasoning
and confirmatory reasoning. After that, I will discuss an important property that can be
used to distinguish some of these approaches: incrementality.
Induction of logic programs as explanatory reasoning
Both concept learning and induction of logic programs aim at formulating a hypothesis
that classifies the examples correctly. We might say that such a hypothesis provides
explanations for the classification of every single example. in the sense that the
classification is obtained by a deductive proof. As a result, the classified instances
themselves become obsolete once a hypothesis has been adopted.
In the case of induction of logic programs, where only sufficient conditions are
induced, a positive classification is obtained by setting up a deductive proof, while a
negative classification results whenever such a proof cannot be constructed (negation as
failure). This means that negative classifications are not really explained: this would
require necessary conditions as well. Rather, the induced hypothesis should be logically
compatible with the negative examples, represented as negated ground literals - for
practical purposes, they can be Simply added to the background theory. This pragmatic
view of negative examples into our logical framework corresponds to the way they are
used in practice: as a means to prevent overgeneralisation, rather than as full-fledged
premisses in a conjectural argument-".
We thus arrive at the following abstract problem statement:
Induction of logic programs from examples.
A predicate-logical language.
A set E of ground positive literals of the target predicate.
A background theory T,defining auxiliary predicates as well as
negative examples (ground negative literals of the target
predicate).
Hypotheses H within the provided language such that:
(i) for all ee E: TuH F e;
(ii) H is compatible with T.
Notice that this problem statement could be easily adapted to learning necessary
conditions by replacing 'positive' with 'negative' and vice versa; likewise, one would
obtain a hypothesis stating both sufficient and necessary conditions by including all






34As argued in (De Raedt & Bruynooghe, 1992). negative examples can be generalised into
constraints with which the hypothesis should be compatible.
47
3. Approaches to computational induction
I will now show that inference from E to H relative to T is a form of explanatory
reasoning, since it obeys the adequacy conditions formulated in chapter 2. These
conditions are reproduced below, with the term 'observation report' replaced with 'set of
examples'.
(EI) Converse entailment condition: a set of examples is explained by
every consistent hypothesis entailing it.
(E2) Converse consequence condition: if a set of examples is explained
by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by every consistent
formula entailing H.
(E3) Special consistency condition: a set of examples is compatible with
every hypothesis by which it is explained.
(E4) Equivalence condition for observations: if a set of examples E is
explained by a hypothesis H, then any set of examples logically
equivalent with E is also explained by H.
The converse entailment condition (EI) states that consistent entailment is a special
case of explanation. For the cases discussed in this chapter this condition can actually be
strengthened to equivalence; I will demonstrate in chapter 7 that the same effect can be
obtained by adding additional conditions. On the other hand, in some cases explanation is
indeed a more comprehensive concept than consistent entailment; this will also be
discussed in chapter 7.
The converse consequence condition (E2) expresses that from a given explanation H,
one might go up along the generality ordering in the Version Space, as long as one does
not go beyond the line established by the G set (recall that consistency is relative to the
background theory including negative examples). It should be noted however that some
forms of explanatory reasoning violate the converse consequence condition, for instance if
explanations are only plausible, rather than deductive, consequences. In such cases, the
Version Space contains 'holes': hypotheses that are in between the Sand G boundaries,
yet do not explain some positive example.
The special consistency condition (E3) basically states that explanations must be
compatible with the negative examples. Finally, condition (E4) expresses that the logical
form of the examples is immaterial; this may seem trivial in the context of clausal logic,
in which formulas are expressed in conjunctive normal form, but note that logical
equivalence should be interpreted relative to the background theory.
We may conclude that induction of logic programs conforms to the adequacy
conditions for explanatory reasoning. Further conditions will be introduced in §24, which
will enable a more detailed categorisation of different approaches to explanatory induction.
Induction of integrity constraints as confirmatory reasoning
Each of Helft's, De Raedt's, and my own problem setting discussed in § 11 is an instance





A hypothesis H within the provided language such that:
(i) H is confirmed by E;
(ii) for all g within the language, confirmed by E: H logically
entails g.
The relation 'H is confirmed by E' is a parameter in this scheme, that can be instantiated
to either 'H is satisfied by the truth-minimal model of E' (Helft, De Raedt) or 'H is a set
of attribute dependencies satisfied by the relation E'. The use of the term confirmation is






(Cl ) Entailment condition: any sentence which is entailed by consistent
evidence is confirmed by it.
(e2) Consequence condition: if the evidence confirms every one of a set
K of sentences, then it also confirms any sentence which is a
logical consequence of K.
(C3) Consistency condition: consistent evidence is compatible with the
set of all the hypotheses which it confirms.
(C4) Equivalence condition for observations: if evidence E confirms a
hypothesis H, then any evidence logically equivalent with E also
confirms H.
The entailment condition (Cl ) states that logical entailment is a special case of
confirmation. This is obviously true for the minimal model setting: if every model of E
is a model of H, certainly the minimal one is, which exists if E is consistent. For the
attribute dependency setting this condition is essentially void, since such a sentence will
be outside the hypothesis language. However, if we generalise this setting to 'the
evidence, being a set of ground facts, forms a model for the hypothesis', then clearly (Cl )
holds for this setting as well.
The consequence condition (C2) states that confirmation is closed under logical
consequence, which is true for each of the three settings. Interestingly, this means that
also here the Version Space model applies, with a trivial S set (the equivalence class of
tautologies). Condition (ii) in the problem statement for confirmatory induction above
then essentially states that we are interested in constructing the G set of this Version
Space. Consistency condition (e3) is obviously valid, since all hypotheses share the same
model with the evidence; the same can be said about (Cd).
We may conclude that each of the three problem settings for induction of non-
classificatory theories can be seen as establishing a form of confirmatory reasoning.
However, there are also difference between these approaches, that hinge upon the question
351 have replaced the term 'observation report' with 'evidence', because in Helft's and De
Raedt's settings the input need not be restricted to ground facts.
49
3. Approaches to computational induction
whether it is allowed to process examples one by one. This question will be addressed
below.
IncrementaL induction
In each of the problem settings discussed previously, hypotheses were constructed on the
basis of a set of examples E. Now suppose a new example e is presented. If the induction
algorithm is able to re-use its previous calculations for E in order to construct one or
more hypotheses for Eu {e}, the algorithm is said to be interactive or incremental. If, on
the other hand, the induction algorithm merely repeats its calculations for the extended set
of examples Eu (e}, the algorithm is said to be empirical or non-incremental.
Mitchell's candidate elimination algorithm, which calculates the Sand G sets
delimiting the Version Space, is a nice example of an incremental algorithm. After receipt
of a new example, the new Sand G sets are calculated from the old sets and the example.
The rationale behind this algorithm is that hypotheses below the S set or above the G set,
that were refuted by some previous example, never become candidate hypotheses again. In
other words: the Version Space is monotonically non-increasing when the set of examples
increases. Notice that this is a necessary condition for the algorithm to converge upon a
unique solution.
Now consider a situation in which only positive examples are available. In order to
prevent overgeneralisation, one might hypothesise that certain instances, that have not
been presented as positive examples, are actually negative examples. This would rule out
those hypotheses that cover the assumed negative examples. However, if examples are
supplied one at a time, it might be the case that an instance that was once considered
negative turns out to be positive. Consequently, some of the hypotheses previously
refuted become candidates again. If this happens, it is clear that the complete Version
Space has to be rebuilt from scratch. The important conclusion must be that an
incremental approach is incompatible with a strategy in which hypotheses are refuted on
the basis of assumed classifications of instances.
However, this is exactly the strategy that is applied in the approaches of Helft and De
Raedt, when they assume that every ground fact that is not known to be true must be
false. Also, in my attribute dependency setting every tuple that is not known to be in the
relation is assumed not to be in it. Does this imply that confirmatory reasoning is
inherently non-incremental? The answer is: no, it does not - confirmatory reasoning can
very well be incremental. For one thing, despite appearances, induction of functional
dependencies can be done incrementally. The reason for this is that the only way to refute
a functional dependency is by demonstrating that two tuples, that have equal values for the
determining attributes but unequal values for the determined attribute, are in the relation.
In other words, functional dependencies are refuted by positive examples only. Since we
only make assumptions about unseen tuples being negative, functional dependencies are
never refuted on the basis of assumptions, but always by hard facts. The set of functional
dependencies satisfied by a relation is monotonically non-increasing when the relation
increases.
For multivalued dependencies the situation is different. As will be explained in chapter
8, a multivalued dependency predicts that, if the relation contains two tuples which have
§12. Discussion
the same values for the determining attributes, a certain third tuple that can be constructed
from those two must also be in the relation. Thus, a multivalued dependency is refuted by
refuting one of its predictions, which requires a negative example, or else an assumption
that any tuple that is not known the be in the relation is out of it. The latter assumption
necessitates a non-incremental strategy. However, incrementality can be restored by not
making any assumption about a tuple being in the relation or not, unless it is explicitly
given by a positive or negative example. This can be formalised by introducing the notion
of a partial relation, which is a pair (E,N) of positive tuples E and negative tuples N. This
leads to the following problem definition.
Incremental induction of multi valued dependencies.
A relation scheme R.
A set E of positive tuples over R.
A set N of negative tuples over R.
A set H of multivalued dependencies over R such that:
(i) for all hE H: h is satisfied by the partial relation (E,N)
(ii) for every multi valued dependency g satisfied by (E,N): H
logically entails g.
What it means for a multi valued dependency to be satisfied by a partial relation will be
explained in chapter 8.
The same idea can be used to obtain an incremental version of Helft's and De Raedt's
approach=, as will be worked out in chapter 7. Rather than demanding that the hypothesis
be satisfied by the truth-minimal model of the evidence, we require in the incremental
setting that the hypothesis not be falsified by the information-minimal partial model of
the evidence. In this model, the truth value of the unseen instances is undefined, preventing
us from making unwarranted assumptions. Hypotheses are only refuted if they explicitly







§13. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have discussed induction from a computational viewpoint. Every
computational approach to induction presupposes a well-defined problem, such as concept
learning from examples, induction of logic programs, induction of non-classificatory
theories, and induction of attribute dependencies. It has been demonstrated that concept
learning can be seen as a special case of induction of logic programs, which in turn is a
prototypical form of explanatory induction, conforming to the four adequacy conditions
(El-4) listed in §8. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that each of the remaining problems
can be seen as an instance of confirmatory induction, aimed at constructing a confirmed
theory entailing all confirmed formulas. This has been similarly achieved by
demonstrating that each of those instances satisfies Hempel's adequacy conditions (Hl-4).
36In a different sense these approaches are incremental: if the evidence is seen as constituting
one or more models of the intended hypotheses, rather than logical statements (De Raedt,
personal communication).
3. Approaches to computational induction
In the course of the discussion I have frequently referred to Mitchell's Version Space
model, which has been developed in the context of concept learning, but has a much
broader conceptual significance. Indeed, in explanatory reasoning the set of possible
hypotheses will be convex relative to logical implication whenever explanation is
identified with deductive entailment. In confirmatory reasoning this set is also convex,
with a fixed upper bound.
Finally, the important notion of incrementality has been discussed. Incrementality is a
property both of an induction algorithm and of a general problem setting. An algorithm is
incremental whenever it processes examples one by one, constructing at each step a
hypothesis that is based on the previous one. Such an algorithm will never reconsider
previously refuted hypotheses, therefore it is important that hypotheses are never refuted
on the basis of assumptions (which may turn out to be wrong) - this may be called
incrementality of the problem setting. Explanatory reasoning is incremental in this sense:
hypotheses are only refuted by known positive or negative examples. The confirmatory
settings of Helft and De Raedt are non-incremental, since every instance not known to be
positive is assumed to be negative. My own, incremental approach to induction of
attribute dependencies in databases suggests a formalisation of incremental confirmatory





- in which the logical tool of a consequence relation is
introduced through the work of Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor-
THE GOAL OF the investigations reported in this thesis is to commence a logicalanalysis of inductive reasoning. We will therefore need to have a good overview of
what logic has to offer regarding the analysis of other forms of reasoning. This chapter is
meant to provide such an overview.
Traditionally, logicians have concentrated on deductive or mathematical reasoning as
their main object of study. It is certainly no exaggeration when I say that, in a not too
distant past, most logicians were of the opinion that logic is necessarily deductive -
and many of them probably still are37. This means on the one hand that the study of
deductive reasoning has provided us with some rather advanced tools; but it also means
that these tools, being tailor-made for analysing deduction, may be not immediately
applicable to other forms of reasoning. I will try to present the logical theory of deductive
reasoning currently in force with an eye for possible adaptations of that theory towards
modelling such alternative forms of reasoning.
Conceivable alternatives include 'approximations' of deductive reasoning, such as
plausible reasoning, as well as forms of reasoning such as induction, which are rather
different from deductive reasoning. The former type of reasoning will be called quasi-
deductive, while the latter will be called a-deductive. Jointly, they will be referred to as
non-deductive reasoning.
The subject of plausible reasoning - or nonmonotonic reasoning, as it is usually
called - started to attract attention from artificial intelligence researchers, and later
logicians, some fifteen years ago. It is the first non-deductive form of reasoning that has
been submitted to a relatively advanced logical analysis. Recently, this analysis has
reached a stage in which it is sufficiently general so as to be applicable, at least in
371n the words of Dov Gabbay: 'some members of the traditional logic community are still
very conservative in the sense that they have not even accepted non-monotonic reasoning
systems as logics yet. They believe that all this excitement is transient, temporarily generated
by computer science and that it will fizzle out sooner or later. They believe that we will soon be
back to the old research problems, such as how many non-isomorphic models does a theory
have in some inaccessible cardinal or what is the ordinal of yet another subsystem of analysis.
I think this is fine for mathematical logic but not for the logic of human reasoning. There is no
conflict here between the new and the old, just further evolution of the subject.'
(Gabbay, 1994, p.368, note 7)
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principle, to other forms of non-deductive reasoning. The formal framework of
consequence relations, developed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990), wi\l form the
backbone of the logical analysis of induction attempted in this thesis, providing ample
justification for the quite comprehensive elaboration of that framework in the present
chapter.
§14. DEDUCTION: THE LOGIC OF SAnSFACTION-PRESERVA nON
Logic is the formal study of reasoning: the process of drawing conclusions from
premisses. The unit of reasoning is the argument. In its most simple form, an argument
consists of a set of premisses, and a conclusion:
all human beings are mortal
Socrates is a human being
:. Socrates is mortal
The conclusion sign :. separates the premisses from the conclusion.
This argument is deductive: its distinctive quality is that the truth of the conclusion is
guaranteed by the truth of the premisses. This is formalised by means of a truth-valued
semantics, which determines the exact conditions under which a formula is true or false38.
Such a semantics consists of a set of interpretations, representing the possible states of
affairs, and a satisfaction relation F between interpretations and formulas. If an
interpretation m satisfies a formula <p we say that m is a model of the formula, and write
m F <po If all models of a set of formulas L are also models of <p, we say that L logically
entails <p or <p is a logical consequence of L, and write L F <po If L is empty, <p is called a
tautology; instead of 0 F <p, we write F<P. A formula qr is a contradiction if -''11 is a
tautology. Iwill refer to F as the standard semantics of deduction.
It is often said that deduction is truth-preserving, in the sense that the conclusion of a
deductive argument is true whenever the premisses are. Defining a formula to be true if it
is satisfied by a distinguished intended interpretation, we see that the idea of truth-
preservation is indeed captured by the standard deductive semantics. However, it seems
more accurate to say that deduction is satisfaction-preserving: the conclusion of a
deductive argument is satisfied by any interpretation satisfying the premisses-". Clearly,
satisfaction-preservation implies truth-preservation, but the former generalises the latter
by quantifying over all possible interpretations. Furthermore, deductive arguments are
meaningful even if their premisses are false.
38A precise definition of this semantics is given in section 1.2.
39What I call 'satisfaction' some others may prefer to call 'truth in a model'. However, the
main point is that there is a distinction between absolute definitions of truth, and relative or
model-theoretic definitions of truth (Haack, 1978, p.108). By using the more neutral term
'satisfaction' I hope to avoid confusion. What I want to stress here is that, whenever we reason
about the 'real world' (which we often do), we would be satisfied with mere truth-preservation.
Deduction offers us something much stronger!
See also (Etchemendy, 1990), especially Ch.2 and p.49.
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Although logical entailment is a well-defined notion, the question whether a certain ~
logically entails a certain <P can be quite hard to answer. This is especially true when the
domain of interpretation is infinite (as in the case of the integers), since in that case ~
may have an infinite number of models. Proof theory is a computationally oriented
method for calculating the relation of logical entailment. The basic idea is to set apart a
set of axioms, and a set of inference rules that transform one or more given formulas into
a new formula; axioms and inference rules are jointly called a proof procedure. Given a
proof procedure P, we say that <P is provable from ~ and write ~ ~ p <p if there exists a
finite sequence of formulas <PI, <P2, ... , <Pn which is obtained by successive applications of
inference rules to axioms, premisses in ~, or previous formulas in the sequence, or
combinations of these, while <Pn is the conclusion <po Such a sequence of formulas, if it
exists, is called a proof of <P from ~. I will often write ~, without explicit reference to a
particular proof procedure.
The question whether ~ is actually the same relation as F= takes us to the metatheory
of deductive logic. We say that a proof procedure is sound if ~ F= <P whenever ~ ~ <P; it is
complete if ~ ~ <P whenever ~ F= <po If a proof procedure can be shown to be both sound
and complete, this is called a representation theorem. Representation theorems have been
obtained for a variety of logical languages and proof theories, including first-order
predicate logic. Further metatheoretical notions include decidability and compactness. A
logic is decidable if there exists an effective procedure for deciding whether ~ ~ <po
Propositional logic is decidable (since the number of models of a formula, i.e. truthvalue
assignments to propositional atoms, is always finite), whereas first-order predicate logic
turns out to be semi-decidable: there are procedures that produce a proof whenever one
exists, but no procedure is guaranteed to halt and terminate with failure if no proof exists.
A logic is compact if a set of formulas ~ is consistent iff every finite subset of ~ is (a set
of formulas is consistent if for no formula <P it is the case that ~ ~ <P and ~ ~ --.<p). First-
order predicate logic is compact, a property that will be used to prove several
completeness results in chapter 7.
Clearly, ~ is a relation on 2LxL, which (if it is sound and complete, i.e. equivalent
to F=) enjoys a wealth of special properties:
inclusion: if <PE~, then ~ ~ <P;
transitivity: if ~ ~ <P for all <pE <I> and <I> ~ \jI, then ~ ~ \jI;
monotonicity: if ~ ~ <p, then ~u{",} ~ <P for all \jI;
deduction theorem: ~u {"'}~ <P iff ~ ~ \jI~<P;
proof by refutation: ~ l- <P iff ~u {--.<p} is inconsistent.
I will refer to such properties as metalevel properties, since they can be used to reason
about deduction as a form of reasoning. Clearly, some of these properties belong to the
tool kit of every mathematician.
To wrap up the foregoing discussion: deductive reasoning can be analysed on three
distinct levels. The semantic level is the most basic but the least practical, and formalises
the idea that deduction is truth-preserving: the conclusion of a deductive argument is true
whenever the premisses are. On the proof-theoretical level, one is concerned with the
question how to actually derive the conclusion from the premisses. Finally, on the meta-
theoretical level one can reason about deductive reasoning as such, establishing e.g. the
completeness of a particular proof procedure, or the fact that deductive conclusions drawn
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on the basis of partial knowledge remain valid when the whole of available knowledge is
taken into account.
Non-deductive logics
Clearly, a non-deductive logic is not truth-preserving. This means that every once in a
while one draws a conclusion that turns out to be false. If a conclusion is refuted by fur-
ther observations, we say that the conclusion is defeated; non-deductive logics are likewise
called defeasible. Clearly, in a defeasible logic one must use all the information available
to derive a conclusion, and one must always be prepared to give up earlier conclusions.
A better understanding of all these issues is obtained when non-deductive logics are
analysed on the metalevel. Thus, whereas for deductive logic semantics and proof theory
are the pillars upon which the metatheory is built, for non-deductive logics it seems to be
just the other way around: we start by investigating which properties a certain non-
deductive logic has or does not have, and only then we devise a semantics which precisely
matches that specific set of properties. The process of devising a semantics matching a set
of properties is called a characterisation.
The remainder of the present chapter will be devoted to the development of a
metatheory of plausible reasoning, and a semantic characterisation of that metatheory, as
put forward in a seminal paper by Sarit Kraus, Daniel Lehmann and Menachem Magidor,
published in 1990 in the Artificial Intelligence journal. In that paper, the authors set out
to "study general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning and try to isolate properties that
could help us map the field of nonmonotonic reasoning by reference to positive
properties". Their approach will form a model for much of the foundational work on
induction presented in this thesis.
§15. THE KLM FRAMEWORK FOR PLAUSffiLE REASONING
The need for a framework such as that developed by Kraus et al. (henceforth referred to as
the KLM framework) is nowhere demonstrated more clearly than in the phrase
'nonrnonotonic reasoning'. Usually, the kind of reasoning studied under that name is
exemplified by the prototypical ornithological argument
typically, birds fly
Tweety is a bird
:. Tweety flies
Clearly, such arguments are defeasible, and the corresponding kind of reasoning is
nonmonotonic - yet so are virtually all non-deductive forms of reasoning. For instance,
the inductive conclusion 'all swans are white' is defeated by the observation of a black
swan, which demonstrates that induction is nonmonotonic as well. It is a regrettable fact
that 'nonmonotonic reasoning' is used most frequently in the sense of 'plausible
reasoning', whereas it is such a wider (and better-defined) term. To avoid confusion, I will
use the term 'plausible reasoning' whenever I mean plausible reasoning.
§15. The KLM framework for plausible reasoning
Plausible consequence relations
Following Gabbay (1985), Kraus et al. focus the study of plausible reasoning on the level
of consequence relations, where a consequence relation is a set of arguments.
DEFINITION 4.1. Let L be a propositional language. A consequence relation
r ~LxL 40 is a set of pairs of formulas of L. Elements of a consequence
relation are called argumentsr' : instead of (P,q)E t- we write p t- q. The left-
hand formula is called the premiss of the argument (if it is a conjunction,
each of the conjuncts is also called a premiss), and the right-hand formula is
called its conclusion.
The intended interpretation of p I- q is 'if p, normally q' or 'q is a plausible consequence
ofp'.42
It is the aim of Kraus et at. to develop sensible axiomatisations of the binary relation
t-. each characterised by a suitable semantics. To this end, they employ a metalanguage
containing a binary predicate l- (written infix for convenience), variables ranging over
formulas of L (denoted by Greek letters from the beginning of the alphabet), and constants
referring to formulas of L (for convenience, these constants are simply the formulas
themselves - typewri ter font refers to formulas from L).
Kraus et at. choose a Gentzen-style notation of axiom schemata and inference rules to
express structural properties of 1-. An example of an axiom schema is
• Reflexivity:
Here, a is a variable in the metalanguage, ranging over formulas of L. A consequence
relation satisfies such an axiom schema if it contains all instances of it (an instance is
obtained by replacing the metavariable a with a formula of L). For example, if bird is a
proposition of L then a consequence relation satisfying Reflexivity contains the argument
bird t- bird ('birds normally are birds').
An example of an inference rule is
Cautious Monotonicity:
The metalevel formulas above the line are the antecedents of the inference rule, and the
formula below the line is its consequent. A consequence relation satisfies an inference rule
if it is closed under that rule, that is, whenever it contains instances of all the antecedents
40A set of premisses l: is treated as the conjunction of its elements; obviously, this requires l:
to be finite.
41Kraus et al. use the phrase 'conditional assertion'; I prefer a term which is also applicable
to forms of reasoning other than plausible reasoning.
421t should be noted that the two intended interpretations are quite different: the first
statement is reminiscent of material implication (if ... , then ... ), while the second is analogous
to logical entailment. Kraus et al. do not make this distinction, which is, I believe, a mistake
- see §16.
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(such that the same variable is replaced by the same formula of L throughout), it also
contains the corresponding instance of the consequent. For example, if a consequence
relation contains bird t- feathers and bird t- flies, then it satisfies Cautious
Monotonicity only if it also contains birdtdeathers t- flies ('birds with feathers
normally fly').
Deductive arguments like 'penguins are birds' can also be incorporated in the KLM
framework. They are not part of the consequence relation, but collected separately in a
background theory T. If 'penguins are birds' is known from the background theory, this is
written as TF p errqu i.ri-eb i.r d, as usual. In fact, rather than introducing an explicit
background theory, the KLM framework utilises a restricted set of models U, so that FP
means 'for all me U: m F p'. The distinction is technical, and for all practical purposes U
can be thought of as being the set of models of T.
Deductive arguments can be 'lifted' to the metalevel, where they can be used in
inference rules such as the following:
• Right Weakening:
For instance, ifFflies~-,penguin ('no penguin flies') and the consequence relation
contains bird t- flies, then it satisfies Right Weakening only if it also contains
bird t- -.penguin ('birds are normally not penguins').
Rule systems for plausible reasoning
Axiom schemata and inference rules can be combined to derive additional rules. For
instance, by putting y=a. in Right Weakening and applying Reflexivity, one obtains the
following derived rule:
• Entailment:
What this derivation tells us is that a consequence relation satisfying Reflexivity and
Right Weakening contains at least all deductive arguments. Furthermore, note that
Reflexivity can be obtained from Entailment by putting ~=a., which implies that in the
presence of Right Weakening, Reflexivity and Entailment are equivalent, and only one of
them needs to be included if both properties are required. Part of the KLM framework aims
at finding elegant axiomatisations or rule systems for different sets of required properties.
Kraus et at. define five different rule systems, three of which are of immediate interest
to us here. In order of increasing strength, these are the systems C (for cumulative
reasoning), P (preferential reasoning) and M (monotonic reasoning). P is strictly stronger
than C (and M is strictly stronger than the other two) in the following sense: every
preferential consequence relation is cumulative, but some cumulative consequence
relations are not preferential. Consequently, every preferential consequence relation
satisfies all the properties of cumulative consequence relations, and the system P can be
obtained from C by adding some additional rules.
We summarise the main definitions and results concerning these three rule systems
below. The weakest rule system C contains, according to Kraus et al., the minimal
§15. The KLM framework for plausible reasoning
conditions under which a consequence relation can still be claimed to model some form of
plausible reasoning.
DEFINITION 4.2 (KLM 3.143). A consequence relation I- is said to be
cumulative iff it satisfies the following axiom schema and inference rules:
• Reflexivity: aI-a












Together, these rules constitute the system C.
One of the derived rules of C is the following (KLM 3.3):
• And:
The next rule system, P, takes the central position in the KLM framework.
DEFINITION 4.3 (KLM 5.1). A consequence relation I- is said to be
preferential iff it satisfies the rules of C and the following:
al-y,pl-Y
avf3 I- Y• Or:
Together, these rules constitute the system P.
One of the derived rules of P is the following (KLM 5.2):
• s:
It can be shown (KLM 5.3) that an alternative axiomatisation of P is obtained by
replacing Cut with And, resulting in the following set of properties: Reflexivity, Left
Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Cautious Monotonicity, and Or.
Finally, the third rule system M is the strongest of the three. As we will see below it
43This refers to Definition 3.1 of (Kraus et al., 1990).
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models monotonic, deductive reasoning.
DEFINITION 4.4 (KLM 7.1). A consequence relation I-- is said to be
monotonic iff it satisfies the rules of C and the following:
a. I-- P
-,PI---,a.• Contraposition:
Together, these rules constitute the system M.
An alternative axiomatisation (KLM 7.3) can be obtained from P by replacing Cautious
Monotonicity with
• Monotonicity:
Since Left Logical Equivalence is implied by Monotonicity, this results in the following
set of properties: Reflexivity, Right Weakening, And, Monotonicity, and Or.
Furthermore, we notice that Or could also be replaced with rule S (KLM 7.3).
Characterisation of plausible consequence relations
Each of the rule systems in the KLM framework is characterised by an appropriate
semantics. Obviously, the weakest system C requires the most elaborate semantics, and
each of the stronger systems simplifies this semantics in some respect. The basic idea of
the semantics for C was already proposed by Shoham (1987), who introduced a partial
ordering of preference between interpretations, stipulating that a. plausibly entails P if
every most preferred model of a. satisfies p.
However, for cumulative reasoning the preference relation compares sets of models
rather than single models. A further technicality is that the same set of models may appear
at more than one place in the ordering. Therefore, preference is expressed between abstract
states, each of which is labelled with a set of models (recall that U is a set of models,
expressing an implicit background theory)44.
DEFINITION 4.5 (KLM 3.10). A cumulative structure'P is a triple (S,l,<),
where S is a set of states, l: S~2U is a function that labels every state with
a nonempty set of models, and < is a binary relation46 on S.
44It should be noted that a state is fully determined by the set of models labelling it and its
place in the preference ordering, and thus needs no further definition. In the words of Kraus et
al.: 'We shall not define further the notion of a state, but suppose that every state is, in a
[structure], labeled with a set of [models] (intuitively the set of all [models] the reasoner thinks
are ~ossible in this state)' (p.18!).
4 What I call a structure is called a model by Kraus et al., and what I call a model they call a
world. I chose to change terminology because I prefer to use the term 'model' in its classical
sense.
46< is not necessarily a partial order, but it should satisfy a certain 'smoothness condition',
which is for instance satisfied if < does not have infinite descending chains.
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Every cumulative structure defines a consequence relation, as follows.
DEFINITION 4.6 (KLM 3.11, 3.13). Let W = (S,l,<) be a cumulative
structure. A state SES satisfies a formula aE L iff for every model me l(s),
m F= a; the set of states satisfying a is denoted by [a]. The consequence
relation defined by W is denoted by t-w and is defined by: a t-w ~ iff every
state minimal (wrt. <) in [a] satisfies ~.
It is relatively easy to show that the consequence relation defined by a cumulative
structure is in fact cumulative, that is, it satisfies the rules of C (KLM 3.16). This is a
soundness result for cumulative consequence relations.
The corresponding completeness result requires that, for an arbitrary cumulative con-
sequence relation t-. there exists a cumulative structure W such that t-w coincides with 1".
Briefly, the construction is as follows. Define an equivalence relation - by: a-~ iff a I" ~
and ~ t- a, and let S be the set of equivalence classes of formulas under -. Furthermore,
each equivalence class is labelled with the set of normal models for the formulas in that
class, where a model mE U is a normal model for a iff it verifies all of its plausible
consequences. Finally, s, is preferred over s2 (S,<S2) iff some formula in s, is a plausible
consequence of some formula in S2, and s,;t:s2. The combination of soundness and
completeness gives us the following representation theorem.
THEOREM 4.7 (KLM 3.25). A consequence relation is a cumulative
consequence relation iff it is defined by some cumulative structure. •
The corresponding results for P and M are obtained by constraining cumulative
structures. A preferential structure is a cumulative structure where states are labelled with
singleton sets of models, and < is a strict partial order. We then essentially have a
preference over models (except that the same model may label different states - see
(Kraus et al., 1990, p. 193) for an example why this additional freedom is needed).
DEFINITION 4.8 (KLM 5.6). A preferential structure is a triple W = (S,l,<),
where S is a set of states, I: S~U is a function that labels every state with
a model, and < is a strict partial order'? on S. A state SES satisfies a
formula aE L iff l(s) F= a; the consequence relation defined by W is denoted
by t-w and is defined as in Definition 4.6.
For proving completeness the following preferential structure is built. Let S be the set of
pairs (m,a) of models m and formulas a, such that m is a normal model for a. Every
state (m,a) in S is simply labelled with m. Finally, a state (m,a) is preferred over an-
other state (n,~) iff av~ t- a (expressing that a is not less ordinary than ~48) and m ~ ~
47I.e., < is irreflexive and transitive. In addition, < should satisfy the 'smoothness
condition' .
481nthe words of Kraus et al.: 'Indeed, if we would conclude that a is true on the basis that
either a or ~ is true, this means that the former is not more out of the ordinary than the latter'
(p.195). Notice that by Or and Reflexivity ~ I- a is a sufficient condition for av~ I- a.
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(this is just to make the ordering irreflexive). We then have the following representation
theorem.
THEOREM 4.9 (KLM 5.18). A consequence relation is a preferential
consequence relation iff it is defined by some preferential structure. •
A monotonicti structure is a preferential structure in which the preference relation < is
empty. This removes the need for the intermediate level of states, since different states
labelled by the same model can be considered identical. In practice, a monotonic structure
is thus defined by a subset Wof U, and the consequence relation defined by a monotonic
structure is equivalent to logical entailment over W.
DEFINITION 4.10 (KLM 7.4). A monotonic structure is a set W~U. The
consequence relation /--w defined by a monotonic structure W is defined by:
a I-w ~ iff every model me W that satisfies a, also satisfies ~.
In order to prove completeness, we need to construct a monotonic structure V from a
given consequence relation /--,such that I- and I-v coincide. To this end, V is defined as
follows:
V = {me U I for all a,~e L: if a I- ~, then m 1= a~~}
That is, V consists of those models that verify every plausible argument as if it were a
deductive argument. It is not difficult to show that the consequence relation defined by V
corresponds to I- if the latter is monotonic.
THEOREM 4.11 (KLM 7.5). A consequence relation is a monotonic
consequence relation iff it is defined by some monotonic structure. •
This concludes our discussion of the characterisation results for the systems C, P and M.
§16. DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I have tried to show how the standard analysis of deductive logic can be
adapted in order to accommodate for a non-deductive form of reasoning. The KLM
framework provides a systematic study of different forms of plausible reasoning, and will
be a model for my subsequent investigations of different forms of induction. As I will
argue below, this is possible because the KLM framework is so flexible that it in fact
provides a methodology for analysing any kind of reasoning. I will also discuss criteria for
comparing the strength of different rule systems.
The KLM approach as a methodology of descriptive logic
Although Kraus et al. were only concerned with plausible reasoning, their choice of
considering plausible consequence as a metanotion on top of a classical propositional
language (rather than devising a special-purpose language such as default logic (Reiter,
49Kraus et al. call such structures simple preferential.
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1980) or circumscription (McCarthy, 1980)) turns their approach into a methodology
for analysing arbitrary forms of reasoning on the metalevel. Indeed, the formal analysis in
Part II of this thesis provides a case in point: although many of the ideas underlying that
analysis were conceived independently of the KLM framework, it was the paper by Kraus
et at. which prompted the formalisation of those ideas by means of conjectural
consequence relations worked out in chapters 6 and 7.
I would like to add that both Kraus et al,' s analysis of plausible reasoning and my
analysis of induction should be considered, in my view, as belonging to a distinguished
branch of logic which I will call descriptive logic. The aim of descriptive logic is to
provide a catalogue of different forms of reasoning, and to study the distinguishing
qualities of each of those forms of reasoning, in their own right as well as in relation to
each other. If such a catalogue deals only with reasoning forms of type X, I call it a
descriptive logical theory of type X. For instance, the KLM framework establishes a
descriptive logical theory of plausible reasoning; my primary aim in this thesis is to
provide a descriptive logical theory of induction. In order to justify this new terminology,
I have to explain why the systematic study of reasoning forms is useful, and why it
requires a separate branch of logic.
The first point is easily dealt with. One only needs to consult the scientific literature
in order to find answers to questions like: What is deduction? What is induction? Is any
non-deductive logic inductive? What is abduction? and what is its relation to induction?
What constitutes a logical system? Throughout the philosophical and logical literature,
one will find either embarrassingly few answers, or an equally embarrassing variety of
proposed answers, to these questions. In my view, this state of affairs puts a threat to the
scientific credibility of logic, and reduces logic to 'the formal study of whatever logicians
choose to study'.
Be that as it may, one might argue that the ontology of reasoning forms should be
(and is) treated in the field known as philosophy 0/ logic. To quote Haack:
' ...among the characteristically philosophical questions raised by the
enterprise of logic are these: What does it mean to say that an argument is
valid? that one statement follows from another? that a statement is
logically true? Is validity to be explained as relative to some formal
system? Or is there an extra-systematic idea that formal systems aim to
represent? What has being valid got to do with being a good argument?
How do formal logical systems help one to assess informal arguments?
C ... ) Is there one correct formal logic? and what might 'correct' mean here?
How does one recognise a valid argument or a logical truth? Which formal
systems count as logics, and why? Certain themes recur: concern with the
scope and aims of logic, the relations between formal logic and informal
argument, and the relations between different formal systems.'
(Haack, 1978, p.1)
It perhaps only requires a bit of good will to see that the systematic study of reasoning
types would fit into Haack's description of the main questions studied by philosophy of
logic. What bothers me, however, is that the issue of non-deductive or non-standard logics
seems to occupy a rather peripheral position within that field. Furthermore, and perhaps
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more importantly, it seems to be a (regrettable) fact of life that issues raised in
'philosophy of Y' are usually taken to be of limited significance by practitioners of Y. I
do, therefore, strongly advocate the view that the systematic study of logic forms an
integral part of logic itself, rather than a meta-science studying the things logicians do.
One can draw a parallel with the study of computer programming languages: although
initially computer programming was identified with imperative programming, the advent
of other programming paradigms such as functional and logic programming prompted
computer scientists to reflect upon the essence of computer programming and
programming paradigms, rather than banishing that subject to 'philosophy of
programming languages' (although the term sounds good!).
To reiterate the point: descriptive logic, the systematic study of reasoning forms, is a
branch of logic whose significance, especially for artificial intelligence researchers, can
hardly be overestimated. The work by Kraus et al. represents an important contribution to
descriptive logic, providing a descriptive logical theory of plausible reasoning. I will take
advantage of the inherent flexibility of their framework, by using their methods to
construct a descriptive logical theory of conjectural consequence relations, thus providing
a constructive proof for the proposition that the KLM approach represents a methodology
of descriptive logic.
The pragmatics of consequence relations
If one accepts this methodological view of the KLM framework, the distinction between
the object level (a propositional language) and the metalevel (the language of plausible
arguments) seems crucial. As soon as the metalevel consequence symbol t- is interpreted
as an object level connective, the methodological view seems to vanish.
Ironically, Kraus et at. are not very clear on this point, as is demonstrated by their
account of the pragmatics of plausible consequence relations.
'The queries one wants to ask an automated knowledge base are formulas
(of L) and query ~ should be interpreted as: Is f3 expected to be true? To
answer such a query the knowledge base will apply some inference
procedure to the information it has. We shall now propose a description of
the different types of information a knowledge base has.
The first type of information (... ) is coded in the universe ofreference U
that describes both hard constraints (e.g., dogs are mammals) and points of
definition (e.g., youngster is equivalent to not adult). Equivalently, such
information will be given by a set of formulas defining U to be the set of
all [models] that satisfy all the formulas of this set.
The second type of information consists of a set of conditional assertions-?
describing the soft constraints (e.g., birds normally fly). This set describes
what we know about the way the world generally behaves. This set of
conditional assertions will be called the knowledge base, and denoted by K.
50Called 'plausible arguments' in this chapter.
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The third type of information describes our information about the specific
situation at hand (e.g., it is a bird). This information will be represented by
a formula, ( ... )
Our inference procedure will work in the following way, to answer query ~.
In the context of the universe of reference U and a specific situation
described by o, it will try to deduce (... ) the conditional assertion a. t- ~
from the knowledge base K. This is a particularly elegant way of looking
at the inference process: the inference process deduces conditional assertions
from sets of conditional assertions.' (Kraus et al., 1990, pp. 173-174)
For instance, given the 'hard' rule
Fpenguin~bird
and the 'soft' rules
bird t- flies
penguin t- -,flies
the conditional assertion penguin t- f 1i e s , which would establish a kind of
contradiction, can be derived using rules from M, but not using only rules from pSI;
Kraus et al. say that the assertion is monotonically, but not preferentially, entailed by the
knowledge base.
Now this may be considered 'a particularly elegant way of looking at the inference
process' by some - but it is not the kind of inference process I am concerned with in this
thesis. The difference is that Kraus et al. interpret a given plausible consequence relation
as a knowledge base, while I interpret it as a description of the behaviour of a
particular reasoning agent. Under the first interpretation the symbol t- represents the
connective of plausible implication; but then one wonders why this connective cannot be
nested (as in (a. l- ~) t- y), or why different plausible implications cannot be combined by
means of other connectives (as in a. t- y v ~ t- y)? Under the second interpretation these
questions simply make no sense: the expression (a. l- ~) t- y is just as meaningless as
(a. F ~) F y.
The position taken in this thesis can be summarised as follows:
(i) an argument like a. t- ~ describes part of the behaviour of a particular
reasoning agent;
(U) a metal eve Irule like Cautious Monotonicity is a rationality postulate
for certain kinds of reasoning;
(iii) a consequence relation closed under the rules of a certain rule system is
a complete description of the behaviour of an agent performing a
certain kind of reasoning.
For instance, if a plausible reasoning agent would accept the conclusions f 1i e sand
SIThe proof proceeds via Transitivity, a derived rule in M but not in P. To see that
penguin I- fl ies is not preferentially entailed, consider the preferential model con-
sisting of three states s-a-cuwith l(s)={bird, flies}, l(t)={penguin, bird}, and
l(u)={penguin,bird,flies ).
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has_wings from the premiss bird, we would consider the agent irrational if it
wouldn't accept the conclusion flies from the premiss birdAhas_wings.
Comparing forms of reasoning
The different rule systems in the KLM framework are related by metalevel entailment: for
instance, every rule of P can be derived from the rules of M, prompting Kraus et at. to
call M stronger than P. Since consequence relations can be viewed as Herbrand
interpretations of rule systems, an equivalent formulation of this observation is that every
monotonic consequence relation is preferential. This can also be seen on the semantic
level, by noting that every monotonic structure V establishes a preferential structure
W=(V'/V,0)52, such that the monotonic consequence relation t-v defined by V coincides
with the preferential consequence relation t-w defined by W.
However, the connection between this formal relation of relative strength between rule
systems and the intuitive relation of relative strength between forms of reasoning is not
so clear-cut as one might conclude from the KLM framework. Intuition tells us that
plausible reasoning is weaker or less restrictive than deductive reasoning, in the sense that
plausible reasoning allows, in general, for more conclusions from given premisses than
deductive reasoning does. Thus, the weakest possible form of reasoning would draw any
conclusion from arbitrary premisses - let us call such a form of reasoning flunky.
Flunky reasoning is axiomatised by the following rule:
Flunk: at-p
The system F consists of the single rule of Flunk. Now, it is easy to see that every rule
of M is a derived rule of F, so F is stronger than M according to the KLM criterion!
Another way to see this is by noting that every flunky consequence relation (there is only
one, viz. LxL) is monotonic (i.e. it is defined by the empty monotonic structure).
I would argue that the criterion for comparing the strength of different forms of
reasoning operates by relating semantic structures rather than rule systems. For instance,
the claim that preferential reasoning is less restrictive than monotonic reasoning might be
substantiated as follows. Let W=(S,l,<) be a preferential structure defining a preferential
consequence relation t-w, let V~U be the set of background models labelling some state in
S53, and let t-v be the monotonic consequence relation defined by V. From Definitions 4.8
and 4.10 we see that t-v is indeed a subset of t-w, and if < is non-empty the inclusion is
proper. That is, for a given formula a we can draw at least the same consequences using
t-was we can draw using I-v; for instance, by virtue of the preference relation we may be
able to conclude bird t-w flies, while bird~v flies. Furthermore, t-vrepresents
the most comprehensive monotonic consequence relation included in t-w: any monotonic
consequence relation t-x that is a superset of t-v, and that includes an argument in t-w but
not in I-v (such as bird t-w fl ies) , would also include some argument not in I-w
(such as -s f Li e s I-x...,bird). t-v contains all the arguments from t-w that can be
521v: V-7 V denotes the identity function on V.
53StrictIy speaking, V should be defined as (l(s) I s is minimal in [a] for some aE L}, i.e.
only including those models in U that are actually used to determine the preferential
consequences of some a.
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obtained by means of monotonic, i.e. non-preferential, means; it is called the monotonic
restriction of rw It is the existence of such a mapping between semantic structures which
prompts us to call one form of reasoning more restrictive than another.
§17. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have introduced the main formal tool that will be applied in this thesis:
the general concept of a consequence relation, intended as a metalevel abstraction of an
arbitrary reasoning form. lowe this tool to Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor, who use it to
develop a descriptive logical theory of plausible reasoning. I have argued that the concept
of a consequence relation establishes in fact a methodology of descriptive logic.
The rule systems developed by Kraus et at. will also play a role in the coming
chapters, which is the reason why they have been presented here in some detail. For
instance, my characterisation of explanatory reasoning will be based on a converse form of
the rules of M. Furthermore, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, confirmatory
reasoning can be thought of as a form of preferential reasoning. This will be worked out
more fully in chapter 7.
The question arises whether the methods for a logical analysis of reasoning outlined in
this chapter are universal. Does every form of reasoning allow for a tripartite
formalisation in terms of semantics, proof theory and metatheory? As we have seen in the
previous chapter, Carnap's answer to this question is negative: his 'inductive logic' only
provides a semantics in terms of a function assigning a degree of confirmation to arbitrary
arguments, rendering the concept of a proof theory superfluous. On the other hand, the
KLM framework does supply a tripartite formalisation of plausible reasoning. In this
respect, it is illustrative to compare their approach to the standard formalisation of
deductive reasoning: the only difference appears on the semantic level, in that the concept
of satisfaction-preservation is replaced by the concept of what might be called preferential
satisfaction-preservation. I will generalise this in the next chapter by introducing the
concept of a preservation semantics, whose main virtue it is to define a certain semantic





The next three, increasingly technical chapters make up the
core of this thesis. In the first chapter, Outline of a
descriptive theory of induction, I take issue with the idea that
a logical semantics is necessarily based on the notion of
truth. In my view, any quality worth preserving in an
argument may give rise to a logic formalising some useful
form of reasoning. Two of the qualities that may be preserved
in inductive arguments are explanatory power and regularity
of interpretations. In the next chapter, Properties of
conjectural consequence relations, I commence my study of
general patterns of conjectural reasoning in the spirit of Kraus
et al. Starting with the adequacy conditions for a material
definition of the relation of confirmation formulated by
Hempel, I propose a number of rules for explanatory and
confirmatory reasoning, and some rules that are meaningful in
both cases. Systems of such rules are studied and semantically




OUTLINE OF A DESCRIPTIVE
THEORY OF INDUCTION
- in which it is argued that the logical foundations of
induction be based on a generalised notion of preservation
semantics, two qualities that may be preserved in inductive
arguments being explanatory power and regularity of
interpretations -
IN THIS CHAPTER I will present a blueprint of a descriptive theory of induction: acatalogue of different forms of inductive reasoning. The central concept in such a
descriptive theory of induction is the notion of a conjectural consequence relation,
fonnalising the process of inductive hypothesis formation. This concept, which will be
fully developed in the next two chapters, is called conjectural consequence relation rather
than inductive consequence relation, because it may not completely capture every aspect of
inductive hypothesis formation (for instance, there is no inherent notion of
generalisation), and because it may be applicable to other forms of reasoning as well.
The outline of a descriptive theory of induction presented in this chapter will also
discuss other ingredients, and their relation to conjectural consequence relations. In order
to get a clear picture of what other ingredients are needed, we start by asking a very
general question: What constitutes a logical system? In principle, the answer will be that
the usual tripartite model of semantics, proof theory and metatheory will suffice.
However, it is clear that such a semantics cannot be satisfaction-preserving, as in the case
of the standard semantics for deduction (§ 14). This raises two questions:
(i) are there alternative semantic qualities that can be preserved?
(ii) can we say anything about the truth of the conclusion, given the truth
of the premises?
The first question will lead to the general notion of a preservation semantics, while the
second leads to the concept of a truth-estimating semantics.
On the level of proof theory, I will draw a distinction between a proof procedure and
what I call a discovery procedure, which only infers conclusions that maximise some
utility measure. Although the latter is, in general, what we want (even in the case of
deduction!), I will argue that the utility measure is an extra-logical factor, outside the
logical system proper.
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§18. WHATIS A LOGICAL SYSTEM?
Recall that in chapter 4 the following picture of logic emerged. Logic can be characterised
on three distinct levels: semantics, proof theory, and metatheory. The aim of semantics is
to provide formulas with a meaning, and to define the notion of semantic entailment. The
goal of proof theory is to provide a more computationally oriented counterpart to semantic
entailment, by formulating axioms and inference rules. Semantics and proof theory are
linked together by the metatheoretical notions of soundness and completeness.
The question arises whether this tripartite model of semantics, proof theory and
metatheory is capable of capturing the essence of an arbitrary form of reasoning. Clearly,
when devising a non-deductive logical system we have to give up some of the nice
properties of deductive logic. In this light, it is important to have a clear idea of which
characteristics of deductive logic are inherent to logical systems as such, and which
characteristics derive from the fact that the form of reasoning being modelled is deductive.
This is by no means a simple task, since the standard deductive machinery seems so
familiar to us that it is hard to imagine alternatives. This is especially true for the standard
deductive semantics, due to Tarski (1936). In the words of John Etchemendy:
'The highest compliment that can be paid the author of a piece of
conceptual analysis comes not when his suggested definition survives
whatever criticism may be leveled against it, or when the analysis is
acclaimed unassailable. The highest compliment comes when the suggested
definition is no longer seen as the result of conceptual analysis-when the
need for analysis is forgotten, and the definition is treated as common
knowledge. Tarski's account of the concepts of logical truth and logical
consequence has earned him this compliment.' (Etchemendy, 1990, p.l)
Unlike Etchemendy, who criticises it on the grounds of material inadequacy, I accept
Tarski's standard deductive semantics, but am seeking ways to generalise it, in order to
make it applicable to a wider spectrum of reasoning forms.
What is a semantics?
The distinguishing virtue of Tarski's model-theoretic semantics is that it substantiates the
following statement:
(1) if the premises of a deductive argument are true, then its conclusion
is true also.
As we have seen in §14, Tarski achieves this by defining truth as satisfaction by a
distinguished intended interpretation. In this way we obtain a clear-cut distinction between
deductively valid and deductively invalid arguments.
Clearly, a non-deductive semantics must substantiate a much weaker statement than
(1). One possible weakening is embodied in Carnap's proposal for an 'inductive logic'
(see §7):
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(2) if the premises E of an argument are true, then the probability
that its conclusion H is true also is estimated at c(H,E).
Notice that every argument is assigned a degree of confirmation, so that (2), by itself,
does not set apart a distinguished set of 'inductively valid' arguments. However, we could
achieve something like that by stipulating that c(H,E) > 0, or c(H,E) > c(H,true), or
c(H ,E) = 1 (the latter stipulation would, presumably, yield the deductively valid
arguments).
The KLM framework provides an alternative, qualitative weakening of (1):
(3) if the premises of a plausible argument are true, then its conclusion
is expected to be true also.
Here, the conclusion of a plausible argument is expected to be true whenever the intended
interpretation is possible in at least one most preferred epistemic state among those that
satisfy the premises (see Definition 4.6) ..
I have tried to demonstrate that different semantic accounts can be formulated in a way
which reveals the manner in which they assess the truth of the conclusion, given the truth
of the premises. Let us call such an assessment the truth-estimating conditions imposed
by the semantics. What I want to illustrate now is that the truth-estimating viewpoint is
not always the conceptually most appropriate one.
Consider Peirce's definition of abduction as inference of explanatory hypotheses, where
a hypothesis is explanatory if it logically entails the premises of the abductive argument.
This leads to the following truth-estimating condition:
(4) if the premises of an abductive argument are false, then its
conclusion is false also.
What this truth-estimating condition tells us is that the truth of the premises of an
abductive argument is a necessary condition for the truth of its conclusion. The
weakness of this truth-estimating condition, being inherent to abduction per se, is
something we have to live with - but its formulation seems to be quite counterintuitive.
I will argue below that a much better picture of the semantics of abduction is obtained
when it is defined in terms of a semantic quality that is preserved by abductive
arguments=.
Such a preservatory viewpoint has already been considered in §14, where we concluded
that deduction is satisfaction-preserving in the sense that an interpretation satisfies the
conclusion of a deductive argument whenever it satisfies the premises:
(5) satisfaction by an interpretation is preserved when passing from the
premises of a deductive argument to its conclusion.
It is easy to see that (5) is a sufficient condition for (1), if a statement is defined to be true
whenever it is satisfied by a distinguished intended interpretation. Conversely, (5) is
obtained if (1) holds regardless of which interpretation is the intended one. Thus, (1) and
(5) are equivalent if we have no additional knowledge about the intended interpretation.
54Sometimes, condition (4) is paraphrased by saying that a reasoning form like abduction is
falsity-preserving - but who wants to preserve falsity?
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In a similar vein, the KLM semantics can be viewed from a preservatory viewpoint:
(6) satisfaction by a most preferred epistemic state is preserved
when passing from the premises of a plausible argument to its
conclusion->,
The equivalence of (3) and (6) is a matter of definition rather than proof: (6) gives a
precise answer to the question what it means to say that the conclusion of a plausible
argument is expected to be true. One could say that the truth-estimating viewpoint of
KLM semantics is derived from the preservatory viewpoint, which is the more
fundamental one.
Abduction or explanatory reasoning is another form of reasoning for which the
preservatory viewpoint is much more natural. Consider the following statement:
(7) explanatory power is preserved when passing from the premises
of an abductive argument to its conclusion.
Explanatory power is a central concept in the explanatory view of induction put forward in
this thesis. Intuitively, the explanatory power is the set of explanations of observed
phenomena provided by a logical theory. An argument preserves explanatory power if the
set of explanations provided by the conclusion is at least as comprehensive as the set of
explanations provided by the premises. In the spirit of Hempel's deductive-nomological
model of explanations (Hempel, 1966), we may define the explanatory power of a theory
as the set of its deductive consequences'v, Now, one may note that under this definition of
explanatory power (7) is equivalent to saying that the premises are among the deductive
consequences of the conclusion, which is in turn equivalent to (4). However, it is clear
that (7) provides a much more natural viewpoint on the semantics of abduction than (4).
Furthermore, there are wider conceptions of explanatory power under which the
equivalence of (7) and (4) no longer holds: for instance, we could define the explanatory
power of a formula as the set of its plausible, rather than deductive, consequences.
The point I hope to have illustrated is this. There are (at least) two possible angles
from which one can view the concept of semantics, one being more natural for some
forms of reasoning, the second for others. The preservatory viewpoint was found more
natural for explanatory reasoning, and more fundamental for plausible reasoning a La
KLM. The standard deductive semantics seems to be primarily viewed from the truth-
estimating viewpoint, although it can be independently and equivalently viewed from the
preservatory viewpoint.
It remains to be decided whether Carnap's degree of confirmation can be equally well
55This statement is slightly ambiguous. It does not mean to say that the quality of 'being
most preferred' is preserved (which would imply that every most preferred model of the
premises is also a most preferred model of the conclusion), but rather that satisfaction by
'selected models' is preserved (namely, the most preferred models of the premises). This will be
made more precise below.
56This is, admittedly, a simplification. First of all, it disregards the structure of the proof of
the observation from the theory: some explanations may be more powerful, or simple, than
others. Secondly, observations may be restricted to a sublanguage of the language in which the
theory is formulated. The proposed definition of explanatory power is therefore a starting
point, that may require further refinements.
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approached from the preservatory angle. My claim is that it cannot - nor is it intended to
serve as a preservatory semantics. This becomes immediately clear once one realises that
the preservatory viewpoint makes sense only when it indeed serves to dismiss some
arguments that do not preserve the designated semantic quality. But Carnap's degree of
confirmation is defined for arbitrary arguments - indeed, to restrict its scope would be to
limit its applicability unnecessarily. But if we do not restrict the scope of the c-function,
then the preserved semantic quality must be void.
A related point has been made already by Carnap himself when he remarked that
induction, in his view, does not represent inference in the classical sense. Let us recall the
citation from chapter 2:
'What we call inductive logic is often called the theory of nondemonstrative
or nondeductive inference. Since we use the term 'inductive' in the wide
sense of 'nondeductive', we might call it the theory of inductive inference ...
However, it should be noticed that the term 'inference' must here, in
inductive logic, not be understood in the same sense as in deductive logic.
Deductive and inductive logic are analogous in one respect: both investigate
logical relations between sentences; the first studies the relation of
[entailment], the second that of degree of confirmation which may be
regarded as a numerical measure for a partial [entailment]. .. The term
'inference' in its customary use implies a transition from given sentences
to new sentences or an acquisition of a new sentence on the basis of
sentences already possessed. However, only deductive inference is inference
in this sense.' (Carnap, 1950, §44B, pp. 205-6)
What is emphasised here is that there is no inherent notion of proof in his 'inductive
logic'. According to Carnap, it does not make sense to ask: 'is there an inductive proof of
H from E?'; all one can ask is 'what is the degree to which H is confirmed by E?'. What
this demonstrates is that truth-estimating conditions do not necessarily lead to an
associated proof theory.
Let us recover our breath and reinforce the points made above. My first point is that
there exist two different concepts of semantics, rather than just two viewpoints from
which the concept of semantics can be perceived. Truth-estimating semantics aims at
assessing the truth of the conclusion of an argument. Preservation semantics aims at
assessing the semantic connection that exists between premises and conclusion of an
argument. These two concepts are fundamentally different, only to coincide in one specific
case, namely the case of deductive reasoning (fig. 5.1).
My second point is that, in principle, only the preservation semantics gives rise to a
proof theory. Like the previous point, this point cannot be rigorously proved but only
made plausible. One case in point is, of course, provided by Carnap's 'inductive logic',
which doesn't have a proof theory (or, alternatively, a trivial one: infer anything from
anything). This also means that the concepts of soundness and completeness only make
sense in the presence of a preservation semantics.
A third, related point is that, while a preservation semantics mirrors some essential
semantic feature of a particular form of reasoning, a truth-estimating semantics is, at least
in principle, applicable to arguments of any type. Carnap's claim that his 'inductive
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Figure 5.1. The two concepts of preservation semantics and truth-estimating
semantics are fundamentally different, but coincide in the case of deductive
reasoning.
logic' captures the essence of non-deductive reasoning (and even, as a special case,
deductive reasoning) is therefore, in a way, justified. It is not his framework, which
definitely has its merits, that is criticised here, but the fact that he calls it a logic. In my
view, it embodies a proposal for a truth-estimating semantics that can, in principle, be
applied to an arbitrary form of reasoning.
The idea that preservation, rather than mere truth-preservation, is the essential feature
of logic is not new. In a paper published in 1991, Jennings, Chan and Dowad 'argue for a
generalisation of inference from the standard account in terms of truth preservation to one
which countenances preservation of other desirable metalinguistic properties':
'( ... ) truth is not the only inferentially preservable property.
A system of inference essentially provides procedures by which a set I;of
sentences (for example, the set of one's beliefs) having some complex of
metalinguistic properties can be unfailingly extended to a larger set I;'
having the same complex of properties. By all means, we may regard truth
as one of the properties to be preserved, but what other properties are to be
preserved can depend upon our interests.' (Jennings et al., 1991, p.l047)
§J8. What is a logical system?
Furthermore, the view that abduction is the logic of preserving explanations has also been
put forward by Zadrozny, who calls an inference rule abductive 'if it preserves sets of
explanations ' (Zadrozny, 1991, p.l).
For the purposes of this thesis, I will now attempt to give a more exact definition of a
preservation semantics. The basic idea is that such a semantics specifies a set of semantic
objects, such that for an inference from a to ~, if a semantic object stands in a certain
relation to a (it is for instance a model of a), it stands in the same relation to ~; or
equivalently, the set of semantic objects (a] standing in a certain relation to a is a subset
of the set of semantic objects (~] standing in the same relation to ~. A modification of
this scheme is suggested by the preferential semantics of Kraus et al.: to construct from
[a] a different set of semantic objects to be included in WI, by means of a preservation
function f.
DEFINITION 5.1. Let L be a logical language. A preservation semantics is a
triple (S,( .i.». where S is a set of semantic objects, (.]: L~2S is a
meaning junction mapping any formula to a set of semantic objects, and f:
2S~2S is a preservation function mapping any set of semantic objects to
another set of semantic objects. The consequence relation defined by a
preservation semantics is given by a t- ~ iff f([a)) ~ WI·
As an example, the cumulative KLM semantics is obtained from this scheme by
interpreting [a] as the set of episternic states satisfying a, and defining f as the function
returning the set of minimal states under a preference ordering. Clearly, the standard
deductive semantics is another instance of this scheme, with (a] denoting the set of
classical models of a, and f the identity function. Finally, to obtain the explanation-
preserving semantics of abduction, we interpret (a] as the set of consequences of a under
some (quasi-)deductive inference mechanism, and f again as the identity function ..
Clearly, it will be necessary to formulate some additional constraints on the functions
( .] and f. For instance, it is reasonable to require that (.] is well-behaved with respect to
the logical connectives:
(aA~] = [a] n [~]
(av~]= (a] u W]
(...,a] = S - [a]
and so on. Such constraints will indeed be satisfied by any preservation semantics we will
consider in this thesis.
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that f maps any set of semantic objects
onto a subset:
'\Is~S: f(s) c s (*)
Indeed, this constraint is satisfied for all three preservation semantics just mentioned (in
fact, for the standard deductive semantics and the abductive semantics, set-inclusion is
trivially strengthened to equality). Nevertheless, I believe that this constraint is too strong
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for some other forms of reasoning, most notably inductive reasoning and counterfactual
reasoning. I will not dive into the subject here - an example will be given below in §19.
However, for all the preservation semantics formally worked out in chapter 7 the
inclusion constraint (*) holds. In such cases we will say that f is a selection function. 57
With this conception of a preservation semantics we have sufficiently liberated
ourselves from the chains imposed by the standard deductive semantics. A complete
formal characterisation of this notion, however important, is beyond the scope of this
thesis. As for the concept of a truth-estimating semantics, I will not attempt to give a
precise definition, since this concept does not playa major role in this thesis. For all
practical purposes, it may be identified with a function c: LxL~[O,I], satisfying a
number of constraints like in Carnap's 'inductive logic'.
What is a proofprocedure?
Having observed the need for a wider conception of the concept of a logical semantics, it
is now time to consider the concept of a proof theory. Here, I take the position that the
'traditional' conception of a proof theory is still adequate as a computational counterpart
to the preservation semantics.
It follows that metatheory maps the relation between proof theory and preservation
semantics. For instance, a proof procedure is sound if any formula it derives preserves the
designated semantic quality relative to the premises. Conversely, the proof procedure is
complete whenever it is able to derive, from arbitrary premises, every conclusion that
preserves that same semantic quality. But now we may ask whether completeness in this
sense is always a desirable property. Isn't it true that, even in deductive logic, we are often
only interested in deriving only those conclusions that, besides preserving the semantic
quality, serve a certain goal?
For instance, suppose that we want to construct an Automated Mathematician: a
computer program that, equipped with basic mathematical knowledge, is able to derive
interesting mathematical concepts and theorems58. Such a computer program should be
able, for instance, to derive the fundamental theorem of arithmetic from elementary
number theory. Now let L denote the initial knowledge, then we may write L I-AM cp if cp
is a formula derived by the Automated Mathematician. Clearly, we don't want I-AM to be
complete with respect to the standard deductive semantics-": we don't want tautologies or
formulas in L to be 'derived', nor do we want every logically equivalent formulation of
the fundamental theorem of arithmetic to be produced.
On the other hand, if we wanted to implement an Automated Theorem Checker which,
supplied with L and cp, tests whether L I-ATC cp, then it is clear that, ideally, I-ATC should
be complete with respect to 1=, because the theorem checker should work for arbitrary L
and cpo Similarly, if I-LP denotes a query answering procedure in logic programming
systems, constructing a substitution 9 such that L I-LP cp9 for arbitrary logic programs L
57Strictly speaking, if f is not a selection function the name of a preservation semantics is a
bit of a misnomer, since some of the elements of f« aD do not stand in the same relation to a as
th~ stand to p.
See (Lenat, 1980) for an attempt to tackle this problem.
59According to Godel's celebrated incompleteness theorem, it is even impossible for a proof
procedure to be complete as soon as elementary number theory is included.
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and queries cp, it is again clear that I-LP should be complete'v.
One way to describe the behaviour of a discovery procedure like the Automated
Mathematician is to view it as a heuristic search algorithm which generates, in some way
or another, formulas cp such that (i) :E I-ATC cp, and (ii) h( cp) reaches some optimal value,
where h is a heuristic evaLuation function assessing the utility of the formula as a
mathematical theorem. There is no need to explicate these concepts any further; suffice it
to say that the resulting discovery procedure effectively establishes a restriction of the
proof procedure I-ATC. Clearly, automated induction algorithms embody discovery
procedures rather than proof procedures. The question we need to address now is whether
the heuristics employed in such discovery procedures are part of the logical system or not.
In this thesis I wiII take the position that discovery procedures like the Automated
Mathematician and automated induction algorithms are built upon logical systems, but are
not themselves logical systems. This is not to say that proof procedures are more
important than discovery procedures: on the contrary, most practical research on induction
in artificial inteIligence is aimed at developing inductive discovery procedures rather than
inductive proof procedures. Furthermore, it is usually a good idea to integrate the
heuristics with the proof procedure, in order to avoid the generation of useless formulas as
much as possible. The point I want to stress here is not that discovery procedures are
useless, but rather that the heuristics they employ are extra-LogicaL and not part of the
logical system. Indeed, suppose that we would include heuristics in our logic, i.e. in the
proof procedure: in order to characterise the resulting proof procedure, we would need to
include them in the semantics as well. What we would have achieved, then, is mainly a
corruption of the typical (and meaningful) dualism that exists traditionaIIy between proof
theory and semantics. I prefer tokeep the dualism, and. to view discovery procedures as
consisting of a logical system on one hand, and extra-logical factors such as heuristics on
the other.
The compLete picture
We are now in a position to describe the view of a logical system that I propose in the
context of this thesis (fig 5.2). Essentially, it follows the traditional lay-out of a deductive
system in that it consists of a semantics, a proof procedure, and a metatheory. The main
difference with a deductive logic is that the semantics focuses upon the semantic quality
that is preserved by every argument, without necessarily assessing the extent to which a
derived conclusion is true. The latter is done by a truth-estimating semantics, such as the
one proposed by Carnap under the heading 'inductive logic'. Furthermore, since such a
truth-estimating semantics is, at least in principle, independent of a particular reasoning
form, it is only considered to be part of the logical system proper insofar it can be merged
with the preservation semantics, as in the case of deductive logic (and, presumably, also
in the case of plausible logic, although a truth-estimating semantics is not included in the
KLM framework).
6~0 be precise: clausal resolution (the proof procedure employed in logic programming
systems) is not complete in this sense, because it does not obey the metalevel principle of
proof by refutation (see §14). However, it is refutation complete (1:v {-,Ijl) is inconsistent
whenever 1: t= Ijl), which is sufficient for a query answering procedure.
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Figure 5.2. A logical system proper consists of a preservation semantics and a proof
procedure, sound and complete with respect to the preservation semantics. Truth-
estimating semantics, employed to assess the extent to which a derived conclusion
is true, is not restricted to the arguments of one particular logical system; a
discovery procedure employs heuristics to restrict the range of the proof procedure.
As usual, the metatheory relates the proof procedure to the semantics provided with the
logical theory, i.e. the preservation semantics. To state the same point differently: the
preservation semantics characterises the proof procedure. Finally, the proof procedure can
be extended with heuristics in order to obtain a discovery procedure, which is hoped to
derive only the most 'interesting' conclusions. Exactly what constitutes an interesting
conclusion is fixed by the heuristics; since such a heuristic is an operational concept that
does not have a clear semantic counterpart, I consider it to be an extra-logical factor
outside the underlying logical system, even if heuristics are usually operating in close
connection with the proof procedure.
§19. ELEMENTS OF AN INDUCTIVE LOOIC
We are now in a position to provide an answer to the question: what constitutes an
inductive logic? Basically, this consists of a logical system (semantics, proof procedure,
and metatheory), a truth-estimating semantics, and a discovery procedure (i.e., a heuristic
utility measure). In this thesis I will concentrate on a logical system for induction, based
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on notions as explanation and confirmation. I will not further address the problem of
devising an appropriate truth-estimating semantics - as I have indicated, I do not think
that this problem, important as it may be, is specifically linked to inductive reasoning.
The discussion of a discovery procedure for induction will be postponed until §33, where I
will describe a utility measure for induced integrity constraints in a relational database.
I will now discuss the two main ingredients for the next two chapters: the concept of a
conjectural consequence relation, and several possible preservation semantics for
conjectural reasoning. I use the adjective 'conjectural' rather than 'inductive' because these
two ingredients do not exclusively and completely characterise inductive reasoning, both
in the sense that some aspects that are typical of induction may be missing (such as the
generality of hypotheses, see below), and in the sense that some of the characteristics of
induction that are formalised here are shared with certain other forms of reasoning (e.g. the
use of a semantic preference ordering).
Conjectural consequence relations
Following the work of Kraus et al., my account of the logical characteristics of induction
will be based on the notion of a conjectural consequence relation. To clearly mark the
distinction with plausible consequence relations, I will borrow a symbol originally
proposed by Michalski (1983) and write a t::: ~ for 'hypothesis ~ could be conjectured if
the evidence is a' .61 In the next two chapters I will develop several rule systems and
semantics for different forms of conjectural reasoning.
We may note again (see also §16) that a consequence relation is a metalevel notion
modelling the behaviour of a particular reasoning agent, and that a rule system provides
rationality postulates for such an agent. This is no different for conjectural consequence
relations. For instance, given background knowledge including
Fcrows_are_black~chevy_is_biack
and the fact that the reasoner accepts the inductive argument
chad_is_black I< crows_are_black
our rationality postulates might prescribe that the hypothesis 'all crows are black' can
still be maintained after observation of Chevy being black, by stipulating that the
inductive argument
chad_is_blackAchevy_is_blackl<crows_are_black
must also be in the consequence relation describing the behaviour of the inductive agent.
We could say that a system for conjectural reasoning puts limits to the rational behaviour
of an inductive reasoner.
Preservation semantics
The main concern of this thesis is to investigate logical systems for induction. Within
such a logical system, preservation semantics occupies a central position. I will now
61Michalski interprets (X t::: ~ as '(x generalises to W (Michalski, 1983, p.89).
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investigate a few specific proposals for such a preservation semantics, some of which are
worked out in the next chapters.
For explanatory induction the basic idea is to consider explanatory power as the
preserved quality, where explanatory power is identified with the set of formulas that can
be inferred under a deductive or quasi-deductive regime. Somewhat more precisely, a
preservation semantics for explanatory reasoning is built upon an explanation mechanism,
which in this thesis will be identified with a consequence relation satisfying one of the
KLM rule systems C, P or M. Given an explanation mechanism /-, the meaning function
[.J maps a formula a to its closure under 1--, denoted by Cnt-(a) = (y I a I-- y}62. The
selection function f is the identity function - that is, an argument a j::: ~ preserves
explanatory power if Cnt-(a) ~ Cnt-(~), i.e. for every y, if a I-- y then ~ I-- y.
Clearly, if I-- is a deductive proof procedure, then this can be reduced to the requirement
that ~ I-- a. More precisely, we have the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.2. If I-- is transitive and reflexive, then Cnl-(a) ~ Cnt-(/3) iff /31-- a.
Proof. For the if part, suppose ~ I- a and a I-- y, then ~ I- Y by
Transitivity.
For the only-if part, suppose Cnt-(a) ~ Cnt-(~), then (since aE Cnt-(a) by
Reflexivity) aE Cnt-(~). •
As a corollary, we have Cnt-(a) ~ Cnl-(~) iff ~ I-- a whenever I-- satisfies the rules of M63.
A complete axiomatisation of this kind of preservation semantics for induction is given in
§26.
In the case of confirmatory induction I propose a preservation semantics that employs
the preservation function f. Here, the semantic objects are interpretations, and the
meaning function maps a formula to the set of its models, as usual. From the models of
the observations [aJ in a confirmatory argument the preservation function constructs a set
of regular interpretations f([a)), and the preservation condition requires that every regular
interpretation is a model of the hypothesis. The intuition behind regular interpretations is
that they stick to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the observations. As an illustration,
consider again Hempel's example of the black ravens (§6), with observations
Raven(a)ABlack(a) /\ -,Raven(c)ABlack(c) /\ -,Raven(d)/\-,Black(d)
An inductive hypothesis like '<Ix: Ravenfxj-e Black/x) does not refer to the names of
individual crows - as far as this and similar universal hypotheses are concerned, the
constants a, c, d in the observations could be permuted, or even replaced by different ones.
Indeed, even observations with more than three objects would bear the same relation to
such hypotheses, as long as these objects are described as either a black raven, a black
non-raven, or a non-black non-raven. Such regular interpretations would convey the same
information as the observations, even if not everyone of them is a model of the
observations. Given observations a, the set of regular interpretations would be
62That is, the semantic objects are formulas from L.
63This holds also for consequence relations satisfying the rules of the strictly weaker system
eM, a KLM system that captures monotonic (hence transitive) consequence relations that fail
to satisfy the rule of Contraposition.
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constructed out of the models of a by means of the preservation function f. I will call
such a form of reasoning regularity-based confirmatory reasoning.
What this notion of regular interpretations brings us is an associated notion of
generalisation: the confirmed hypothesis should be a formula that does not refer to the
objects in the observations, hence a formula that does more than just replicating the
logical content of the observations. We could say that this notion of regularity as
invariance under renaming of objects amounts to a view of induction as generality-
preserving reasoning. This appears to be a very appealing view indeed, which deserves
to be investigated further. However, it seems to me that this view has some quite drastic
logical ramifications. For one thing, note that f is not a selection function (f(s)fP for
some sg), since some regular interpretations do not satisfy the observations. As a result,
quite a few of Hempel's adequacy conditions would fail to hold, such as the entailment
condition (CI) and the consequence condition (C2).
For this reason, the regularity-based confirmatory semantics will not be analysed to its
full strength in this thesis. Instead we will consider a more 'classical' instantiation in
which f is a simple selection function. One possible selection function stays close to the
ideas of Hempel, Helft and De Raedt, by treating only the truth-minimal model(s) of the
observations as regular. The semantic quality that is preserved is then satisfaction by the
regular model. The idea of minimising truth is closely related to the Closed-World
Assumption as it is frequently used for reasoning about the information contained in
databases; it will be referred to as closed-world reasoning. Since the truth-minimal models
can be viewed as the minimal elements under a certain partial ordering, closed-world
reasoning establishes a kind of preferential reasoning. The general case of an arbitrary
preference ordering, which stays very close to the KLM system P, is axiomatised in §27.
A third type of conjectural reasoning that will be studied in chapter 7 is similar to
closed-world reasoning in that it also employs a partial ordering on semantic objects,
namely the information ordering on partial interpretations. However, the pragmatics of
this ordering is quite different from a preference ordering: its minimal elements do not
represent the 'best' interpretations, but the ones that can be used to enumerate all the
others. In other words, the information ordering is a computational rather than a logical
device. Iwill demonstrate in chapter 7 that this form of reasoning is rather weak, requiring
no more than compatibility of evidence and inductive conclusion. This form of reasoning
is therefore called consistency-based confirmatory reasoning.
§20. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we set out to present a blueprint of a descriptive theory of inductive
reasoning. I have identified conjectural consequence relations as the central notion in such
a descriptive theory, modelling certain aspects of the process of inductive hypothesis
formation. I have argued that, just like other abstract forms of reasoning, conjectural
consequence relations can be formalised by means of a tripartite logical system consisting
of semantics, proof theory and metatheory. Different forms of inductive reasoning
correspond to different logical systems for conjectural consequence relations, that will be
developed in the next two chapters.
5. Outline of a descriptive theory of induction
It is important to understand the significance of such logical systems for induction. In
a way, they accomplish the same as any logical system: a formalisation of the notion of a
valid argument. However, validity should here not be understood as deductive validity, i.e.
truth preservation: clearly, a deductive logic of induction is impossible. The notion of
validity is not absolute, but relative to a certain reasoning form, formalised by a logical
system. I believe that much of the confusion about the infamous 'Problem of Induction'
has been caused by the misconception that a logic of induction should be built on top of
the deductive notion of validity.
Much of the work in this chapter has therefore been devoted to a liberation from the
dogma that logic is the study of deductive reasoning. It may seem that we have
completely overthrown the conventional view of logic - however, the only significant
innovation has been to disconnect the notions of preservation semantics (the counterpart
of a proof procedure) and truth-estimating semantics. I have also pointed out a distinction
between a proof procedure and a discovery procedure, but this distinction is significant for
any logic and, although not always articulated so explicitly, probably well understood.
An analysis of some possible logical systems for inductive hypothesis formation will
be carried out in the remainder of this thesis. However, this analysis should be viewed as a
starting point of the investigations into this subject, rather than an endpoint. One open
problem that has been identified is the formalisation of induction as generalisation-
preserving reasoning. This idea will not be further pursued here because it would
represent, in the current context, too radical a departure from the ideas of Peirce and
Hempel.




- in which the study of general patterns of inductive reasoning is
commenced, leading to a catalogue of rules for explanatory and
confirmatory reasoning -
THIS CHAPTER IS intended to provide an initial, conceptual analysis of conjecturalconsequence relations. It provides a detailed analysis of the adequacy conditions for
confirmatory and explanatory reasoning, formulated as metalevel inference rules for
conjectural consequence relations. I also discuss some additional properties not considered
by Hempel, most notably: verification, falsification, and incrementality. Furthermore, I
indicate the interrelationships that exist between a number of these rules.
A main difference with Hempel's approach is that in my framework observations and
hypothesis are required to be compatible. This has led to a slight reformulation of some of
Hempel's adequacy conditions. In the context of semantically expressed background
knowledge in the form of a restricted set of models U, this requires a proof-theoretic
counterpart: the concept of an admissible formula, with which I will start my
investigations.
§21. THE CONCEPf OF AN ADMISSmLE FORMULA
Recall from §6 that, according to Hempel's adequacy conditions for confirmation,
contradictory evidence confirms any hypothesis. This choice can be justified by an analogy
with deductive reasoning, where an inconsistent formula entails any formula, and allows a
statement of the entailment condition (HI) in the form originally proposed by Hempel:
any sentence which is entailed by an observation report is confirmed by it.
However, this choice does not carryover to the explanatory case: contradictory
evidence is not explained by every hypothesis but only by contradictory ones, since the
explanatory power of contradictory evidence encompasses every formula in the language,
hence the explanatory power of non-contradictory formulas will always be less
comprehensive. The only choice that can be made consistently in both the confirmatory
and the explanatory case is to require that evidence and hypothesis are compatible, hence
contradictory evidence does not confirm, nor is explained by, any hypothesis. The price to
pay is that some adequacy conditions become slightly more complicated.
Since we will employ an implicit background theory by restricting the set of models
U, a formula is contradictory iff it is unsatisfiable with respect to U. Clearly, this is a
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semantic notion - if we want an independent proof-theoretic development of conjectural
reasoning, we will need a counterpart that is formulated in terms of a consequence relation.
Such a counterpart is provided by the following definition.
DEFINITION 6.1. Given a conjectural consequence relation 1', a formula
ae L will be called admissible iff a I'a, and inadmissible otherwise.
Of course, the full proof that a formula is admissible if and only if it is satisfiable by
some model in U requires a representation theorem. However, if the consequence relation
satisfies some simple properties, part of the relation between admissibility and
satisfiability wrt. U can already be formulated. For instance, if the consequence relation is
such that premisses and conclusion are always compatible, it follows that any
contradictory a is inadmissible.
When translating adequacy conditions for conjectural reasoning to rules for conjectural
consequence relations, the concept of admissibility is used as follows. Whenever a
condition requires an observation report or a hypothesis to be consistent, it is translated to
a requirement that the formula in question be admissible. In order to indicate that the
resulting rule has an antecedent to this effect, we add the qualification 'admissible' to the
name of the rule. Note that in the context of learning from examples, the intuitive reading
of a condition a I'a would be 'a does not cover any negative example' if a occurs as a
hypothesis elsewhere in the rule, and 'a does not conflict with the negative examples' if it
occurs as evidence (as explained in §12, negative examples are assumed to be part of the
background theory).
§22. ADEQUACY CONDmONS FOR CONFIRMATORY REASONING
I will now translate Hempel's set of adequacy conditions for confirmation (or rather, the
slightly reformulated conditions (el-4) listed in §8) into rules for confirmatory
consequence relations. Throughout this section, the intended interpretation of a t::: ~ is
'observations a confirm hypothesis W.64
We start with the entailment condition:
(Cl ) Entailment condition: any sentence which is entailed by a consistent
observation report is confirmed by it.
(C 1.1) Any consistent observation report is confirmed by itself.




This rule is too generous, since it also applies if a is contradictory. As discussed in the
previous section, we should add an antecedent to this rule requiring that a be admissible:
64Here, the notion of confirmation should be taken liberally, including the possibility that IX
is indifferent regarding ~. In Hempel's terminology, IX /( ~ means 'IX does not disconfirm W.
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Admissible Entailment:
In words: an admissible observation report confirms any of its consequences.
As for condition (Cl.I), notice that by putting ~=a in Entailment we obtain the
axiom schema 0.1::: a (Reflexivity), expressing that any observation report confirms itself.
Clearly, this axiom schema is too strong, since it implies that any formula would be
admissible. However, applying the same substitution to Admissible Entailment, or
translating (Cl.l) by reading 'consistent' as 'admissible', would yield a tautology. We
should therefore explicitly add sufficiently weakened forms of Reflexivity. As it turns out,
the following three rules are sufficient, each of them expressing some aspect of
admissibility:








Left Reflexivity states that any formula that occurs as evidence in a conjectural argument
is admissible; Right Reflexivity expresses the same for hypotheses occurring in some
conjectural argument. These rules imply that a formula is admissible iff it occurs in some
conjectural argument.
The third weakening of Reflexivity is much less intuitive, which is remarkable since
Reflexivity itself seems such a simple rule. Confirmatory Reflexivity can perhaps best be
understood when considering its contrapositive:
This rule states that if ~ is inadmissible, i.e. too strong a statement with regard to the
background knowledge, its negation --.,~ is so weak that it is confirmed by arbitrary
admissible formulas a.
Next, we arrive at the group of consequence conditions.
(C2) Consequence condition: if an observation report confirms every one
of a set K of sentences, then it also confirms any sentence which is
a logical consequence of K.
(e2. I) Special consequence condition: if an observation report
confirms a hypothesis H, then it also confirms every
consequence of H.
(e2.2) Equivalence condition: if an observation report confirms a
hypothesis H, then it also confirms every hypothesis which
is logically equivalent with H.
(e2.3) Conjunction condition: if an observation report confirms each
of two hypotheses, then it also confirms their conjunction.
6. Properties of conjectural consequence relations
Putting general consequence condition (C2) aside for the moment, we see that each of the
other three rules has an immediate translation into a rule for confirmatory consequence




In words, any hypothesis that is logically weaker than a given hypothesis confirmed by a.
is also confirmed by a.. This rule will be further analysed in §24. Notice that Admissible
Entailment is an instance of Right Weakening (put ~=o.).
Equivalence condition (C2.2) translates to Right Logical Equivalence:
F~f-7y, a. I< ~
o.l<y
Clearly, Right Logical Equivalence follows from Right Weakeningv>. FinalIy,
conjunction condition (C2.3) translates to the rule of Right And:
• Right Logical Equivalence:
• Right And:
Right And is a very powerful rule, stating that the set of all confirmed hypotheses
(interpreted as a conjunction) is itself confirmed. The combination of Right And and Right
Weakening implies Hempel's general consequence condition (C2): if E confirms every
formula of a set K, then it also confirms the conjunction of the formulas in K (by Right
And), and therefore also every consequence of this conjunction (by Right Weakeningj=.
The next group of adequacy conditions is formed by the consistency conditions.
(C3) Consistency condition: every consistent observation report is
compatible with the set of all the hypotheses which it confirms.
(C3.1) Special consistency condition: an observation report is
compatible with any hypothesis which it confirms.
(C3.2) An observation report does not confirm any hypotheses
which contradict each other.
Like the general consequence condition (C2), general consistency condition (C3) cannot be
translated directly into a rule, since we have no means to refer to the set of confirmed
formulas. However, in the light of Right And the conjunction of the formulas in this set
is itself confirmed, and therefore it is sufficient to formulate a rule expressing the special
consistency condition (C3.l):
• Consistency:
Notice that, as a coroIlary of this rule, we have that contradictory formulas are not
admissible (put ~=o.).
Condition (C3.2) expresses that for any formula ~, if ~ is in the set of confirmed
651n fact, (C2.2) is better numbered (C2.1.1), but I follow Hempel's original numbering here.
66This holds only for finite K, an assumption that I will make throughout.
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Clearly, Right Consistency is implied by Consistency and Right And.
Finally, we consider the following equivalence condition:
(C4) Equivalence condition for observations: if an observation report B
confirms a hypothesis H, then any observation report logically
equivalent with B also confirms H.
The translation of this condition is obvious.
• Left Logical Equivalence:
l=aH~ • a I< y
~ I< Y
It is interesting to note that (C4) is the only condition given by Hempel relating two
confirmatory arguments with different observations. In §24 we will consider some
additional rules of this important form.
§23. ADEQUACY CONDmONS FOR EXPLANATORY REASONING
I will proceed by translating the set of adequacy conditions for explanatory reasoning (§8)
into rules for explanatory consequence relations. Throughout this section, the intended
interpretation of a I< ~ is 'hypothesis ~ is a possible explanation of observations a' .
We start with the converse entailment condition:
(E1) Converse entailment condition: an observation report is explained
by every consistent formula entailing it.
(El.1) Any consistent observation report explains itself.
The following rule provides a first approximation of (EI):
Converse Entailment:
However, an antecedent should be added to the effect that f3 is an admissible hypothesis:
I=~-ta , ~ I< ~
a I< ~Admissible Converse Entailment:
As in the case of confirmatory reasoning, condition (El.I) is expressed by rules of
restricted reflexivity. Left and Right Reflexivity are valid for explanatory reasoning as
well; thus, the validity of these rules extends to conjectural reasoning in general. In
addition we will employ the following rule:
Explanatory Reflexivity:
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Like its confirmatory counterpart, this rule is best understood by rewriting it into its
contrapositive:
This rule states that if ~ is inadmissible, i.e. too strong a statement with regard to the
background knowledge, its negation -,~ is so weak that it is explained by arbitrary
admissible formulas a.
Next, we consider the converse consequence condition:
(E2) Converse consequence condition: if an observation report is
explained by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained by every
consistent formula entailing H.
CE2.I) Equivalence condition: if an observation report is explained
by a hypothesis H, then it is also explained every hypothesis
which is logically equivalent with H.
Ignoring the requirement of consistency, the following rule captures the essence of the
converse consequence condition:
• Right Strengthening:
This rule expresses that any hypothesis that is logically stronger than a given explanation
for a also explains a. However, according to our approved recipe Right Strengthening
should be weakened in order to allow only admissible hypotheses:
••• . F'Y~ ~ , a I< ~ , 'Y I< 'Y• Admissible Right Strengthening:
al<'Y
A point that should be stressed here is that Admissible Right Strengthening requires
certain properties of the underlying explanation mechanism (i.e. monotonicity) - this
will be elaborated in the next chapter.v?
The next adequacy condition for explanatory reasoning is the special consistency
condition:
(E3) Special consistency condition: an observation report is compatible
with every hypothesis by which it is explained.




Consistency is therefore a rule generally valid for conjectural reasoning.
67Notice that Admissible Right Strengthening fails to imply the equivalence condition
(E2.1). However, as will be demonstrated in Lemma 6.9, CE2.1)is implied in the presence of
some other rules for explanatory reasoning.
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Clearly, there are no analogues in explanatory reasoning to the consistency condition
(C3), nor to condition (C3.2), because alternative explanations may be incompatible. For
. instance, if p, q, and -,q are admissible we have both p k pl\q and p I< Pl\-,q, so the set
of explanations of p is not consistent. Furthermore, the conjunction of two explanations
is not necessarily an explanation, so Right And is invalid. However, notice that, just as
the set of hypotheses confirmed by given observations is closed under conjunction by
Right And, the set of observations explained by a given hypothesis is also closed under
conjunction, giving rise to the rule of Left And or, as I will call it, Additivity.
Additivity:
This rule is of great importance for practical incremental induction algorithms. To
understand its significance, suppose that a denotes the observations seen so far, while ~ is
a new observation. We want to know whether 'Y, which is known to be an explanation of
a, also explains al\~. The rule of Additivity now states that a sufficient condition for this
is that 'Y explains the new observation ~. Notice that this rule is clearly invalid for
confirmatory reasoning.
As a corollary to Consistency and Additivity, the following rule is valid for
explanatory consequence relations:
Left Consistency:
This rule expresses that the set of observations explained by a given hypothesis ~ is
consistent. Notice that Left Consistency is not valid for confirmatory reasoning: there is
no inherent reason why the same hypothesis could not be conjectured given evidence -,a
if it can be conjectured given a.
Unlike the previous rules, the rules of Additivity and Left Consistency have not been
derived from the adequacy conditions for explanatory reasoning, but represent additional
postulates. In effect, this means that adequacy condition (E3) has been strengthened as
follows:
(E3) Explanatory consistency condition: every consistent hypothesis is
compatible with the set of all the observation reports which it
explains.
(E3.1) Special consistency condition: an observation report is
compatible with any hypothesis by which it is explained.
(E3.2) Two incompatible observation reports are not explained by
the same hypothesis.
(E3.I) corresponds to the rule of Consistency, which in the presence of Additivity implies
(E3). (E3.2) corresponds to the rule of Left Consistency.
Finally, the equivalence condition for observations (E4) has been treated earlier, and
corresponds to Left Logical Equivalence.
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§24. ADDITIONALRULES FOR CONJECIVRAL REASONING
In the previous two sections the rules of Left and Right Reflexivity, Left and Right
Logical Equivalence, and Consistency turned out to be valid for both confirmatory and
explanatory reasoning. Thus, these rules express general properties of conjectural
reasoning, with an intuitive reading obtained by interpreting a t::: ~ as 'hypothesis ~ could
be conjectured if the evidence is a,68. The intention of the present section is to identify a
few additional rules that are meaningful for both confirmatory and explanatory reasoning,
even if not all of them are actually generally valid.
Predictions
Given his background as a member of the Wiener Kreis, and his familiarity with Popper's
work, it is surprising that Hempel did not include the principles of verification and
falsification among his adequacy conditions. The principle of verification can be
formulated as follows:
A predicted observation verifies the hypothesis.
Here, verification should be interpreted qualitatively: the hypothesis is still a possible
conjecture after observation of a predicted observation. The principle of falsification, on
the other hand, can be formulated as follows:
An observation, the negation of which was predicted, falsifies the hypothesis.
Clearly, if a hypothesis is falsified, it ceases to be a possible conjecture.
In order to formulate these principles as rules, we need to define what a prediction is.
DEFINITION 6.2. Given a conjectural argument a t::: ~, a formula "(E L is
predicted iff Fal\~~"(.
This definition stresses the fact that the 'epistemic outcome' of a conjectural argument
a I< ~ is al\~ rather than just ~. Of course, al\~ is logically equivalent to ~ if ~ explains
a by deductive entailment, and the definition of a prediction could be simplified to
F~~"(. However, al\~ is logically stronger than ~ if ~ only plausibly explains a, or if ~
is merely confirmed by a. Definition 6.2 covers all these cases.
It is now straightforward to formalise the principles of verification and falsification:
Fal\~~"( , a t::: ~
al\"( t::: ~




68Notice that, with the exception of Consistency, each of these rules is also valid when a \(~
is interpreted as '~ is a plausible consequence of a' (they are all valid in KLM's system C).
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In analogy with Verification and Falsification, if y is a predicted formula, it can also be
added to the hypothesis, but its negation cannot. This is expressed by the folIowing rules:
F(Y."P--7Y, (l I< P
(Y.I< p/\y




In the next two subsections, I will investigate the implications of Verification and Right
Extension, and those of Falsification and Right Excess.
Verification, Right Extension, and lncrementality
The significance of Verification and Right Extension exceeds conjectural reasoning: they
are also valid in KLM's weakest system C.
LEMMA 6.3. Verification and Right Extension are derived rules of the
system C.
Proof. Suppose F(l/\P--7Y, then by Entailment (Y./\p t- y. Furthermore, if
(Y.I- p, then by Cut (Y.t- y. By using Cautious Monotonicity we derive
(Y./\y I- P; by using Right And we obtain (Y.t- p/\ y. •
The proof of Lemma 6.3 suggests that Verification is related to Cautious Monotonicity,
while Right Extension is related to Right And; I will now argue that this is indeed the
case.
Cautious Monotonicity states that, if P and y are two tentative conclusions from rx,
adding one of them to (l still alIows the other one as a tentative conclusion:
(Y.I<P,(Y.I<Y
(l/\p I< YCautious Monotonicity:
Since P and yare tentative conclusions, they can only be reached by means of additional
assumptions not present in (l (coded in e.g. the preference ordering employed by the
reasoner). Cautious Monotonicity states that these additional assumptions can be
combined without problem: the assumptions on which P is based do not contradict the
assumptions on which y is based. Now, one can imagine, at least in principle, that
sometimes such assumptions are incompatible - in such a case, we need to state that
both tentative conclusions are based on the same assumptions. This, of course, is exactly
what is stated by Verification: (l/\p includes alI the assumptions needed to derive p, and
F(l/\P--7Y states that, given these assumptions, y can be obtained deductively rather than
tentatively. In a similar fashion, Right Extension represents a weakening of Right And. A
concrete example of a form of confirmatory reasoning in which Cautious Monotonicity is
replaced by its weaker versions Verification is given in §28.
Right Extension shows certain ways of strengthening the hypothesis. Although this
rule is rather trivial for explanatory reasoning, it interacts in an interesting way with
Right Weakening, a property of confirmatory reasoning.
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LEMMA 6.4. The combination of Right Extension and Right Weakening is
equivalent to the following rule:
Fo;A~-tY , 0; I< ~
0; I< Y
Proof In order to derive Predictive Right Weakening, suppose Fo;A~-tY
and 0; I< ~, then by Right Extension 0; I< ~Nf, and the result follows by
Right Weakening.
Predictive Right Weakening implies Right Weakening, since F~-tY
implies Fo;A~-tY.
Predictive Right Weakening implies Right Extension, since Fo;A~-tY
implies Fo;A~-t~AY. •
• Predictive Right Weakening:
In words, Predictive Right Weakening expresses that given a conjectural argument, any
predicted formula is confirmed by the same evidence. The manner in which Right
Weakening is strengthened to Predictive Right Weakening reflects the idea that the
'epistemic outcome' of a conjectural argument 0; I< ~ is o;A~ rather than just ~. The
adjective 'predictive' will be used whenever the consequent of the rule refers to a predicted
formula. Notice that by putting y=o; in Predictive Right Weakening we obtain Left
Reflexivity.
Lemma 6.4 results from the delicate interplay between Right Extension, which can be
seen as a restricted form of Right Strengthening, and Right Weakening. A similar result





The significance of this rule becomes perhaps more apparent when considering its
contrapositive (an equivalent formulation):
Fo;-t~ ,~Il:y
0; 11= Y
That is, hypotheses that are refuted by certain evidence stay refuted when the evidence is
strengthened. In other words, the set of refuted hypotheses is monotonically non-
decreasing with the evidence, or equivalently, the set of possible hypotheses (the Version
Space) is monotonically non-increasing. This is exactly the property that was mentioned
in §12 as a necessary condition for performing incremental induction, which justifies its
name.
A conjectural consequence relation is said to be incremental whenever it satisfies
Incrementality. Note that Admissible Converse Entailment is an instance of
Incrementality (put '(=0;). This implies that an incremental confirmatory consequence
relation satisfies both Admissible Entailment and Admissible Converse Entailment, and
one may wonder whether this combination of a rule and its converse re-introduces the
69Clearly, Left Weakening is invalid for deductive or plausible reasoning.
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confirmation paradox through the back door. This question will be answered in the next
chapter: the semantics for incremental confirmatory reasoning proposed in §28, formulated
in terms of partial models, satisfies both Right Weakening (hence Admissible Entailment)
and Incrementality (hence Admissible Converse Entailment). This is not at variance with
Hempel's analysis (§6), since he considered the joint effect of the consequence condition
(Right Weakening) and the converse consequence condition (Right Strengthening), the
latter of which is much stronger than Converse Entailment.
I will now prove a result that is similar to Lemma 6.4.
LEMMA 6.5. The combination of Verification and Incrementality is
equivalent to the following rule:
Predictive Incrementality:
Proof To derive Predictive Incrementality, suppose I=al\y~~ and a I< y,
then by Verification al\~ I< y, and by Incrementality ~ I< y.
Predictive Incrementality implies Incrementality, since I=a~~ implies
I=al\y~~.
Predictive Incrementality implies Verification, since I=al\~~y implies
I=al\~~al\y. •
Predictive Incrementality can be seen as a strengthening of Incrementality, in the sense
that ~ is not merely a weakening of evidence a, but can be any set of predicted
observations. Since Verification is considered to be valid for arbitrary conjectural
consequence relations, I will consider Incrementality and Predictive Incrementality
interchangeable. Note that Right Reflexivity is an instance of Predictive Incrementality
(put y=~). .
Falsification, Right Excess, and Consistency
Falsification is not universally valid: for instance, it fails to hold for deductive reasoning
(al\-,y may be unsatisfiable, in which case anything can be deduced from it). Similarly,
Right Excess is not valid for deductive reasoning (put a=false). As it turns out, both
Falsification and Right Excess are reformulations of Consistency.
LEMMA 6.6. Each of Falsification and Right Excess is equivalent to
Consistency in the presence of Left and Right Logical Equivalence.
Proof To derive Falsification, suppose I=al\~~y, i.e. I=~~-,(al\-'y),
then by Consistency al\-,y ~ ~.To derive Consistency from Falsification,
suppose a I< ~ and F~~-,a, i.e. I=al\~~false, then by Falsification
al\-,false ~ ~,and by Left Logical Equivalence a ~~, a contradiction.
To derive Right Excess, suppose I=al\~~y, i.e. F~I\-,y~-,a, then by
Consistency a ~~I\-'y. To derive Consistency from Right Excess, sup-
pose a I< ~ and F~~-,a, i.e. Fal\~~false, then by Right Excess a ~
~I\-,false, and by Right Logical Equivalence a ~ ~, a contradiction. •
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Of these three equivalent rules, Consistency will be considered the most fundamental one.
A consequence relation is said to be consistent whenever it satisfies Consistency.
The next two results show that Consistency is equivalent to Right Consistency in the
case of confirmatory reasoning, and to Left Consistency in the case of explanatory
reasoning.
LEMMA 6.7. In the presence of Admissible Entailment and Left Reflexivity,
Right Consistency implies Consistency.
Proof For Consistency, suppose I=~-+"',ex, i.e. I=ex~,~. Now, either we
have ex t:: ex, or else ex Ii: ex. In the former case, ex t::,~ by Admissible
Entailment, and we conclude by Right Consistency. In the latter case, we
have ex Ii: 0 for any 0 by Left Reflexivity. •
As has already been remarked, Consistency implies Right Consistency in the presence of
Right And. As a corollary to Lemma 6.7, we have that Right Consistency and
Consistency are equivalent in the presence of Left Reflexivity, Admissible Entailment,
and Right And.
LEMMA 6.8. In the presence of Right Reflexivity and Admissible Converse
Entailment, Left Consistency implies Consistency.
Proof For Consistency, suppose I=~~,ex. Now, either ~ t:: ~ or ~ Ii: ~; in
the former case, ,ex t:: ~ by Admissible Converse Entailment, and we
conclude by Left Consistency. In the latter case, we have 0 Ii: ~ for any 0 by
Right Reflexivity. •
Since Left Consistency follows from Consistency in the presence of Additivity, as has
been noted above, it follows that Left Consistency and Consistency are equivalent in the
presence of Right Reflexivity, Admissible Converse Entailment, and Additivity.
Convex consequence relations
As we have seen above, confirmatory reasoning obeys the rule of Right Weakening, while
certain forms of explanatory reasoning satisfy the rule of Admissible Right Strengthening.
I will now show that these two properties can be seen as special cases of the more general
property of convexity, thus providing a clear link with the Version Space model (see §9).
In confirmatory reasoning, the rule of Right Weakening expresses that confirmed
hypotheses can be arbitrarily weakened:
• Right Weakening:
Thus, if we order the set of hypotheses by logical implication, there will be an upper
boundary of hypotheses confirmed by ex, and every hypothesis below this boundary is also
confirmed by ex (fig. 6.1). Analogously, if the rule of Right Strengthening would be valid
for explanatory reasoning, the set of explanations of given observations would have a
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Figure 6.1. Graphical representation of the set of hypotheses
confirmed by given evidence c, when Right Weakening
holds. Arrows point from stronger to weaker hypotheses.
lower boundary with respect to the ordering of logical implication, and every hypothesis
above this boundary is an explanation of a (fig. 6.2).
Right Strengthening:
Figure 6.2. Graphical representation of the set of
explanations of given evidence u, if
Right Strengthening would hold.
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Figure 6.3. Graphical representation of the set of possible
hypotheses given evidence a, when Right Interval holds.
We are interested in what these two rules have in common. Graphically speaking, the
answer is simple: supply the set of possible hypothesis with both a lower and an upper
boundary (fig. 6.3). The formal analogue of this figure is the following rule:
I=~~'Y, I='Y~O ,ex I< ~ , a I< 0
al<'Y
• Right Interval:
Clearly, both Right Weakening and Right Strengthening imply Right Interval. A
consequence relation is said to be convex whenever it satisfies Right Interval. The
justification for this terminology is that Right Interval expresses that the set {~ I exI< ~ }
is convex wrt. the ordering established by 1= (if ~,oare elements, then so is any 'Y such
that ~~'Y~O).
However, no consistent explanatory consequence relation satisfies Right
Strengthening. The following result shows that explanatory consequence relations that
satisfy Admissible Right Strengthening are convex.
LEMMA 6.9. In the presence of Admissible Converse Entailment and Left
and Right Reflexivity, Right Interval is implied by Admissible Right
Strengthening.
Proof First of all, if a I< ~ then ~ I< ~ by Right Reflexivity. Furthermore,
if I=~~'Y then 'Y I< ~ by Admissible Converse Entailment, and 'Y I< 'Y by
Left Reflexivity. We conclude by Admissible Right Strengthening. •
An interesting corollary of Lemma 6.9 is that, in the presence of the same three rules,
Admissible Right Strengthening implies Right Logical Equivalence, since the latter is an
instance of Right Interval (put o=~).
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As suggested by the similarity between fig. 6.3 and fig. 3.1, the rule of Right Interval
can be construed as expressing the Version Space model of concept learning from
examples. This becomes immediate once the condition y t::: y is read as 'y does not cover
any negative example'. For instance, an adequate reading of Admissible Right
Strengthening in the context of learning from positive and negative examples is 'if ~ is a
possible explanation/P of positive examples o; and y implies ~ without covering any
negative examples, then y is also a possible explanation of a.'.
One may note that if the set of possible hypotheses is closed under conjunction, the
upper boundary in fig. 6.3 is represented by a single hypothesis. The same can be said
about the lower boundary if the set of possible hypotheses is closed under disjunction.
This justifies the following definitions.
DEFINITION 6.10. A consequence relation is said to be conjunctively closed
if it satisfies the following rule:
Right And:
A consequence relation is said to be disjunctively closed if it satisfies the
following rule:
Right Or:
As we will see in the next chapter, explanatory consequence relations are typically
disjunctively closed, while confirmatory consequence relations are conjunctively closed.
The following property of incremental convex explanatory consequence relations will
prove useful in the next chapter.
LEMMA 6.11. In the presence of Predictive Incrementality and Explanatory
Reflexivity, Admissible Right Strengthening implies the following rule:
C" R" ht St heni a I< y , ---,~ ~ yonsistent Ig rengt emng: Aa. I< I-'/\y
Proof Suppose ---,~It y; since F---,(~/\Y)/\Y-t---,~, we have ---,(~/\y) It Y by
Predictive Incrementality. Furthermore, suppose a. t::: y, then by Right
Reflexivity (which is an instance of Predictive Incrementality) y t::: y, so by
Explanatory Reflexivity we have ~/\y t::: ~/\y. We conclude by Admissible
Right Strengthening. •
Consistent Right Strengthening is a powerful rule, which states that an explanation y can
be extended with any formula ~ of which the negation is not explained by y.
70By Right Reflexivity, this means that 13 itself is admissible, i.e. does not cover any
negative example.
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§25. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I will now summarise the main results of this chapter. The following rules have been
found valid for either explanatory or confirmatory reasoning - from now on, any
conjectural consequence relation will be assumed to satisfy them.
• Left Reflexivity:
• Right Reflexivity:















l=aA~~Y , a I< ~
aAY I< ~
l=aA~~Y , a I< ~
a I< ~AY
It may be argued that neither of these rules seems typical for conjectural reasoning: each of
them could also occur in, say, the context of plausible reasoning. Therefore, additional
properties are needed to characterise different forms of conjectural reasoning.
Adding the following three rules ensures satisfaction of each of Hempel's adequacy
conditions for confirmation 71.
DEFINITION 6.12. A conjectural consequence relation is said to be
confirmatory if it satisfies the following rules:
• Confirmatory Reflexivity:
• Right Weakening:
a I< a , a It: -,~
~I<~
I=~~Y , a I< ~
a I< Y
It is called Hempelian if, in addition, it satisfies the following rule:
al<~,aI<Y
a I< ~AY• Right And:
100
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§25. Summary and conclusions
In the presence of Right Extension, Right Weakening is equivalent to Predictive Right
Weakening. Furthermore, confirmatory consequence relations satisfy Admissible
Entailment, which means that Right Consistency implies Consistency (Lemma 6.7). For
Hempelian consequence relations, Right Consistency and Consistency are equivalent. The
distinction between confirmatory and Hempelian consequence relations is motivated by the
fact that in the next chapter I will identify a form of confirmatory reasoning that is not
conjunctively closed.
Analogously, I have given rules that express the adequacy conditions for explanatory
reasoning.
DEFINITION 6.13. A conjectural consequence relation is said to be




FI3~(X ,13 I< 13
(X I< 13
(Xl<y,I3I<Y
(x" 13 I< Y
Admissible Converse Entailment:
Additivity:
It is called Peircean if, in addition, it satisfies the following rule:
Ad 0 obi ROh S h ° Fy~I3,(XI<I3,YI<Ynnsst e ig t trengt emng: (Xl<y•
For explanatory consequence relations Left Consistency and Consistency are equivalent.
The distinction between explanatory and Peircean consequence relations is needed because
not every explanatory consequence relation satisfies Admissible Right Strengthening -
most notably, inference of plausible explanations does not.
I have furthermore identified the concepts of incremental and convex conjectural
consequence relations. An incremental consequence relation only considers a hypothesis to
be falsified when it is explicitly contradicted by available observations. This is expressed
by the rule ofIncrementality, or equivalently (in the presence of Verification) by the rule
of Predictive Incrementality. Any incremental conjectural consequence relation satisfies
Admissible Converse Entailment.
Convex consequence relations satisfy the property of Right Interval; this holds for
confirmatory and Peircean consequence relations alike. Hempelian consequence relations
are conjunctively closed, hence there is a single strongest hypothesis. Alternatively,
consequence relations may be disjunctively closed, giving rise to a single weakest
hypothesis - this is trivially so for confirmatory consequence relations (because of Right
Weakening), but also for certain explanatory consequence relations, as we will see in the
next chapter.
In principle, the results in this chapter have been formulated with an eye for the
subsequent formulation and proof of a number of representation theorems in the next
chapter, However, I would like to stress that the results obtained in this chapter also have
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a certain independent value: they provide a vocabulary with which existing approaches to
and models of computational induction can be described and analysed. The following
correspondences are particularly significant:
(i) the notion of convexity is the formal analogue of the well-known
Version Space model of learning concepts from examples;
(ii) the notion of an admissible hypothesis can be construed as one not
covering any negative example;
(iii) the property of Incrementality formalises a practical distinction
between so-called interactive and empirical approaches to
computational induction;
(iv) the property of Additivity represents a characteristic of explanatory
induction that is computationally employed in many induction
algorithms.
Thus, this chapter can also be seen as a contribution to the machine learning literature, in
the sense that it provides some tools for the conceptual analysis of machine learning
problems and algorithms.
APPENDIX: PROPERTIES OF CONJECfURAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
Although the central concern of this thesis is the notion of inductive proof procedures
rather than discovery procedures, I will briefly demonstrate that some of the rules discussed
in this chapter are meaningful also when interpreted as properties of discovery procedures.
This is primarily meant to illustrate that the concept of a conjectural consequence relation
may have significance outside the scope of this thesis.
I will assume that the discovery procedure operates as follows: it receives a sequence of
observations al,a2,a3, ... ' and after each observation ai it outputs a single hypothesis
~i' also referred to as the current hypothesis. This is denoted by al"·· ."ai K ~i; i.e. in
statements of the form a K ~, a refers to the complete set of observations presented to
the discovery algorithm up to a certain moment.
Clearly, the fact that the discovery procedure outputs, at any moment, a single
hypothesis means that rules of the form
... a K P
aK'Y
are meaningless if y;tp (and tautologies otherwise). This rules out a number of rules
(Right Logical Equivalence, Left Reflexivity, Right Strengthening and its derivations,
(Predictive) Right Weakening, Right And, and Admissible Entailment). Furthermore,
rules of the form
al<'Y
are meaningless if 'Y allows for several instantiations for fixed a (this rules out
(Admissible) Converse Entailment and Entailment).
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Of the remaining rules, (Predictive) Incrementality is not invalid but of limited use,
since it expresses that the discovery procedure always outputs the same hypothesis (for
suppose that P is the current hypothesis, then P was also output at every previous step);
Confirmatory and Explanatory Reflexivity do not seem very meaningful; and Right
Consistency is true but trivial, since if a I< P then a ~ y for any 'Y#P. This leaves us
with the following set of rules:
Consistency:
Fa/\p~y , a I< P
a/\Yl<p

















• Left Logical Equivalence:
In the context of a discovery procedure, Verification expresses that the procedure will
not change its current hypothesis if the next observation is a predicted one. In the
terminology of (Angluin & Smith, 1983), Verification indicates that the discovery
procedure is conservative. On the other hand, Falsification expresses that the current
hypothesis must be abandoned if the next observation contradicts a prediction. The rule of
Consistency expresses the stronger property that the current hypothesis is (logically)
compatible with the observations.
Right Reflexivity seems a reasonable rule: if a discovery algorithm conjectures P on
the basis of a, wouldn't it still conjecture P if it finds out that P is actually true?
Additivity expresses another (but much weaker) 'conservative' property: the current
hypothesis is retained if it would also have been output on the basis of the next
observation alone. Left Consistency seems reasonable in the context of an explanatory
discovery procedure. Left Logical Equivalence expresses that the syntactical form of the
observations (including their order) is irrelevant, which mayor may not be true for a
discovery procedure.
However, note that a discovery procedure might also satisfy some rules that are
meaningless for proof procedures. For instance, the following rule expresses that new
hypotheses are never logically weaker than old ones:
• Generalisation:
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Clearly, this property does not make much sense for a proof procedure: if y is a possible
conjecture on the basis of IX,and <> is a possible conjecture on the basis of IX/\I3,it does
not follow that there exists any relationship between yand <>.
* * ** * *
CHAPTER 7
RULE S YS TEMS FOR
CONJECTURAL REASONING
in which various forms of conjectural reasoning will be
axiomatised and semantically characterised -
INTHIS CHAPTER I will develop axiomatic and semantic accounts of various forms ofconjectural reasoning. The main purpose of the resulting logical systems is to provide
a descriptive taxonomy of conjectural reasoning. This taxonomy will contain two main
families, corresponding to the two forms of conjectural reasoning considered in this thesis:
explanatory and confirmatory reasoning. Within the family of confirmatory reasoning a
further distinction is made between incremental and non-incremental forms, the former
based on the semantic notion of regular models, the latter based on the notion of
consistency. For each of these three forms of conjectural reasoning a characterisation is
given in the form of a semantics accompanied by a sound and complete rule system. It
should be noted that the representation results are obtained for a propositional language L.
§26. EXPLANATORY REASONING
This section provides a formalisation of the idea that explanatory reasoning preserves
explanatory power. As defined in §19, given some explanation mechanism h the
explanatory power of a formula exis defined as its closure Cnl-(ex) = {y I ex I- y}. Using
this definition, we may require of an explanatory argument exI< ~ that Cnl-(ex) ~ Cnl-(~)'
i.e. for every y, if ex I- y then ~ I- y. If I- satisfies the rules of the system M from the
KLM-framework this is equivalent with ~ I- ex (Lemma 5.2).
In this section I will mostly restrict attention to explanation mechanisms that satisfy
the rules of M. The resulting form of conjectural reasoning is referred to as strong
explanatory reasoning; the adjective 'strong' will be often omitted if no confusion can
arise. Weaker explanation mechanisms will be briefly considered at the end of the section.
Strong explanatory reasoning is characterised in two steps. I will first define a system,
Mrev, which embodies a reversed version of the KLM system M. However, Mrev does
not satisfy Consistency, and is therefore, strictly speaking, not a system for explanatory
reasoning. Using rules discussed in the previous chapter, a more restrictive version of
Mrev, called EM, is defined and characterised.
7. Rule systems for conjectural reasoning
Reverse deductive consequence relations
This subsection presents a reversed version of the KLM system M, defined in such a way
as to facilitate as much as possible the development of a system for strong explanatory
reasoning in the next subsection. Since the latter is self-contained, the reader may want to
skip the present subsection.
Given a set of models representing the implicit background theory, a reverse deductive
consequence relation consists of those arguments of which the conclusion has at least the
same explanatory power as the premisses in each of those models, where the explanatory
power of a formula a in a model m is the set {y I m 1= a~y}. This leads to the
following definition.
DEFINITION 7.1. A reverse deductive structure is a set WcU. The
consequence relation it defines is denoted by j:::w and is defined by: a j:::w P
iff for every me Wand for every yE L: if m 1= a~y then m 1= p~y. A
consequence relation is called reverse deductive iff it is defined by a reverse
deductive structure.
For fixed m and y the preservation condition boils down to m 1= p~av'Y; quantifying
over 'Ywe obtain the equivalent condition a j:::w P iff for every mE W: m 1= p~a. This
latter condition will be used in the proof of the representation theorem; however, as a
definition the above formulation is preferred, because it expresses the idea of a preservation
semantics more clearly.
The following system provides an axiomatisation of reverse deductive consequence
relations; a formal proof of this statement follows the discussion of the main features of
the system.
D EFlNITION 7.2. The system M rev consists of the following axiom
schema and inference rules:
• Reflexivity: at<a












Mrev can be readily obtained from the KLM system M (with some minor modifications)
by applying the rewrite rule a I- p ~ P t<a. The first four rules have been discussed in




LEMMA 7.3. Every consequence relation satisfying the rules of Mrev is
incremental, convex, disjunctively closed, and conjunctively closed.
Proof. Predictive Incrementality implies Incrementality by Lemma 6.5.
By Lemma 6.9, Right Interval foIlows from Admissible Converse
Entailment (which is an instance of Predictive Incrementality) and Left and
Right Reflexivity (hence from Reflexivity).
In order to derive Right Or we will need the following rule:
a I< ~
...,~ I< ..., a
Contraposition can be derived as foIlows. Suppose a I< ~, then by
Conditionalisation ~~a I< true, by Incrementality ...,a~...,~ I< true,
and by Right Strengthening ...,a~...,~ I< ...,a. Furthermore, since by
Reflexivity ...,a I< ...,a, we conclude by Additivity and Incrementality.
Now, to derive Right Or, suppose a I< ~ and a I< y, then by
Contraposition ...,~ I< ...,a and ...,yI< ...,a, by Additivity ""~I\""y I< -,a, and
we conclude by Contraposition.
Right And follows from Right Strengthening.
• Contraposition:
•
The fact that reverse deductive consequence relations are conjunctively closed may seem
surprising, but this is a consequence of the fact that an unsatisfiable formula entails
everything. Indeed, we will see below that explanatory consequence relations are not
conjunctively closed (they continue to be disjunctively closed, however). To see that
Mrev does not satisfy Consistency, observe that for any unsatisfiable formula a we have
I=a~-,a, but also a I< a by Reflexivity.
In order to prove completeness of Mrev with respect to the set of reverse deductive
structures we will need the following rule:
I=~~a
a I< ~
To see that Converse Entailment is a derived rule of Mrev, put a='( in Incrementality and
use Reflexivity.
The following theorem proves that reverse deductive structures characterise reverse
deductive consequence relations.
Converse Entailment:
THEOREM 7.4 (Representation theorem for reverse deductive consequence
relations). A consequence relation is reverse deductive iff it satisfies the
rules of Mrev-
Proof. The only-if part involves demonstrating that, for a given reverse
deductive structure W, the consequence relation lew it defines satisfies the
rules of Mrev. This is quite trivial and wiIl only be done for Predictive
Incrementality. Suppose that I=al\y~~, i.e. for every mE U: if m 1= a and
m 1= y then m 1= ~. Furthermore, suppose that for every mE W: m 1= y~a,
i.e. if m 1= y then m 1= a. Since WS;;;;U, this implies that for every me W,
if m 1= y then m 1= ~, i.e. m 1= y~~.
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For the if part, let t< be an arbitrary consequence relation satisfying the rules
of Mrev, and consider the following reverse deductive structure:
W = {mE U I for all a, ~ such that a t< ~: m F ~~a}
We will prove that a t< ~ iff a t<w~. The only-if part follows directly from
the construction of W. Suppose that a ~~,we will show that there exists a
model moE W that does not satisfy ~~a.
Define r0 = {-,a} u {()I ()t< ~}; we will first show that I'0 is satisfiable.
Suppose not, then by compactness there is a finite ~~ {() I ()t< ~} such that
FLl~a72, i.e. F~~(~~a); by Converse Entailment ~~a t< ~. Further-
more, since () t< ~ for ()Ell, we have ~ t< ~ by Additivity 73. Using
Additivity and Incrementality, we obtain a t< ~. Contradiction, so T 0 is
satisfiable.
Let mo Fro; clearly mo'rl=a and, since by Reflexivity ~E ro, mo F ~. We
conclude that mo does not satisfy ~~a; it remains to prove that moE W;
i.e., that for all <p, '" such that <p t< '" we have mo F ",~<p. Suppose
<p t< \jI, then by Right Strengthening <p t< \jI"~, and by Conditionalisation
",~<p t< ~; thus 'I'~<PE ro and therefore mo F \jI~<p. •
As indicated above, reverse deductive consequence relations are not consistent, since
unsatisfiable formulas do count as explanations. Overcoming this defect leads us to the
notion of strong explanatory reasoning.
Explanatory consequence relations
In this subsection I will define a system EM (explanatory reasoning wrt. a monotonic
explanation mechanism) that satisfies Consistency but contains weaker versions of
Reflexivity and Right Strengthening. The semantic characterisation of explanatory
reasoning demonstrates that EM is strictly more restrictive than Mrev.
I will start again with a semantic definition of explanatory reasoning. Like a reverse
deductive structure, an explanatory structure is a set of models. However, an explanatory
structure defines a different consequence relation, since not only must the conclusion of
every argument have at least the same explanatory power as the premisses, but in addition
the conclusion should be satisfiable.
DEFINITION 7.5. A strong explanatory structure is a set W~U. The
consequence relation it defines is denoted by t<w and is defined by: a t<w ~
iff (i) there is an mE W such that m F ~, and (ii) for every mE Wand for
every yE L: if m F a~y then m F ~~y. A consequence relation is called
strong explanatory iff it is defined by an explanatory structure.
72By a slight abuse of notation, ~ denotes both a finite set of formulas, and their
conjunction.
73If ~=0, we have true j:: ~ by Reflexivity and Convergence.
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As said before, the adjective 'strong' will be often omitted if no confusion can arise.
Furthermore, in the proofs of the lemmas below condition (ii) will be read as the
. equivalent condition (in for every me W: m 1= ~~(l.
As for an axiomatisation of explanatory consequence relations, we should note that the
conclusion of an explanatory argument is required to be admissible. As has been argued in
§23, this means that Reflexivity should be weakened in various ways. It turns out that
only Explanatory Reflexivity will be among the rules defining the system EM: both Left
and Right Reflexivity are derived rules. The other rule of Mrev that is not valid in EM is
Right Strengthening. It is easy to see why this is so: if y is inadmissible, then I=Y~~,
yet (l ~ y for any «. We therefore add a condition stating that y must be admissible,
leading to the rule of Admissible Right Strengthening. Finally, a rule should be added to
ensure the validity of Consistency. In the light of Lemma 6.8 it is sufficient to add Left
Consistency. We thus obtain the following system for explanatory reasoning.


















The significance of the rules of EM as properties of explanatory reasoning has been
discussed in the previous chapter, with the exception of the rule of Conditionalisation.
This rule can be best understood if one recalls a discussion from §9, where a distinction
was drawn between two different representations of examples: the 'examples as
implications' approach, and the 'examples as classifications' approach. In the former case,
examples are ground implications with the description of an instance as antecedent, and a
classification as consequent. In the latter case, the description of the instance belongs to
the background theory, while the example comprises only the classification of the
instance. Conditionalisation expresses that the former approach is as powerful as the
latter: anything that can be induced by means of the 'examples as classifications' approach
can also be induced by means of the 'examples as implications' approach/", It should be
added that, in the case of strong explanatory reasoning, both approaches are actually
74Since the background theory is left implicit in our framework, the description of the
instance (~) is added to the hypothesis rather than the background theory.
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equivalent, since the following rule is a derived rule of EM:
~-HX J::: Y
(X I< ~J\y• Reverse of Conditionalisation:
The derivation of this rule is left to the reader.
The following lemma lists a few properties of strong explanatory reasoning.
LEMMA 7.7. Every consequence relation satisfying the rules of EM is
consistent, incremental, convex, and disjunctively closed, but not
conjunctively closed.
Proof. By Lemma 6.8, Left Consistency implies Consistency in the
presence of Right Reflexivity and Admissible Converse Entailment (both
instances of Predictive Incrementality).
Predictive Incrementality implies Incrementality.
By Lemma 6.9, Right Interval follows from Admissible Right
Strengthening, Admissible Converse Entailment, and Left and Right
Reflexivity. In order to show that Left Reflexivity is a derived rule of EM,
suppose (X J::: ~, then by Predictive Incrementality ~ J::: ~. Furthermore, by
Left Consistency -,(X ~ ~, and we conclude by Explanatory Reflexivity.
Right Or can be derived by means of the following rule (note that
Contraposition is not valid in EM):
(XJ:::~,-.(XJ:::-'(X
-.~ J::: -, (X
To derive Admissible Contraposition, suppose (X I< ~, then by
Conditionalisation ~~(X J::: true, by Incrementality -,(X~-,~ J::: true,
and, since by assumption -.(X J::: -,(X, by Admissible Right Strengthening
-,(X~-,~ J:::-,(X. We conclude by Additivity and Incrementality.
In order to derive Right Or, first note that (X J::: ~ implies ~ J::: ~ by Right
Reflexivity (an instance of Predictive Incrementality), hence ~vy J::: ~ by
Incrementality and ~vy J::: ~vy by Left Reflexivity. Suppose (X J::: ~ and
(X I< y. Now, either -.(X J::: -,(X or -.(X ~ -.(X; in the former case we can
apply Admissible Contraposition to obtain -.~ J::: -,(X and -,y J::: -,(X, hence
-'~J\-'y J::: -,(X by Additivity, and we conclude by Admissible Contra-
position. On the other hand, if -,(X ~ -.(X then a J::: ~vy by Explanatory
Reflexivity. •
• Admissible Contraposition:
The following derived rules of EM are used in the proof of the representation theorem:
Incrementality, Right Reflexivity and Admissible Converse Entailment (instances of
Predictive Incrementality), Consistent Right Strengthening (Lemma 6.11), and
Consistency (Lemma 6.8).
To see that EM is not conjunctively closed, let p and q such that -,p ~ q and q J::: q,
then by Consistent Right Strengthening q J:::qJ\p. However, since q ~ (qJ\p)J\(qJ\-'p) by
Consistency, Right And would give us q It qJ\-.P, which, together with q I< q, results in
p I< q by Consistent Right Strengthening. That is, adding Right And to EM would lead
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to a situation in which every admissible hypothesis would either explain an arbitrary
observation or its negation, which is clearly counterintuitive.
The characterisation of explanatory consequence relations requires a few steps more
than in the case of reverse deductive reasoning. I start by proving that the rules of EM are
sound with respect to the semantics defined by explanatory structures.
LEMMA 7.8 (Soundness of EM). Any explanatory consequence relation
satisfies the rules of EM.
Proof Let W~U be an explanatory structure; we need to demonstrate that
t::w, as defined in Definition 7.5, satisfies the rules of EM. Since all the
rules of EM, with the exception of Left Consistency, are valid rules of
reverse deductive reasoning, we only need to check condition (i) for those
rules. This is trivial for Predictive Incrementality, Additivity, Admissible
Right Strengthening, and Conditionalisation.
For Explanatory Reflexivity, since (l t::w (l means that some model in W
satisfies u, -,~ ~w (l implies that not all models in W satisfy (l-t-,~, i.e.
there is a model in W satisfying <XJ\~ and hence ~.
For Left Consistency, suppose that moE W satisfies ~, while all models in
W satisfy ~-t(l. It follows that mo satisfies o, hence not all models in W
satisfy ~-t-,(l. •
In order to prove completeness, we need to build an explanatory structure W from a
given consequence relation t:: satisfying the rules of EM, such that (l t:: ~ iff (l t::w~' For
non-empty consequence relations the construction of W is the same as for reverse
deductive reasoning: .
W = {mE U I for all o; ~ such that (l t:: ~: m F ~-ta}
The chief difference with reverse deductive reasoning is that every explanatory hypothesis
is satisfiable in W.
LEMMA 7.9. Let t:: be a consequence relation satisfying the rules of EM,
and let W be defined as above. If at:: f3 then there is a model me W such
that m 1= f3.
Proof Let rx t:: ~; we will prove that {~} U {o-ty I y t:: o} is satisfiable.
Suppose not, then by compactness there is a finite ~~ {o-ty I y t:: o} such
that F~-t-,~. Furthermore, since cpt:: 'If for any 'If-tcpE Ll, we have
'If-tcp t:: true for any 'If-tCPE~ by Conditionalisation, ~ t:: true by
Additivity, and ~ t:: ~ by Right Reflexivity and Admissible Right
Strengthening. But then by Consistency Llo~-t~, a contradiction. •
Furthermore, we have that every inadmissible formula is unsatisfiable in W.
LEMMA 7.10. Let t:: be a non-empty consequence relation satisfying the
rules of EM. and let W be defined as above. If r~r then r is unsatisfiable
in W.
I I I
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Proof. Let a I< ~, then t rue I< true by Incrementality and Left
Reflexivity. Furthermore, if y ~ y then -, y I< t rue by Explanatory
Reflexivity, hence m Ftrue-+-.,y for every me W. •
I will now show that W defines a consequence relation that is included in 1<.
LEMMA 7.11.. Let I< be a non-empty consequence relation satisfying the
rules of EM, and let W be defined as above. If a I<w {3 then a I< {3.
Proof Suppose that a ~~, we will show that either no model in W
satisfies ~, or there exists a model moE W that does not satisfy ~~a.
First of all, if ~ ~ ~ then ~ is unsatisfiable in W according to Lemma 7.10.
In the remainder of the proof we will assume that ~ I< ~. Define ro = {-,a}
U {o I 0 I< ~}; we will first show that r0 is satisfiable. Suppose not, then
by compactness there is a finite LlC;;;;{OIOI<~} such that FLl~a, i.e.
F~~(Ll~a); by Admissible Converse Entailment Ll~a I< ~ (recall that ~
I< ~). But by Additivity Ll I< ~; using Additivity and Incrementality, we
obtain a I< ~. Contradiction, so I'0 is satisfiable.
Let mo FrO; clearly mo"rl=a and, since ~E I'0, mo F ~. It remains to prove
that m 0 is in W; i.e., that for all <p, 'I' such that <p I< 'I' we have
m 0 1= 'I' ~ <p. Let <p I< '1'; if -, ~ It '1', then by Consistent Right
Strengthening <p I< 'l'J\~, and by Conditionalisation 'I'~<p I<~; thus
'I'~<PE r0 and therefore mo 1= 'I'~<p. On the other hand, if -,~ I< 'I' then by
Conditionalisation and Incrementality ~~-''I' I< true, by Admissible
Right Strengthening ~~-''I' I< ~, and by Additivity and Incrementality
-''1' I<~; thus -''I'E ro and therefore mo V= '1', hence mo F 'I'~<p. •
Armed with the previous three lemmas we can prove the completeness of EM.
THEOREM 7.12 (Representation theorem for explanatory consequence
relations). A consequence relation is explanatory iff it satisfies the rules of
EM.
Proof The only-if part is Lemma 7.8_ For the if part, let I< be an arbitrary
non-empty consequence relation satisfying the rules of EM, and let
W = {mE U I for all a, ~ such that a I<~: m 1= ~~a}
Suppose a I< ~, then by the construction of W, m F~~a for all me W.
Furthermore, by Lemma 7.9 there is a model in W satisfying ~. We may
conclude that a I<w~' Conversely, if a t::w ~ then Lemma 7_11 proves that
a I< ~. We conclude that W defines a consequence relation that is exactly 1<.
For an empty consequence relation put W=0. •
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We may note, to round off our discussion of strong explanatory reasoning, that this
semantic characterisation of EM clearly demonstrates that strong explanatory reasoning is
strictly more restrictive than reverse deductive reasoning, in the following sense (recall
also the discussion of comparison criteria for different forms of reasoning in §16). A
reverse deductive reasoner and a strong explanatory reasoner build their respective
§26. Explanatory reasoning
consequence relation, if they share the same background knowledge, from the same set of
models W~U. The resulting consequence relations differ in the following respect: for
every formula ~ that is unsatisfiable in W, the reverse deductive reasoner will include
arguments a I< ~ for arbitrary aEL, while the explanatory reasoner will include none of
these (notice that such an a always exists, viz. false). The two reasoners will agree on
all other arguments. So the strong explanatory restriction of a reverse deductive
consequence relation is always a proper subset of the latter.75
This concludes the investigations into the formal properties of strong explanatory
reasoning. Before developing rule systems for confirmatory reasoning in the next sections,
I will now spend a few words on weaker forms of explanatory reasoning.
Weaker notions of explanation
If I-- is not transitive, then there exist a, ~ and y such that a I-- ~ and ~ I-- 'Y, yet a II- y,
i.e. Cnl-(~) q;, Cnl-(a). As has been proved by Kraus et. al, transitivity and monotonicity
are equivalent in the presence of the rules of C, the weakest rule system for plausible
reasoning. The upshot is that for plausible consequence relations, the nice equivalence
between Cnl-(a) ~ Cnl-(~) and ~ I-- a, as expressed by Lemma 5.2, breaks down.
However, sometimes we need a plausible explanation mechanism, for instance if we want
to induce default rules with exceptions (ef Bain & Muggleton, 1991).
It seems that we have two options for formalising induction of such weak
explanations. One option, which is left for future research, is to define al< ~ iff Cnl-(a)
~ Cnl-(~)' and to investigate how, if at all, properties of I-- carryover to \<. The other
option, that has been investigated to some extent in (Flach, 1991), is to put a I< ~ iff
~ I-- a (and ~ consistent). Again applying the rewrite rule a I-- ~ ::::} ~ I< a to rules of
KLM, it is easily shown that Incrementality and Additivity of I< correspond to Right
Weakening and Right And of 1--, respectively. Since both latter rules are satisfied in the
weakest KLM system C, it seems safe to assume that even with plausible explanation
mechanisms we have Incrementality and Additivity. However, it can also be shown that
Right Strengthening of I< corresponds to Monotonicity of 1--. In other words, when
strengthening a given plausible explanation one may reach a 'hole' in the Version Space:
a hypothesis that is in between the Sand G sets, yet does not explain the examples.
Further research is needed to characterise the implications of this observation.
§27. REGULARITY -BASED CONARMA WRY REASONING
In this section and the next one I will consider various formalisations of confirmatory
reasoning. The idea underlying the formalisation in this section has essentially been stated
in §19: to consider as possible hypotheses those formulas that are satisfied by every
75As a consequence, no strong explanatory consequence relation coincides with a reverse
deductive consequence relation. This contrasts with e.g. the relation between monotonic and
preferential reasoning, since every monotonic consequence relation is preferential. This
phenomenon can be traced back to the inclusion of Left Consistency in EM (all other rules of
EM are valid in Mrev): this rule, like its relatives Consistency and Right Consistency,
expresses that certain arguments should be excluded from the consequence relation.
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regular interpretation, where a regular interpretation is one in which the objects behave in
a way similar to the observed objects. The resulting form of confirmatory reasoning is
called regularity-based confirmatory reasoning. Various possible notions of regularity
come to mind. For instance, it could be established by a partition on the set of
interpretations, such that an interpretation is regular if it falls in the same equivalence
class as a model of the observations. As has been indicated in §19, such a notion of
regularity would invalidate Hempel's conditions (C1) and (C2) - since Hempel's views
formed the starting point for my investigations into confirmatory induction, I have chosen
to develop a notion of regularity that remains more faithful to his ideas.
In proposing this notion I do not make any claim to originality: it can be directly
traced back to Helft and De Raedt on the one hand, and Kraus et al. on the other. The idea
is to use a partial ordering on interpretations, and to consider as regular interpretations
those models of the observations that are minimal with respect to this ordering. Such a
preference ordering on interpretations seems very natural for plausible reasoning - but is
it also natural for conjectural reasoning? One could raise the following objections:
(i) regularity is a property of interpretations, not an ordering relation
between interpretations;
(ii) even if regularity is an ordering between interpretations, this ordering
must depend on the observations.
One possible defence against these objections is to point at the truth-ordering employed by
Helft and De Raedt. This ordering selects as regular interpretations those in which no
objects other than the observed ones have the attributed properties, which seems very
reasonable. Nevertheless, each of the two points above makes some sense and deserves
further investigation.
Below I give a characterisation of regularity-based confirmatory reasoning on the basis
of such a preference ordering by means of so-called preferential confirmatory consequence
relations. This system is a variation of the KLM system P, the main difference being the
added requirement of consistency of the observations. After that I will demonstrate how
closed-world reasoning on the basis of the truth-ordering of interpretations fits into the
framework of preferential confirmatory reasoning.
Preferential confirmatory consequence relations
I will start with a semantic definition of preferential confirmatory reasoning. This
definition establishes a close variant of KLM's notion of a preferential structure (see
Definition 4.8), the difference being that only satisfiable formulas are allowed in
confirmatory arguments.
DEFINITION 7.13. A preferentiaL confirmatory structure is a triple W =
(S,L,<), where S is a set of states, I: S~ U is a function that labels every
state with a model, and < is a strict partial order76 on S, called the
preference ordering, that is srnoothl". A state SES satisfies a formula aE L
iff L(s) 1= a; the set of states satisfying a is denoted by [a], and a minimal
76I.e., < is irreflexive and transitive.
77I.e. for any S'c;;S and for any SE S', either s is minimal in S', or there is a te S' such that t<s
and t is minimal in S'. This condition is satisfied if < does not allow infinite descending chains.
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element of [a] (wrt. <) will be called a regular state for a. The consequence
relation defined by W is denoted by I<w and is defined by: a I<w ~ iff
(i) there is a state SE S satisfying a, and (ii) every regular state for a
satisfies ~. A consequence relation is called preferential confirmatory iff it is
defined by a preferential confirmatory structure.
States are labelled with models, so the preference ordering between states can be used to
define a relation between models - however, since the same model can label several
states, this relation will not, in general, be a partial order. According to Kraus et al., the
additional freedom provided by states 'is vital for the representation theorem to hold'
(p.181), and I will follow them in this respect.
The following set of rules will be proved to axiomatise preferential confirmatory
consequence relations.
DEFINmON 7.14. The system CP consists of the following inference rules:
• Confirmatory Reflexivity: al< a, a ~-,~
~ I< ~
• Left Logical Equivalence:
FaH~ , a I< y
~ I< Y
Predictive Right Weakening:











• Right Consistency: a I< ~a~-,~
In comparison with Hempelian consequence relations (Definition 6.12) two rules are
added: Left Or and Cautious Monotonicity, both of which are valid principles of
preferential reasoning. As argued in §24, Cautious Monotonicity can be seen as a
strengthening of Verification, which states that if a confirms y, then any predicted
observation ~ provides further confirming evidence - Cautious Monotonicity extends this
to any ~ that is also confirmed by a. The rule of Left Or states that if both a and ~
provide confirming evidence for y, the knowledge that at least one of them is true should
not refute y. As will be demonstrated below (Lemma 7.16), both of these rules make use
of the fact that regular states are minimal elements of the preference ordering - in other
words, choosing another mechanism to select regular states would most probably violate
both Cautious Monotonicity and Left Or. Note also that without these two rule the
system would be rather weak: the other rules (with the exception of Left Logical
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Equivalence) only say something about the right-hand side of confirmatory arguments.
The following lemma gathers some further properties of CPo
LEMMA 7.15. Every consequence relation satisfying the rules of CP is
consistent, convex, disjunctively and conjunctively closed.
Proof. By Lemma 6.7, Right Consistency implies Consistency in the
presence of Admssible Entailment and Left Reflexivity (which are both
instances of Predictive Right Weakening).
Right Interval and Right Or are implied by Right Weakening, hence by
Predictive Right Weakening.
Right And is a rule of CPo •
To see that CP is not incremental, let p and q be such that p t=:: q and I=p~q. Cautious
Monotonicity yields pl\q t=:: q, and Predictive Right Weakening gives p x q t=:: p.
Incrementality would give q t=:: p, which means that p and q have the same 'confirmatory
power', which defies our intuitions. Alternatively, it is easy to show that Incrementality
is invalid by constructing an appropriate preferential confirmatory structure. For instance,
let S have two states sand t with s-a, and let [p]={t} and [q]={s,t}, then p.vq t=:: p but
q jl::p.
I will now prove the validity of the rules of CP.
LEMMA 7.16 (Soundness of CP). Any preferential confirmatory
consequence relation satisfies the rules of CPo
Proof. For Confirmatory Reflexivity, suppose [a] is non-empty, and not all
regular states for a satisfy -,~; it follows that some state in S satisfies ~.
For Left Logical Equivalence, notice that logically equivalent formulas are
satisfied by the same states.
For Predictive Right Weakening, if all regular states for a satisfy ~ and
I=al\~~y, then (since all regular states for a satisfy a) all regular states
for a satisfy y.
For Cautious Monotonicity, we need the fact that < is a smooth partial
order. Suppose that [a] is non-empty, and all regular states for a satisfy ~
and y - clearly, [al\~] is non-empty. Now, let s be regular for al\~, then
SE [a]; I will prove that s is regular for a. Suppose not, then there is a
tE [a] such that t-cs and t is regular for a. Now, every state regular for a
satisfies ~, hence te [a/\~]. But this contradicts the minimality of s in
[a/\~], hence s is regular for a and thus satisfies y.
For Right And, if all regular states for a satisfy ~ and y, then clearly they
satisfy ~I\ y.
For Left Or, note that [av~] = [a] u [~]; thus, if [a] and [~] are non-empty
then so is [av~]. Furthermore, the set of regular states for av~ is a subset
of the union of the regular states for a and ~, since a state cannot be
minimal in [av~] without being minimal in at least one of [a] and [~).
For Right Consistency, suppose [a] is non-empty, and all regular states for
a satisfy ~; it follows that no regular state for a satisfies -,~. •
II6
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In order to prove completeness, we need to build a preferential confirmatory structure
W from a gi ven consequence relation t:: satisfying the rules of CP, such that ex t:: ~ iff
ex I<w~. As in the case of explanatory structures, such a confirmatory structure is built
from a specific set of models. These models are selected relative to a given formula, as
follows.
DEFINITION 7.17. Let t:: be a conjectural consequence relation. The model
me U is said to be normaL for ex iff for all ~ in L such that ex t:: ~, m F ~.
So, a model is normal for a formula if it satisfies every confirmed hypothesis. Thus,
given certain evidence the set of normal models decreases when the set of confirmed
hypotheses increases. Notice that every model in U is normal for an inadmissible formula,
which is therefore not satisfied by some of its normal models. An admissible formula is
satisfied by every normal model, however. Notice also that if ex is admissible and y is
inadmissible, then by Confirmatory Reflexivity ex t:: -,y, hence no normal model for ex
satisfies y.
The set of models normal for admissible formulas will be used to build a preferential
confirmatory structure. The following lemma states the key result about normal models:
they can characterise arbitrary Hempelian consequence relations.
LEMMA 7.18. Suppose a consequence reLation t:: satisfies Right Weakening
and Right And, and Let a be an admissibLe formuLa. ALLnormal models for
a satisfy {3 iff a t:: {3.
Proof The if part follows from Definition 7.17.
For the only-if part, suppose ex t:: ex and ex ~ ~; I will show that there is a
normal model for a that does not satisfy ~. Let r0 = {-,~} u {8 I a t:: 8}; it
suffices to show that r0 is satisfiable. Suppose not, then by compactness
there is a finite ~~{ 8 I ex t:: 8} such that F~~~, i.e. Fex~(~~~); by
Right Weakening ex t:: ~~~. But by Right And ex t:: ~; using Right And
and Right Weakening we obtain ex t:: ~, a contradiction. •
Notice from the proof of Lemma 7.18 that normal models exist for any admissible ex.
Given an arbitrary preferential confirmatory consequence relation t::, the completeness
proof is based on a preferential confirmatory structure W = (S,l,<) constructed as follows:
(1) S = {(m,a) I ex is an admissible formula, and m is a normal model for ex};
(2) L«m,a») = m;
(3) (m,ex) < (n,~) iff exv~ t:: ex and m 'tI= ~.
Thus, states are pairs of admissible formulas and normal models. The labelling function
simply maps a state to the model it contains. Condition (3) defines the preference ordering
between states: note that ~ t:: ex is a special case of av~ t:: ex by means of Left Or, and the
fact that a is admissible. The condition m 1/= ~ is added to make the ordering irreflexive;
note that as a consequence any (m,ex)E S is minimal in [a].
The main difference between the preferential consequence relations of Kraus et al. and
my preferential confirmatory consequence relations is the way unsatisfiable formulas are
treated. In the KLM framework unsatisfiable formulas are characterised by the fact that
they have every formula in L as a plausible consequence, which means that they don't
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have normal models. In my framework, unsatisfiable formulas confirm no hypotheses, and
have all models in U as normal models. In both cases, the structure W that is used to
prove completeness contains only satisfiable formulas in its states. This means that we
can replicate most of KLM's results about the structure W.
PROPOSITION 7.19. (1) (KLM 5.13) The relation < is a strict partial order.
(2) (KLM 5.15) The relation < is smooth: for any SE [a], either s is
minimal in [aj or there exists a state t-:s minimal in [a].
(3) (KLM 5.11) If av{3 I< a and m is a normal model for a that satisfies {3,
then m is a normal model for {3.
(4) (KLM 5.14) (m, a) is minimal in [f3J iff m F {3 and av{3 I< a.
The first two statements express that W is a preferential confirmatory structure. The
remaining two are used in the proof of the following lemma.
LEMMA 7.20. Let I< be a consequence relation satisfying the rules of CP,
and let W be defined as above. If a I< {3 then a I<w {3.
Proof Suppose that IX I< p; we will show that (i) there is a state in S
satisfying IX, and (ii) every minimal state in [IX] satisfies p.
(i) By Left Reflexivity IX is admissible; furthermore, by Right Consistency
IX It __p, so by Lemma 7.18 there exists a model m normal for IX. We
conclude that (m,a)e [IX].
(ii) Suppose (n,y) is minimal in [IX], then y is an admissible formula, n is
a normal model for y that satisfies a, and yvlX I< Y by Proposition 7.19
(4). By Proposition 7.19 (3) n is a normal model for a, hence n 1= p. •
The following lemma proves the converse of Lemma 7.20, and completes the proof of the
representation theorem.
LEMMA 7.21. Let I< be a consequence relation satisfying the rules of CP,
and let W be defined as above. If a I<w f3 then a I< {3.
Proof Suppose IX I<w p, then IX must be admissible (since no state in S
satisfies an inadmissible formula). Furthermore, given any model m normal
for IX, (m,lX) is minimal in [IX], hence m satisfies p, and the conclusion
follows by Lemma 7.18. •
We may now summarise.
THEOREM 7.22 (Representation theorem for preferential confirmatory
consequence relations). A consequence relation is preferential confirmatory
iff it satisfies the rules of CPo
Proof. The only-if part is Lemma 7.16. For the if part, let I< be a
consequence relation satisfying the rules of CP and let W be defined as
above. Lemmas 7.20 and 7.21 prove that IX I< P iff IX I<w p, i.e. I< is
preferential confirmatory. •
The rule system CP demonstrates that Hempel's adequacy conditions for confirmation
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can be extended to a complete axiomatisation; the semantics of preferential confirmatory
structures provide an operationalisation of the relation of confirmation. I will now show
that closed-world reasoning ii la Helft and De Raedt fits nicely into this framework.
Closed-world reasoning as preferential confirmatory reasoning
The concept of closed-world reasoning is borrowed from logic programming, where a logic
program consisting of definite clauses can only have positive literals among its ground
atomic consequences: it can't say that some ground atom is false. Consequently, the
Herbrand base of ground atoms is divided into two subsets: those that are logical
consequences of the program (these are true), and those that are not (the truthvalues of
these are unknown). The well-known Closed-World Assumption (CWA) now proposes to
interpret the latter as being actually false. In the lattice of Herbrand models of the
program, this amounts to taking the bottom element of this lattice as the intended model.
The ordering in this lattice is the ordering of truth-content: one Herbrand model is
smaller than another if the set of ground atoms considered true in the first model is a
subset of those considered true in the second model78. This truth-ordering provides a link
with the preferential confirmatory structures discussed above.
LEMMA 7.23. The consequence relation established by the truth-minimal
model semantics is preferential confirmatory.
Proof Such a consequence relation is defined by the following preferential
confirmatory structure: take the set of Herbrand interpretations for S, the
identity function for l, and the proper subset ordering for <79. •
This means that the truth-minimal model semantics inherits all the properties of
preferential confirmatory consequence relations. Note that in the case of an indefinite
program this semantics would require truth in all minimal models of the program: there
is no sophisticated treatment of negation in the body of clauses.
When restricted to definite programs, the truth-minimal model semantics also enjoys
some properties not shared with every form of preferential confirmatory reasoning.
LEMMA 7.24. The consequence relation established by the truth-minimal
model semantics for definite clauses satisfies the following property:
ex~-.~,exl<ex
ex I< ~
Proof If exis admissible it is satisfied by some state, hence it has a unique
minimal state labelled by a single Herbrand model, in which every formula
is either true or false. •
Admissible Completeness:
Notice that Admissible Completeness is satisfied by every preferential confirmatory
structure in which the set of states satisfying a formula forms a downward semilattice
under the preference ordering.
78If we identify a (two-valued) Herbrand interpretation with the set of ground atoms it assigns
the truth value true, then this ordering coincides with the subset ordering.
79Thus, the distinction between states and models is not needed for modelling minimal
Herbrand model semantics as a preferential structure.
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In order to characterise the main feature of the truth-minimal model semantics, namely
that it minimises the assignment of truth to ground atoms, we could try something like
CtWp
Ct I<-,P
in which rx is a definite program and p is a positive literal. However, note that also
Ct W -,p, since definite programs only have positive ground atomic consequences,
while Ct ~ P by Right Consistency - in other words, the rule of Negation as Failure is
invalid if p is a negative literal. A complete axiomatisation of the truth-minimal model
semantics thus calls for a more fine-grained tool than consequence relations, that operate
on the complete language. The interested reader is referred to (Dix, 1994ab) for a possible
approach.
Negation as Failure:
§28. CONSISTENCY-BASED CONFIRMATORY REASONING
The preference ordering in preferential confirmatory structures picks out certain models of
the premisses, and draws conclusions justified by those models. When the evidence is
incomplete, as is usually the case, the intended model may be not among those deemed
most regular by the preference ordering. If this becomes evident by further observations,
previously refuted hypotheses will have to be reconsidered. In this section I will
demonstrate that it is possible to avoid such non-incremental behaviour. The main idea is
to keep track of all models of the premisses o; and to consider a hypothesis ~ to be refuted
(Ct II:: ~) only if ~ is satisfied by none of the models of Ct. Thus, we switch from
entailment over preferred models of the observations to consistency relative to all models
of Ct. The resulting form of confirmatory reasoning is therefore termed consistency-based.
The form of reasoning just described is characterised below by the system CW, for
weak confirmatory reasoning. It defines 'Ct confirms W as '~ is compatible with o;', which
is clearly the weakest possible definition of confirmation. Moreover, the system is also
related to the rule systems EM and CP considered previously, since each of these is
strictly more restrictive than CW: every explanatory or preferential confirmatory argument
is also weak confirmatory, but not vice versa (with fixed background knowledge). Thus,
the system CW represents the root of our hierarchy of rule systems for conjectural
reasoning.
An alternative characterisation of consistency-based confirmatory reasoning is also
(partly) worked out in this section. Here the idea is to represent the indeterminacy of the
observations not by a large set of models, but instead by a few well-chosen partial or
three-valued models, namely those partial models that are minimal with respect to the
information they contain. We thus see that the concept of a minimal model again plays a
role, but here its connotation is quite different from the preferential setting, where the
minimal models represent educated guesses for the intended model. In contrast, the set of
information-minimal models implies that the intended model is at least as informed as one
of them. This approach has been inspired by the Version Space model of concept learning
(§9), where the S-set of most specific concepts plays a similar role in delineating the set
of all concepts consistent with the examples.
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Weak confirmatory reasoning
As mentioned above, in weak confirmatory reasoning a hypothesis is confirmed if it is
compatible with the observations.
DEFINITION 7.25. A weak confirmatory structure is a set W~U. The
consequence relation it defines is denoted by f:::w and is defined by: a f:::w ~
iff there is an me W such that m t=aA~. A consequence relation is called
weak confirmatory iff it is defined by a weak confirmatory structure.
From this definition it is clear that weak confirmatory consequence relations satisfy both
Right Weakening and Left Weakening (i.e. Incrementality), as well as Consistency. One
additional rule is needed.
DEFINITION 7.26. The system CW consists of the following rules:
t=aAY~~ , a f::: Y
~I<Y
t=aA~~Y , a I< ~
a I< Y








Disjunctive Rationality has not been considered before. The name has been borrowed from
Kraus et al., who identify it as a valid principle of plausible reasoning (although it is not
a derived rule of their system P, nor of my system CP). In the context of confirmatory
reasoning, Disjunctive Rationality is a rather strong rule, which states that if a hypothesis
is confirmed by disjunctive observations it is confirmed by at least one of the disjuncts.
Every consequence relation satisfying the rules of CW is confirmatory, but not
Hempelian.
LEMMA 7.27. Every consequence relation satisfying the rules of CW is
consistent, incremental, convex, and disjunctively closed.
Proof Consistency is a rule of CWo
Predictive Incrementality implies Incrementality by Lemma 6.5.
Right Interval and Right Or are implied by Right Weakening, hence by
Predictive Right Weakening. •
To see that CW is not conjunctively closed, suppose a f::: ~, then (since a ~~A-'~ by
Consistency) Right And would imply a ~-,~.However, it is easy to find formulas a and
~ such that both aA~ and aA-'~ are consistent.
The following theorem proves the equivalence of weak confirmatory structures and the
system CWo
12!
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THEOREM 7.28 (Representation theorem for weak confirmatory consequence
relations). A consequence relation ICis weak confirmatory iff it satisfies the
rules ofeW.
Proof The only-if part involves demonstrating that ICw, as defined in
Definition 7.25, satisfies the rules of CW, which is trivial.
For the if part, let ICbe an arbitrary consequence relation satisfying the rules
of CW, and consider the following weak confirmatory structure:
W = {mE U I for all U,~E L such that m F UI\~: U IC~}
We will prove that U IC~ iff U ICw~' The if part follows directly from the
construction of W. Suppose that U IC~, we will show that there exists a
model moE W that satisfies UI\~.
Define I'0 = [u] U {o I -,0 ~ ~}; we will first show that I'0 is satisfiable.
Suppose not, then by compactness there is a finite L\~{ 0 I -,0 ~ ~} such
that F-,(L\I\U), i.e. F~~-,(L\l\u); by Consistency L\I\U ~ ~. Furthermore,
since -,0 ~ ~ for OE L\, we have -,L\ ~ ~ by Disjunctive Rationality and
-,L\I\U ~ ~ by Incrementality. Combining this with L\I\U ~ ~ we obtain
(-,L\l\u)v(L\l\u) ~ ~ by Disjunctive Rationality and U ~ ~ by Incremen-
tality. Contradiction, so r0 is satisfiable.
Let mo FrO; clearly mo F U and, since by Consistency ~E I'0, mo F ~. It
remains to prove that moE W; i.e., that for all cP, \jI such that mo F CPI\\jI we
have cP IC \jI. Let mOF CPI\\jI, then -,(cpl\\jI)~ro, hence CPI\\jI t:::~; by
Predictive Right Weakening CPI\\jI IC\jI1\~, by Incrementality cP t::: \jI1\~, and
by Right Weakening cP t::: \jI. •
One may remark that we could define a preferential variant of weak confirmatory
reasoning by including a preference ordering on models and defining a hypothesis to be
confirmed if it is satisfied by at least one of the minimal models of the observations. This
will be worked out below for the special case of the information ordering on partial
models.
Consistency-based confirmatory reasoning with partial models
I will start with a brief review of partial logic. A partial interpretation is a function from
L to {true,unknown,false }80. The symbol t; will be used for satisfaction by
partial interpretations; thus, m t; U stands for m(u)=true (m verifies u), m t; -,~
stands for m(~)=false (m falsifies ~), m tI= -,y stands for m(y)E {unknown,true},
and so on. U is now a set of partial models, representing the background knowledge.
Furthermore, U t; ~ stands for 'ifmE U: if m t; u then m t; ~.
Since there are now three truth-values, the truth-tables for the logical connectives need
to be extended. The enlarged truth-tables can be derived from the intended interpretation of
the third truth-value unknown, which represents lack of information as to whether a
formula is true or false - we might say that the 'information-content' of unknown is
less than either true or false. A compound formula is assigned the truth-value
800r equivalently, a partial function from L to (true,false}.
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Other rules that are valid when reformulated in partial terms are Left Logical Equivalence
and Predictive Right Weakening:
a~~,~~a,aI<Y
Partial Left Logical Equivalence: ~ I< Y
a~~--ty,al<~
Partial Predictive Right Weakening:
al<y
As instances of Partial Predictive Right Weakening we obtain Left Reflexivity and
(Partial) Admissible Entailment, as usual.
One may note that these rules are partial variants of rules from CPo However, the
remaining rules of CP are invalid for ppcc consequence relations, most notably
Confirmatory Reflexivity and Cautious Monotonicity. Confirmatory Reflexivity (from a
Ie a and a ~ -,~ conclude ~ Ie ~) is invalid because the condition a ~ -, ~ is not
necessarily caused by every minimal model of a falsifying -,~, the other possible reason
being that no model verifying a also verifies -,~. Only in the first case, but not in the
second, can we conclude that there exists a model verifying ~, as required by the
conclusion of the rule. We may add that Right Reflexivity is valid.
The failure of Cautious Monotonicity (from a Ie ~ and a Ie y conclude al\~ Ie y) can
be traced back to the following observation: a Ie ~ means that the minimal models of a
do not falsify ~ (i.e. m IF-,~); but this does not imply, as it does in the non-partial case,
that these models also verify ~ (i.e. m ~ ~), hence the minimal models of al\~ may be
completely different from those of a. For instance, we may have a Ie ~ and a Ie -,~, but
clearly we don't have al\~ Ie -,~. A partial variant of Verification, which represents a




As indicated in §24, this rule weakens Cautious Monotonicity by demanding that the
hypotheses ~ and yare based on the same assumptions.
The rules found valid so far are collected in the following lemma.





Partial Left Logical Equivalence: ~ I< Y
a ~ ~--ty , a I< ~







• Partial Consistency: al\~ ~ fa 1s e
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Proof. For Right Reflexivity, if a I< P then some model me [a] verifies p,
i.e. [P] is non-empty, and every model minimal in [P] verifies p.
For Partial Left Logical Equivalence, if a 1= P and P 1= a then a and P are
verified by the same models.
For Partial Predictive Right Weakening, let mo be the model minimal in
[a] that does not falsify p, i.e. mo 1= a and mo fI -,p. If additionally
a 1= p~y, we obtain mo 1= y.
For Partial Verification, let mo be the model minimal in [a] that does not
falsify p, i.e. mo 1= a and mo fI -,p. Now, since a 1= p~y, we have
mo 1= Y and therefore moE [aAY]; since [aAy]~[a], mo is also minimal in
[aAY]. Furthermore, let m be the model in [a] such that mo:5":mand
m 1= p; since a 1= P~Y, we have m 1= y and therefore mE [aAY].
For Partial Consistency, if some model in [a] verifies p, then clearly
aAp if' false. •
The completeness of the set of rules in Lemma 7.33 is questionable. For instance, from
the definition of I<w we see that if a I<w P then a I<w aAp; yet, substituting aAp for Y
in Partial Predictive Right Weakening will not work, since a 1= p~(aAp) is invalid if
m(p)=unknown for some model m. One possible solutions-' to this problem is to
replace Partial Predictive Right Weakening with the sound but rather tedious
aAp 1= Y, aA-,Y 1= -,p , a I< p
a I< Y
The reader may want to check that the first two conditions vanish when aAp is substituted
for y. However, my main concern at this stage is conceptual analysis rather than logical
rigour, and I leave the issue of axiom at ising ppcc consequence relations as an open
problem.
I will now demonstrate that the information ordering can be used to build a ppcc
structure defining consequence relations that are closely related to weak confirmatory
consequence relations.
DEFINITION 7.34. A partial weak confirmatory structure is a ppcc structure
W = (V,:5":),where :5": is the information ordering on U, restricted to V. A
consequence relation is called partial weak confirmatory iff it is defined by a
partial weak confirmatory structure.
The following lemma demonstrates the close relation with weak confirmatory consequence
relations.
LEMMA 7.35. Let W be a partial weak confirmatory structure. a I<w {3 iff
there exists a model in [a] verifying {3.
83Another option is to assign to ~ the Lukasiewicz interpretation, which differs from
Kleene's strong interpretation by putting m(ex~~)=true if m(ex)=m(~)=unknown. However,
as a result the language is no longer persistent: increasing the truth-value of exor ~ may
decrease the truth-value of ex~~ wrt. the information ordering.
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Proof. The only-if part follows from Definition 7.32. For the if part, let m
be a model in [a1 verifying ~, then by Lemma 7.31 there exists a model
ns.m such that n is minimal in [a]. Furthermore, m ~ --,~, and therefore
n 11--,~ by Proposition 7.30. We conclude that a t::w ~. •
That is, for any partial weak confirmatory structure W = (V,$.) we have a t::w ~ iff there is
an me V such that m ~ a/\~ - in other words, partial weak confirmatory reasoning
corresponds to verifiability of premisses and conclusion with respect to a set of partial
models, and the information ordering does not affect the set of arguments but only serves
as a computational tool. We may further note that if a/\~ has a partial model, it has a
total model (construct a total model m' from a partial model m by putting m'(p)=m(p) if
m(p):;tunknown, and by arbitrarily putting m'(p) to true or false otherwise).
This means that for any partial weak confirmatory consequence relation there exists an
equivalent weak confirmatory consequence relation. Since the converse is trivially true
(any set of total models is also a set of partial models), this proves the equivalence of
weak and partial weak confirmatory reasoning.
The rules satisfied by partial weak confirmatory consequence relations are thus partial
versions of the rules in CWo The validity of Partial Predictive Right Weakening and
Partial Consistency has been proved above, in the general case of ppcc consequence
relations - for completeness' sake I prove the validity of the remaining two rules below,
which has become very easy in the light of Lemma 7.35.
COROLLAR Y 7.36. Any partial weak confirmatory consequence relation
satisfies the following rules:
• Partial Predictive Incrementality: a ~ 'Y~ ~ , a I< 'Y
~t::'Y
av~ t:: y , ~ Ii:: 'Y
a I< 'Y• Disjunctive Rationality:
Proof. For Partial Predictive Incrementality, suppose that there exists a
model in [a] verifying 'Y, and a ~ 'Y~~; it follows that this model verifies
~, hence there exists a model in [~1verifying y.
For Disjunctive Rationality, first note that [av~] = [a] u [~].Furthermore,
if ~ ~ 'Y then no model in [~] verifies 'Y, and thus the model in [av~]
verifying 'Y must be in [a]. •
In this section I have defined weak confirmatory reasoning, which is also the weakest
form of conjectural reasoning since it only requires consistency between evidence and
hypothesis. This form of reasoning is axiornatised by the system CWo I have further
defined a partial, preferential variant of weak confirmatory reasoning (the axiomatisation of
which remains, as yet, incomplete), and proved the equivalence with weak confirmatory
reasoning if the information ordering on partial models is taken as the preference ordering.
This form of confirmatory reasoning will be put to work in the next chapter, because it
has a distinct advantage over preferential confirmatory reasoning: it is incremental.
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I should add that consistency-based confirmatory reasoning, as defined in this section,
does not, in the general case, establish a preservation semantics (§ 18). If we define a. t::: ~
if there is a model satisfying both a. and ~, this cannot be reduced to a preservation
function f constructing, from the models of a., a set of interpretations satisfying ~, since
this preservation function should operate independently from ~. Even if we use the
information ordering to select minimal models of a. this does not establish a preservation
function, since a. may have several information-minimal models, and if both a. t::: ~ and a.
t::: y the minimal model a. has in common with ~ may be different from the minimal
model it has in common with y. Only in the case that premisses always have a single
information-minimal model (i.e. they are definite) does consistency-based confirmatory
reasoning correspond to a preservation semantics. This indicates that the concept of a
preservation semantics needs to be extended, or complemented by an alternative concept.
§29. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I presented the main formal results of this thesis, in the form of axiomatic
characterisations of three different kinds of conjectural reasoning. The three rule systems
EM (explanatory reasoning with a monotonic explanation mechanism), CP (preferential
confirmatory reasoning), and CW (weak confirmatory reasoning) light parts of the map of
conjectural reasoning, and thus provide a starting point for a descriptive theory of
conjectural reasoning. In addition I have provided an alternative characterisation of weak
confirmatory reasoning in terms of information-minimal partial models. Open problems
include: characterising explanatory reasoning based on non-monotonic explanation
mechanisms, characterising preferential consistency-based confirmatory reasoning, and
extending the concept of a preservation semantics to cover consistency-based reasoning.
Each of the semantic structures characterising these rule systems has been designed to
reflect current practice in the field of machine learning (chapter 3). Explanatory semantics
models preservation of explanatory power, where an explanation is identified with a
deductive proof, as in classification-oriented machine learning approaches. Preferential
confirmatory structures generalise closed-world reasoning, as applied in Helft's and De
Raedt's approaches to induction of integrity constraints. Weak confirmatory structures are
based on compatibility between evidence and hypothesis, an idea that has been applied to
incremental induction of integrity constraints in databases (see the next chapter).
However, neither of these semantics is claimed to fully capture the essence of inductive
reasoning as performed by humans. For instance, identifying an explanation with a
deductive proof seems to be quite crude, even if it is not uncommon in philosophy of
science, since explanations often indicate a causal relation between observations and
explanans. Also, formal ising regular interpretations as minima with respect to a fixed
ordering does not seem to be appropriate in all cases, since the ordering may depend on the
observations. Even if further work is needed on these and related points, I believe that such
future refinements can be incorporated in the formal framework set up in this thesis.
* * * ** * *
PART III
PRACTICE
In the third and last part of this thesis I illustrate the practice
of confirmatory induction in the context of relational
databases. The only chapter in this part, Knowledge discovery
in databases, also illustrates my claim that in confirmatory
induction one needs an additional goal which the inductive
hypothesis are meant to fulfil, since 'being confirmed' is not
an end in itself.

CHAPTER 8
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY IN DATABASES
- in which an illustration of confirmatory induction is given,
and the ideas underlying the system INDEX, a system for inductive
data engineering, are discussed -
THIS CHAPTER IS intended to provide a practical illustration of a number of theoreticalconcepts developed in the previous chapters. In particular, I will discuss how
regularity-based and consistency-based confirmatory induction can be applied in order to
extract implicit structural knowledge in relational databases. This knowledge is then made
explicit by restructuring the database into a knowledge base. This approach, which I call
inductive data engineering, has been implemented in a prototype system called INDEX. This
application of confirmatory induction does not merely serve to illustrate that confirmatory
induction can be useful: the main point is that inductive hypotheses are sought with a
certain goal in mind, viz. to obtain a knowledge base that is better structured. This
explicit goal enables us to assign a heuristic evaluation to inductive hypotheses, which
results in a confirmatory discovery procedure rather than a proof procedure. My objective
in this chapter is to provide sufficient detail for illustrating these points; however, the
emphasis is on conceptual analysis, rather than on a detailed discussion of the applied
methods and algorithms.
§30. INDUCTIVE DATA ENGINEERING
Let me start by giving a concrete example of inductive data engineering. Consider the
train schedule depicted in Table 8.1. There's a wealth of implicit information in this
schedule: for instance, all stopping trains leave from platform 4, while intercity trains
leave from platform 5 or 6. Furthermore, intercity trains leave every thirty minutes, while
stopping trains leave every thirty minutes before 9:00, and every hour thereafter. Notice
that, since the significance of these regularities may extend to other schedules, they can be
seen as inductive generalisations. Furthermore, they can be utilised for representing the
same information in a more structured format. For instance, the second regularity can be
used to compress the schedule considerably (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 contains enough information to reconstruct Table 8.1, which can be
demonstrated as follows. One way to formalise the statement about the regularity of
intercity and stopping trains is by adding a second table, listing for each train the start of a
new 'interval' (Table 8.3). The difference between intercity and stopping trains is indicated
by the 9:30 entry for intercity trains, which is not included for stopping trains.
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Time Direction Type Platform
8:07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
8:09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
8:12 Utrecht stopping train 4
8:16 Tilburg stopping train 4
8:37 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
8:39 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
8:42 Utrecht stopping train 4
8:46 Tilburg stopping train 4
9:07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
9:09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
9:37 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
9:39 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
9:42 Utrecht stopping train 4
9:46 Tilburg stopping train 4
Table 8.1. A train schedule.
Minutes Direction Type Platform
07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
42 Utrecht stopping train 4
46 Tilburg stopping train 4
Note: Intercity trains leave every 30 minutes.
Stopping trains leave every 30 minutes
before 9:00, and every hour after 9:00.
Table 8.2. A restructured train schedule.
Table 8.1 can be reconstructed by the
following procedure: for every pair of entries in
Table 8.2 and Table 8.3 with corresponding
train types, construct an entry in Table 8.1
with a departure time that can be calculated by
increasing the interval from Table 8.2 with the
number of minutes from Table 8.3. In this
way every intercity entry in Table 8.2 results
in four entries in Table 8.1, and every stopping
train entry results in three entries in Table 8.l.
The reader can easily verify that the resulting


















Table 8.3. A table expressing the
regularity of trains.
§30. Inductive data engineering
This demonstrates that, in certain cases, induced regularities can be used to improve
the organisation of structured information. This raises a few questions:
(i) what regularities can lead to restructuring?
(ii) how are these regularities to be induced?
(iii) which of the possible regularities should be selected for restructuring?
The first question is not easy to answer in general: there appear to be many possibly
regularities, each with its own associated notion of restructuring. For instance, suppose
that we know that a certain relation is transitive, then it can be considerably compressed
- however, there are many ways to do that. In this chapter I will restrict attention mostly
to two, relatively simple regularities known from relational database theory: functional
and multivalued dependencies. These concepts will be explained in detail below; to fix the
reader's thought, the regularity in Table 8.1 corresponds roughly to a multivalued
dependency from train type to departure interval.
As for the second question, we first have to decide what kind of induction we are
talking about. I will first show that such regularities cannot be inferred by explanatory
induction. Taken separately, statements like 'intercity trains leave every 30 minutes' are
very weak: they do not explain a single entry in Table 8.1. Only if this statement is
combined with one of the entries in the schedule, say 'at 8:09 there's a train leaving for
Tilburg from platform 6' is it possible to derive other entries like 'at 8:39, 9:09 and 9:39
there are also trains leaving for Tilburg from platform 6'. Another way to show that
inference of regularities like the above is not explanatory is by noting that, even if
evidence from different sources each endorse a regularity separately, their combination may
refute it. For instance, if we split Table 8.1 in two, one half containing the intercity
trains leaving at 8:07, 8:09, 9:07 and 9:09, the other half containing the remaining
intercity trains (8:37, 8:39, 9:37, 9:39), then in each of these halves separately the
regularity 'intercity trains leave (only) every hour' can be observed, while this regularity
is obviously false when the two halves are joined. In other words, the property of
Additivity is invalid for this form of induction, hence it is not explanatory (see Definition
6.13).
I wili show in §32 that such regularities are inferred by confirmatory induction. Both
the regularity-based and the consistency-based semantics can be used, but for multivalued
dependencies the latter is more appropriate in an incremental context. Interestingly, both
semantics coincide for functional dependencies. Before this can be demonstrated a number
of concepts from database theory need to be discussed (§31). The third of the above
questions will be discussed in §33, where I will consider a heuristic measure to assess the
utility of induced regularities.
§31. ATIRlBUTE DEPENDENCIES IN DATABASES
I will start with a brief overview of the relational theory of databases, followed by a
discussion how concepts from this relational theory can be translated to logical concepts.
From the logical view it is a relatively small step to the next section, which discusses
inference of attribute dependencies as confirmatory induction.
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A bit of relational database theory
The notational conventions employed here are close to (Maier, 1983).
DEFINITION 8.1. A relation scheme R is an indexed set of attributes
{AI, ... , An}· Each attribute Ai has a domain Di, l::;i::;n,which is a set of
values. A tuple over R is a mapping t: R ~ UiDi with t(Ai) EDi, t::;i::;n;
usually, a tuple t is denoted as a sequence (t(A I), ..., t(An», i.e. with
attributes referenced by their position rather than by their name. If
X= {A j' , A k} is a set of attributes and t is a tuple, the sequence
(t(Aj), , t(Ak» will be called the X-value of ,s4. A relation over R is a
finite set of tuples over R.
In general, attributes are denoted by uppercase letters (possibly subscripted) from the
beginning of the alphabet; sets of attributes are denoted by uppercase letters (possibly
subscripted) from the end of the alphabet; values of (sets of) attributes are denoted by
corresponding lowercase letters. Relations are denoted by lowercase letters (possibly
subscripted) such as n, p, q, r, u; tuples are denoted by t, tl, t2, .... If X and Yare sets of
attributes, their juxtaposition X Y means Xu Y. We employ the usual notation for
expressions of relational algebra: in particular, 1tx{r) denotes the projection of the relation
r onto the set of attributes X (i.e. the set of X-values of tuples in r), and GX=x(r) denotes
the selection of those tuples in r whose X-value is x.
A functional dependency from attributes X to attributes Yexpresses that the V-value
of any tuple from a relation satisfying the functional dependency is uniquely determined
by its X-value. In other words, if two tuples in the relation have the same X-value, they
also have the same Y-value.
DEFINITION 8.2. Let R be a relation scheme, and let X and Y be subsets of
attributes from R. Afunctional dependency (jd for short) is an expression of
the form X~Y. A relation rover R satisfies a functional dependency X~Y
if tIE rand t2E rand tl(X)=t2(X) imply tl(Y)=t2(Y), and violates it
otherwise.
The following lemma lists the main properties of functional dependencies.
LEMMA 8.3. (1) A relation satisfies a functional dependency X--+Y iff it
satisfies X --+Afor every A E Y.
(2) If a relation satisfies a functional dependency X--+Y, it also satisfies any
functional dependency Z--+Y with Z;;;JX.
(3) If a functional dependency is satisfied by a relation r, it is also satisfied
by any relation r'g.
Proof Immediate from Definition 8.2. •
841 will usually not distinguish between single attributes and singleton sets of attributes, nor
between single values and singleton sequences of values - e.g., if A is a single attribute, I will
say that teA) is the A-value of t, rather than '(teA)~ is the {A l-value of t'.
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(1) allows us, without loss of generality, to restrict attention to functional dependencies
with single attributes on the right-hand side. (2) demonstrates that some functional
dependencies are stronger than others. Formally, we will say that a dependency D] is as
strong as another dependency D2, notation D]~D2' if the set of relations that satisfy D]
is a subset of the set of relations that satisfy D2. Clearly, the relation ~ is transitive and
reflexive, hence a quasi-order - it will be demonstrated below (Lemma 8.7) that, if
functional dependencies are read as logical statements, this relation is a special case of
logical entailment. (3) follows from the fact that a functional dependency expresses a
connection between each pair of tuples from a relation; it is highlighted because it plays
an important role when fds are induced from tuples, as will be explained in §32.
Multivalued dependencies generalise functional dependencies by stipulating that every
X-value determines a set of possible Y-values. For instance, if a relation describes events
that occur weekly during a given period, this relation satisfies a multi valued dependency
from day of week to date: given the day of week, we can determine the set of dates on
which the event occurs. For instance, if the Computer Science course and the Artificial
Intelligence course are both taught on a Wednesday during the fall semester, and there is a
CS lecture on Wednesday September 7, while there is an AI lecture on Wednesday
December 7, then there is also a CS lecture on the latter date and an AI lecture on
September 7.
DEFINITION 8.4. Let R be a relation scheme, let X and Y be subsets of
attributes from R, and let Z denote R-XY. A multivalued dependency (mvd
for short) is an expression of the form X-H Y. A relation rover R satisfies
a multivalued dependency X-HYif tIE rand t2E rand t](X)=t2(X) imply that
there exists a tuple t3E r with t3(X)=t[ (X), t3(y)=t2(Y), and t3(Z)=t[ (Z). Note
that by exchanging t] and t2' there should also a tuple t4E r with t4(X)=t2(X),
t4(y)=t](y), and t4(Z)=t2(Z). If t3~ r or t4~ r, r violates the mvd.
The following lemma lists the main properties of multi valued dependencies.
LEMMA 8.S. (1) A relation satisfies a multivalued dependency X--H Y iff it
satisfies X--H Z with Z=R-XY.
(2) If a relation satisfies a multivalued dependency X--H Y, it also satisfies
any multivalued dependency Z--H Y with Z;2X.
(3) If a relation satisfies a functional dependency X~ Y, it also satisfies the
multivalued dependency X--H Y.
Proof Immediate from Definition 8.4. •
(1) states that mvds are pairwise equivalent. Furthermore, it indicates that an mvd X-H Y
partitions a relation scheme R into three subsets {X,y,R_Xy}85. (2) demonstrates that,
analogously to fds, multi valued dependencies can be ordered according to their strength; we
will use the symbol ~ in both cases. (3) states that functional dependencies are indeed
special cases of multivalued dependencies. Notice that Lemma 8.3 (3) does not extend
85Such a partition is called a dependency basis for X (Maier, 1983).
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multi valued dependencies, since an mvd requires the existence of certain tuples in the
relation. Thus, if r satisfies a certain mvd, some subset of r may not satisfy it.
The following definition introduces some further notation that will prove useful later.
DEFINITION 8.6. Let R be a relation scheme, let r be a set of tuples over R,
let D = X~Y be a multivalued dependency over R, and let Z=R-XY. The
D-closure of r is defined as
riD = {t I t,hE rand t(X)=t, (X), t(y)=t2(Y), t(Z)=tl (Z)}
For instance, if R = {A,B,C}, r = {(a,b"cI)' (a,b2,c2)}' and D =A-HB, then riD =
{(a,bl ,CI)' (ah,c2)' (a,b2,c,), (a,b, ,C2)}' Note that in general riD;;? r, and that r satisfies
mvd D iff riD = r.
Functional and multivalued dependencies are collectively referred to as attribute
dependencies. The attributes found on the left-hand side of an attribute dependency are
called antecedent attributes, those on the right-hand side consequent attributes. Iwill now
demonstrate that there is a straightforward reformulation of attribute dependencies in terms
of logic.
Reformulation in logical terms
For an overview of the subject of logic and databases, see (Gallaire et al., 1984; Reiter,
1984). The basic idea is to associate with a relation r a predicate r, and to view the
relation as a Herbrand interpretation for r. The statement te r, where t = (a" ... ,an), is
represented by a ground fact r (a i . ..., an) . This allows us to write a functional
dependency X~A as a definite c1ause86
Al=A2:-r(X,Al,Zl) ,r(X,A2,Z2)
A relation r satisfies an fd D iff the corresponding set of ground facts, denoted by Ir1. is a
Herbrand model of the corresponding definite clause, denoted by ID1. Since Irl is a set of
ground facts, it can also be interpreted as a logic program; since it is definite, it has a
unique truth-minimal model which of course coincides with Irl87. This link with c1osed-
world reasoning is exploited in §32 below.
Similarly, the multivalued dependency X -H Y corresponds to the definite clause
r(X,Y2,Zl) :-r(X,Yl,Zl),r(X,Y2,Z2)
Notice that this clause also represents the mvd X-HZ with R-XY. The relationship
between the relational and logical views is summarised in the following lemma.
86X, Zl, Z2 may actually denote sequences of variables, and the order of the arguments of r
ma~ be different than shown here; this is however not significant.
8 We will sometimes freely switch between the interpretation of rrl as a Herbrand model, and
its interpretation as a logic program. Wherever this might cause confusion the intended
interpretation is indicated in words. The symbol F is avoided altogether in this context, since
it indicates both satisfaction by a model and logical entailment by a logic program, which
would cause unnecessary confusion.
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LEMMA 8.7. Let r be a relation over a relation scheme R, and let D and D'
be attribute dependencies over R.
( J) r satisfies D iff the Herbrand interpretation rr 7satisfies the clause rD 7.
(2) D~D' iff the clause Io 7 logically entails the clause rD'7.
Proof. Immediate from the construction of rr1 and rD1. •
The logical view allows a closer analysis of the relation ~.
LEMMA 8.8. Let DJ and D2 be two attribute dependencies. DJ~D2 iff there
exists a substitution e unifying variables in the body of rD J 7with variables
at the same position in the body of rD2 7, such that rD J 7e= ro, 7.
Proof. For the if part, the existence of such a substitution indicates thatrD,l a-subsumes88 rD21, therefore rD,l entails rD21, and the result follows
from Lemma 8.7 (2).
For the only-if part, if D, ~D2 then rD,l entails rD21 by Lemma 8.7 (2).
In function-free clausal logic, logical entailment between non-tautological
clauses is equivalent to a-subsumption, so we obtain: rD,l a-subsumesrD21, i.e. there is a substitution a such that every literal in rD,la occurs inrD21. But since the clauses rD,l and rD21 have the same number of literals,
this boils down to: there is a substitution a such that rD ,1a = rD21.
Finally, since (i) the clauses representing attribute dependencies only
contain variables and no constants, (ii) every variable occurring in the head
of rD ,lor rD21 also occurs in its body, and (iii) variables at different
positions within a literal represent different attributes=', we may conclude
that every such a unifies variables in the body of rD,l with variables at the
same position in the body of rD21. •
For instance, let R = {A,B,C,D} and consider the functional dependencies A-:;D and





The first clause can be made equal to the second by applying the substitution
{Bl-:;B,B2-:;B},so that by Lemma 8.8 we may conclude that A-:;D ~ AB-:;D, in
agreement with Lemma 8.3 (2). As a second example, consider the multivalued
dependencies A-HD and AC-HD, represented by the clauses
r{A,Bl,Cl,D2) :-r{A,Bl,Cl,Dl),r{A,B2,C2,D2)
r{A,Bl,C, D2) :-r{A,Bl,C, Dl),r{A,B2,C, D2)
% A->->D
% AC->->D
The first clause can be made equal to the second by applying the substitution
{Cl-:;C,C2-:;C},so that by Lemma 8.8 we may conclude thatA-HD ~ AC-HD, in
agreement with Lemma 8.5 (2).
88See §10 for a discussion of O-subsumption.
89For practical purposes, the variables may be considered typed.
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It may seem that this logical analysis offers little that wasn't known before. However,
consider the problem of deriving the weaker dependency from the stronger one (this was
called specialisation in chapter 3). From the above examples we may conclude that the
only way to do that is by unifying two distinct variables at the same relative position
within each body literal, corresponding to extending the left-hand side of the dependency.
This result is stated without proof below.
PROPOSITION 8.9. (1) X--,>A~ Z--,>AiffZ~X.
(2) X --+-+Y ~ X' --+-+Y' iff X' --+-+Y' is equivalent to Z--+-+ Y with Z~x. •
(2) is stated this way because according to Lemma 8.5 (1) the mvds X~ Y and
X~R-XY are equivalent, hence rX~Yl = rX~R-XYl. For instance, if R =
{A,S,C,D} then A--+-tD andA--+-tBC are equivalent, and so are AC~D and AC~B.
According to Proposition 8.9 (2) we have A~D ~ AC--+-tD, but also, for instance,
A~BC ~ AC~D. This characterisation of ~ can be put to work if we want to
induce attribute dependencies from tuples, as will be detailed below.
Using a proof procedure
The logical view also offers something that is beyond the relational view as such, namely
a proof procedure. I will now illustrate how SLD resolution can be used whenever we
want to check whether a given relation satisfies a given dependency. The idea is to use the
set of ground facts rrl associated with the relation r as a logic program, and to formulate,
for a given dependency represented by a definite clause H: - B, a query ? - B I no t (H)
which, if it succeeds, demonstrates that the dependency is violated by r.
LEMMA 8.10. Let r be a relation and D be an attribute dependency, and let
(D 7 = H: -B. r violates D iff the query ?-B, no t (H) has an SLDNF
refutation from the logic program [r 7
Proof. For the if part, suppose the query? - B I not (H) has an SLDNF
refutation from rr1 and let 9 be the computed answer. By the soundness of
SLDNF resolution/'' we have that V«BA.....,H)9) is a logical consequence of
Comp(r rl). Since the only Herbrand model of Comp(r rl) is the set of
ground facts rr1it follows that every ground instance of (BA.....,H)9 is
satisfied by the Herbrand interpretation r rl. We conclude that no ground
instance of (H : - B)9 is satisfied by rrl, i.e. H: - B is not satisfied by rrl,
hence by Lemma 8.7 (1) r violates D.
For the only-if part, suppose r violates D, hence by Lemma 8.7 (1) H: -B
is not satisfied by the Herbrand interpretation rrl. Let 9 be a grounding
substitution such that (H : - B)9 is not satisfied by rr1i.e. (BA.....,H)9 is
satisfied by r r1 since r rl is the only model of CompO rl),it follows that
(BA.....,H)9 is a logical consequence of Comp(r rl). By the completeness of
SLDNF resolution''! 9 is a computed answer for ?-B, not (H). •
90See e.g. Lloyd, 1987, p.92, Theorem 15.6.
91 Lloyd, op. cit., p.99, Theorem 16.3. This completeness result only holds for hierarchical
138
§3J. Attribute dependencies in databases
Notice that the two literals in B are always grounded by a computed answer e, since the
program contains only ground facts. Thus, if the query? - B, not (H) succeeds, every
- computed answer represents a pair of contradicting tuples from the relation. Furthermore,
since all the variables in H also occur in B, H is also grounded by a computed answer: in
particular, in the case of an mvd H is instantiated to a tuple missing from the relation.
To illustrate the proof-theoretic view, if R = {A,B,C,D} then the functional
dependency A-.;D is represented by the clause
Dl=D2:-r(A,Bl,Cl,Dl) ,r(A,B2,C2,D2).
This fd is satisfied by the relation r if and only if the following query fails:
?-r(A,Bl,Cl,Dl),r(A,B2,C2,D2),not(Dl=D2) .









thereby demonstrating that the fd A-.;D is satisfied. If however we add the tuple
r(a2,b3,c5,d3) . % t5
the fd becomes violated. There are four different proofs of this violation by means of SLD
resolution, corresponding to four ordered pairs of contradicting tuples:
?-r(A,Bl,Cl,Dl),r(A,B2,C2,D2) ,not(Dl=D2).
A=a2, Bl=b3, Cl=c3, Dl=d2, B2=b3, C2=c5, D2=d3
A=a2, Bl=b4, Cl=c4, Dl=d2, B2=b3, C2=c5, D2=d3
A=a2, Bl=b3, Cl=c5, Dl=d3, B2=b3, C2=c3, D2=d2





Clearly, two of these four proofs are redundant.
Suppose we wanted to construct a specialised fd that is satisfied by the relation
{t\ h,t3,t4,tS}' According to Proposition 8.9, the only two non-trivial candidates are
AB-.;D and AC-.;D (AD-.;D is satisfied by any relation). However, the first contradicting
pair of tuples t3,tS have identical B-values, from which we may conclude that they violate
the fd AB-.;D as weI!. What this illustrates is that the SLD proof of violation of a
functional dependency can be fruitfully exploited if we want to construct a specialisation
that is satisfied.
Similarly, the mvd A~B over the relation scheme R = {A,B,C,D} is represented by
the following clause:
r(A,B2,Cl,Dl) :-r(A,Bl,Cl,Dl) ,r(A,B2,C2,D2).
programs, which programs without negated literals in the bodies of clauses trivially are.
Furthermore, the requirements of an allowed query (i.e. every variable that occurs in a negated
literal also occurs in an unnegated literal) and a safe computation rule (delaying negated goals
until alI their variables are ground) are satisfied in our case.
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This mvd is satisfied if and only if the following query fails:
?-r(A,Bl,Cl,Dl),r(A,B2,C2,D2),not(r(A,B2,Cl,Dl)) .
where the last call succeeds, by negation as failure, if and only if the corresponding tuple
is not in the relation. This query fails for instance when r consists of the following five
tuples:
r(aI,bI,cI,dl) .
r (aL,b2 r c2 ,d2) .
r (al,b l,c2 ,d2) .
r(aI,b2,cI,dl) .
r (a2,b3, c3,d3) .







the query succeeds in two different ways:
% t6
?-r(A,BI,CI,DI),r(A,B2,C2,D2) ,not(r(A,B2,Cl,Dl)).
A=a2, BI=b3, Cl=c3, Dl=d3, B2=b4, C2=c3, D2=d4
A=a2, BI=b4, CI=c3, Dl=d4, B2=b3, C2=c3, D2=d3
% t5,t6
% t6,t5
indicating that the mvd A-HB is violated. Notice that the proof of violation of an mvd is
based on a pair of contradicting tuples, as in the case of fds. Furthermore, from these
proofs we can reconstruct the two tuples that are missing from the relation, by





If we add these two tuples the mvd is satisfied again. This clearly illustrates that mvds
behave differently from fds, since a violated fd can never become satisfied again by
throwing in some new tuples!
Suppose however that hand/or te are indeed outside the relation r - can we specialise
A~B to an mvd that is satisfied by r? Inspection of the answers to the above query
reveals that, since t5 and t6 agree in their C-value, the specialisation AC-HB is violated
also. Again we see that a proof of the violation of a dependency contains clues as to what
weaker dependency may be satisfied.
§32. INDUCIlON OF ATfRIBUTE DEPENDENCIES
After having dealt with the formalities of attribute dependencies, I wiII now tum to the
question how such dependencies are to be induced. It has already been indicated that
attribute dependencies are not explanatory, since the explanatory power of one or several
dependencies does not comprehend the explanatory power of the database tuples making up
the evidence. It will be demonstrated below that attribute dependencies are induced from
92This is the head of the clause r A-HB 1.
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tuples by confirmatory induction. The distinction made in chapter 7 between regularity-
based and consistency-based confirmatory induction also plays a role in the present
context. One way to look at confirmation of a dependency is to view the evidence as a
completely specified relation, and to define a dependency to be confirmed if it is satisfied
by that relation. An alternative to such closed-world reasoning is to view the evidence as a
partially specified relation, and to define a dependency to be confirmed if it is satisfied by
at least one fully specified extension of that partial relation. Interestingly, both semantics,
while behaving differently in the case of multivalued dependencies, coincide for functional
dependencies, as will be detailed below.
In this section a I< ~ thus stands for 'a confirms W, where a and ~ denote a set of
tuples and a dependency (or set of dependencies), respectively. I will employ both the
relational and the logical notation: e.g. if R = {A,B,C} the following two statements are
equivalent:
{(a,b, ,c), (a,bloc)} f::: A ~ C
{r (a, bl, c) ,r (a, b2, c) }f::: Cl=C2 : -r (A, Bl, Cl) ,r (A, B2, C2)
One rather important point needs to be considered here: the theory developed in the
previous chapter does not allow, in its present form, restrictions on the syntactic form of
left- and right-hand side of conjectural arguments, while such syntactic restrictions are
obviously playing a role in the present context. Database relations and attribute
dependencies are expressed in distinct sublanguages, so it does not make sense to refer to
confirmatory arguments, say, of the form 0.1< a. Clearly, this affects a number of rules
considered in the previous chapters, such as any form of Reflexivity, Cautious
Monotonicity (from 0.1< ~ and a I< y conclude al\~ t<y; invalid because ~ cannot refer
both to dependencies and tuples), Left Or (from 0.1< y and ~ t< Y conclude av~ I< y;
invalid because the evidence cannot be disjunctive), and Right Consistency (from a t< ~
conclude all: -,~; meaningless because -,~ cannot refer to dependencies).
Among the rules that remain meaningful I mention the following:









Apart from some new notation (~=>y for '(3 and y are sets of dependencies and ~~~y',
~k;a for 'a and ~ are sets (conjunctions) of tuples and ~a~W) these rules have exactly
the same meaning as before. Furthermore, the notion of a prediction can be linked to the
notion of the closure ai~ of tuples a with respect to mvd ~ as defined in Definition 8.6:
a tuple y is predicted, given a conjectural argument 0.1< ~, if it is included in the closure
of a wrt. ~: yE ai~93. It is now possible to reformulate the rule of Verification:
93Notice that the relation => and the function i were originally defined for single
dependencies; they can be extended to sets of dependencies in a straightforward way.
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• Verification:
"IE a i p , a Ie p
aU{Y}IeP
I will now take a closer look at regularity-based and consistency-based confirmatory
induction of attribute dependencies.
Regularity-based confirmatory induction
In this subsection we define a dependency to be confirmed by a relation r if r satisfies the
dependency. In terms of logic this amounts to demanding that r confirms D if the
Herbrand interpretation Ir1is a model of the clause rD1; since the interpretation rr1is also
the truth-minimal model of the set of ground facts r r1, this establishes a form of closed-
world reasoning. We thus inherit the relevant rules of the system CP (§27), i.e. Right
Weakening and Right And. Right And states that the set of confirmed dependencies is
itself confirmed, and Right Weakening states that this set is determined by its maximal
elements with respect to =>. This yields a very straightforward algorithm for determining
the set of confirmed dependencies.
ALGORITHM 8.11. Closed-world confirmatory induction of attribute dependencies.
Input: a relation scheme R, and a relation rover R;
Output: the set Dep(r) of strongest attribute dependencies over R satisfied by T.
1. initialise DEP to the set of strongest dependencies over R;
2. while some dependency in DEP is violated by T, replace it by its minimal
specialisations;
3. remove from DEP every dependency that is weaker than some other
dependency, and output DEP.
In step 2, specialisations of violated dependencies are constructed according to the method
outlined in Proposition 8.9; as indicated in the previous section the pair of contradicting
tuples indicates which of the specialisations are possibly satisfied by the relations, and
which of them are contradicted by the same pair of tuples. For further details the reader is
referred to (Flach, 1990).
One may note that the algorithm outlined above bears a strong similarity to Shapiro's
Model Inference System discussed in chapter 3, which also applied a top-down
specialisation approach. Algorithm 8.11 is essentially a special case of De Raedt's
CLAUDIEN system, which also induces a theory by closed-world confirmatory induction,
but without the strong restrictions on the hypothesis language imposed here.
What should interest us here is that, if we restrict attention to functional dependencies,
the property of Incrementality holds:
• Incrementality:
pea, a Ie "I
Pley
The validity of this rule in the fd case has already been proved in Lemma 8.3 (3). The
point is that this rule is not a derived rule in the system CP, nor is it valid for closed-
world reasoning in general; its validity is a special property of functional dependencies,
which only check whether a certain condition holds for every pair of tuples from the
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relation?". This means that Algorithm 8.11 can be adapted to an incremental setting in
which tuples are processed one by one.
ALGORITHM 8.12. Incremental confirmatory induction of functional
dependencies.
Input: a relation scheme R, a relation rover R, the set Dep(r) of strongest
functional dependencies satisfied by r, and a tuple t over R;
Output: the set Dep( rv {t} ) of strongest functional dependencies over R
satisfied by rv{ t}.
I. initialise DEP to Dep(r);
2. while some fd in DEP is violated by rv{t}, replace it by its minimal
specialisations;
3. remove from DEP every fd that is weaker than some other fd, and output
DEP.
This algorithm works because, by Incrementality, the set of fds satisfied by rv{t} is a
subset of the set of fds satisfied by r; combined with the convexity of this set, as
expressed by Right Weakening, we never need to consider replacements of violated fds that
are not specialisations (step 2).
In contrast, Algorithm 8.12 would be incorrect when applied to multi valued
dependencies. For instance, let r be given by Table 8.4. One can easily check that this
relation satisfies only trivial mvds'" such as A~BC. However, by adding the tuple t =
(al>b],c2) the mvd A--+-'?B becomes satisfied. Algorithm 8.12 would erroneously output
Dep(ru (t}) = 0, since Deptry» 0. Below I will develop an incremental induction
algorithm for mvds performing consistency-based confirmatory induction.
A CB
Table 8.4. A database relation satisfying no non-trivial dependencies.
Consistency-based confirmatory induction
One of the ideas considered in §28 was to define a hypothesis to be confirmed if it is not
falsified by the information-minimal partial model of the evidence96. The information-
minimal model of a set of ground facts differs from its truth-minimal model in that it
941n database parlance, functional dependencies are equality-testing, as opposed to
multivalued dependencies, which are tuple-generating (Beeri & Vardi, 1981).
95Trivial dependencies are satisfied by every relation (i.e. their logical formulations are
tautologies).
96The presentation can be simplified because in the present case the evidence is always
definite, and the hypothesis always has a verifying model.
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assigns the truth-value unknown to all other facts, rather than false. In terms of
proof procedures, this amounts to replacing negation as failure in the query
? -B I not (H) by logical negation. It is easily seen that this does not cbange anything
for functional dependencies, since in that case H is of the form Al =A2, and the variables
Al and A2 also occur in B; thus, by the time the call no t (H) is evaluated it is
completely instantiated, and the outcome is the same regardless whether not is interpreted
as negation as failure, or as logical negation. We conclude that for functional dependencies
the consistency-based semantics coincides with the closed-world semantics.
For multivalued dependencies the situation is different, since in that case H refers to a
tuple, and the behaviour of the call not (H) depends on the interpretation of not: under
negation as failure not (H) succeeds if the tuple is not known to be in the relation, while
under logical negation it succeeds if the tuple is known to be outside the relation. This
calls for the inclusion of negative information in the induction process.
DEFINmON 8.13. Let R be a relation scheme. A partial relation over R is a
pair (p,n) of positive tuples p over R and negative tuples n over R, such
that pnn=0. A partial relation (p,n) satisfies a multivalued dependency
D = X-+-tY if t}Ep and t2EP and t}(X)=t2(X) imply that there exists a
tuple t3EP with t3(X)=t} (X), t3(y)=t2(Y), and (3(Z)=tl(Z)' and violates it if
t3En. The D-c1osure of a partial relation (p,n) is defined as (p,n)iD =pi D.
Logically speaking a partial relation (p,n) is represented by a set r(p,n) 1of positive and
negative ground facts, i.e. a oegative tuple te n corresponds to a negated observation -,n.
Notice that the operation of D-c1osure transforms a partial relation into a non-partial one
satisfying D.
If we define a I< P as 'partial relation a does not violate the set of multi valued
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The validity of Incrementality guarantees that the following incremental algorithm is
correct.
ALGORITHM 8.14. Incremental confirmatory induction of multivalued
dependencies.
Input: a relation scheme R, a partial relation (p,n) over R, the set
Dep«p,n») of strongest multi valued dependencies not violated by (p,n), and
a tuple t over R;
Output: the set Dep«pu{t},n») of strongest multivalued dependencies over
R not violated by (pu{t},n).
1. initialise DEP to Dep«p,n»);
2. while some mvd in DEP is violated by (pu{t},n), replace it by its
minimal specialisations;
3. remove from DEP every mvd that is weaker than some other mvd, and
outputDEP.
The reader may have noticed that if n=0 no mvd is violated by the partial relation (p,n),
so the output of Algorithm 8.14 will be meaningless. One possible approach is to
assume the availability of an oracle, and to replace step 2 in the algorithm by the
following:
2. while some mvd D in DEP is not satisfied by (pu{ t} ,n) do one of the
following:
2a. if D is violated by \pu{t},n), replace it by its minimal specialisations;
2b. if D is not violated by (pu{t},n), query the user about those tuples in
the D-closure of putt} but not in ~u{t};
This approach has been implemented in Prolog; below follows an example session.
The example is taken from (Maier, 1983, p.123). The relation scheme is {Flight, Day,
Plane}, and a tuple serv ice (F,D, P) means that flight number F flies on day D and







New tuple: service (106, monday, 747) •
New tuple: service(106,thursday,1011).
Is service(106,thursday,747) in the relation? yes.
Is service (106,IDonday,1011) in the relation? yes.
The user specifies the relation scheme, and the system shows the initial set of strongest
mvds. The user types in the first two tuples, which concern flight number 106. The
system checks the mvds 0~Plane and 0~Day by asking for a classification for two
8. Knowledge discovery in databases
other tuples. Both of these tuples are classified as positive, so none of the mvds is
violated (note that 0-HFlight cannot be violated, because all tuples have the same flight
number).
New tuple: service(204,wednesday,707).
Is service(106,monday,707) in the relation? no.
Specialise []->->[plane]
service (204 ,wednesday, 707)
service(106,monday, 1011)
not service(106,monday,707)










The next positive tuple introduces new values for all three attributes. The system tests
each of the three initial mvds by posing appropriate queries to the user. None of the three
tuples thus constructed is in the relation, so each of the initial mvds is violated and
replaced by specialisations, constructed by adding one antecedent attribute, according to
Proposition 8.9 (2). This would result in 6 non-trivial specialisations, but note that these
are pairwise equivalent: for instance, Day-s-Ftigh: is a specialisation of 0-HFlight, but
it is equivalent to Day~Plane, which is a specialisation of 0 -HPlane. These








Adding a sixth tuple does not change the set of mvds; as the system doesn't pose further
queries, we may conclude that the closure of the partial relation relative to this set of
mvds is equal to the positive tuples, i.e. every dependency is satisfied by the relation
consisting of the positive tuples (and not just not violated by the partial relation
consisting of positive and negative tuples). Consequently, this set of dependencies is the
same as would be found by the non-incremental closed-world approach on the basis of the
six positive tuples (Algorithm 8.11).
It should be noted that this querying approach can quickly become impracticable when
the number of attributes is large, since the number of possible dependencies, and thus the
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number of queries, is exponential in the number of attributes. In such a case the non-
incremental approach is preferred. A second remark is that the non-incremental approach
tests every dependency against the complete relation, which is costly if the number of
tuples is large (the SLDNF method for testing satisfaction of an attribute dependency, as
outlined by Lemma 8.10, takes O(n2) steps in the fd case, where n is the number of
tuples, and O(n3) steps in the mvd case; there exist slightly more efficient algorithms).
An alternative approach is first to construct the set of violated dependencies by inspecting
the relation once, and to construct the strongest satisfied dependencies from the set of
violated dependencies without reference to the relation; for the fd case, several algorithms
based on this idea have been developed (Kantola et al., 1992; Mannila & Raiha, 1992;
Savnik & Flach, 1993).
§33. A CONARMATORY DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
The methods for constructing a set of strongest attribute dependencies confirmed by a
given set of tuples as outlined above embody (confirmatory) proof procedures, in the sense
that they are able to derive any confirmed dependency'". There is no indication as to which
of these dependencies is actually useful in the domain under consideration. The addition of
a heuristic utility measure to a proof procedure results in a discovery procedure (see §18).
In this section I will discuss such a discovery procedure for attribute dependencies, based
on a heuristic evaluation function estimating the utility of the dependency for
restructuring the knowledge base. This confirmatory discovery procedure has been
implemented in Prolog, and given the name INDEX.
It should be noted that, although it has hitherto not been discussed, the subject of
evaluating confirmed hypotheses is an important and largely unexplored subject. Unlike
explanatory reasoning, where the main goal is to find a hypothesis that best accounts for
the facts, confirmatory reasoning does not carry with it a goal that the hypothesis is to
fulfil. Indeed, if 'being confirmed' would be the goal to be optimised, then confirmatory
reasoning would be reduced to deductive reasoning98. Neither Helft nor De Raedt address
this issue: they simply generate the set of most general formulas that are confirmed,
according to their definition of confirmation. However, this set can become rather large if
the language is complex".
The basic idea underlying this section is that a confirmed hypothesis indicates a certain
regularity implicit in the evidence, which can be exploited to make the evidence less
redundant and more structured. The connection between inducing regularities and
restructuring is especially apparent in the case of attribute dependencies, which give rise to
so-called decompositions of the given relation into smaller and less redundant relations.
The original relation can be composed out of these new relations by means of a
composition rule, representing a more meaningful definition of the original relation in
terms of the new ones. Such a composite relation is called an intensional relation, to
97That is, in combination with Right Weakening.
98This was noticed by Popper, as discussed in §7.
99The complexity of a first-order language is mainly determined by the number and the arity
of the predicates.
147
8. Knowledge discovery in databases
distinguish it from an extensional relation defined by a set of tuples. Logically speaking,
an intensional relation is defined by a set of clauses called a predicate definition. A
knowledge base, also called a deductive database (Minker, 1988), is a set of extensional
and intensional relations, or equivalently, sets of ground facts and predicate definitions.
The goal of attribute dependencies: decompositions
Fds and mvds both describe the same phenomenon: that the consequent attribute(s) can be
removed from the relation, and stored in a separate relation containing only the attributes
in the dependency. The only difference is, that in the case of fds the antecedent attributes
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That is, r is now an intensional relation, and this clause serves as its predicate definition.
In database terminology, r is the join of r, and rz over the attribute A.
DEFINITION 8.15. Let R be a relation scheme, let r be a relation over R, let
D be an attribute dependency over R with antecedent attributes X and
consequent attributes Y, and let Z denote R-XY. The vertical
decomposition of r imposed by D consists of the two projections 1txy(r)
and 1txz{r).
This decomposition is loss less whenever r satisfies D, i.e. r can be reconstructed by
performing a join of 1tXy(r) and 1txz{r) over the attributes X. The join operation is called
the composition function associated with the decomposition. It should be noted that both
the vertical decomposition and the join operation are uniquely determined by the
dependency.
The notion of a decomposition can be generalised: for instance, a partition of a relation
in different subrelations can be called a horizontal decomposition 100. As an example, we
10D-rhisterminology is in accordance with (paredaens et al., 1989), and corresponds to the
direction of an imaginary line separating parts of the original relation. In previous
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might partition the train schedule of Table 8.1 into two schedules, one for intercity trains
and one for stopping trains. Note that the resulting schedules both satisfy the functional
dependency 0-'JType (i.e. the value of the attribute Type is constant in each of them).
Clearly, the original relation did not satisfy this fd, so we might say that the horizontal
decomposition serves the goal of creating subrelations that are guaranteed to satisfy the
dependency - like in the vertical case, we will say that this horizontal decomposition is
imposed by the dependency. In general, however, if a relation does not satisfy a
dependency there are many different horizontal decompositions such that the subrelations
satisfy the dependency.
DEFINITION 8.16. Let R be a relation scheme, let r be a relation over R,
and let D be an attribute dependency over R. A horizontal decomposition of
r imposed by D is a partition {r], ... ,rnl of r into subrelations r], ... ,rn each
satisfying D. Such a decomposition is minimal if none of its subrelations
can be put together without violating D.lOl
The composition function associated with a horizontal decomposition operates by set-
union of the blocks in the partition.
The algorithm for computing minimal horizontal decompositions imposed by a
violated dependency is best understood by considering a few examples. Consider the train
schedule in Table 8.5, in which every stopping train leaves from platform 4, while all
intercity trains for Utrecht, except one, leave from platform 5, and all intercity trains for
Tilburg leave from platform 6. The first step is to partition the relation into
subrelations with equal values for the antecedent attributeslv-, indicated by the double
lines in Table 8.6; this partition is called the antecedent partition, and the sets of tuples
with equal antecedent values are referred to as antecedent blocks. In the second step of
the algorithm a further division is made within each antecedent block between tuples with
different values for the consequent attribute, indicated by the single line in Table 8.6 (only
in the first antecedent block). Clearly, this second division into non-contradicting blocks
has separated all the pairs of tuples contradicting the fd, so this second partition results in
a (non-minimal) horizontal decomposition induced by Direction.Type-e Platform. The
third step of the algorithm consists in putting together non-contradicting blocks from
different antecedent blocks. One obvious way to do this is to keep the 8:57 train separate,
and to combine all the other blocks. It should be noted, however, that this is not the only
publications (Flach, 1990; 1993) I employed the orthogonal terminology, corresponding to
the direction in which parts of the original relation are pulled apart.
IOlparedaens et al. use a different definition of horizontal decomposition (1989, pp.132-
134): the relation is separated into two parts, one part satisfying the dependency, one part
violating it. The first part is not the largest subrelation satisfying the dependency, since the
tuples causing violation are kept together in the second part. While their construction has the
distinct advantage that it defines a unique horizontal decomposition in the case of fds (the only
case they consider), it does not really capture the idea of an exception: if 100 intercity trains in
the direction Utrecht leave from platform 5, while one doesn't, their second relation wil1
contain 101 tuples.
1021nthis example 1 assume that the value of the Direction attribute is the first station
mentioned in the schedule.
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H M Direction Type Platform
8 07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
8 09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
8 12 Utrecht stopping train 4
8 16 Tilburg stopping train 4
8 57 Utrecht/Zwolle intercity 6
9 07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
9 09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
9 12 Utrecht stopping train 4
9 16 Tilburg stopping train 4
10 07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
10 09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
10 12 Utrecht stopping train 4
10 16 Tilburg stopping train 4
Table 8.5. A train schedule with an irregular train.
minimal decomposition: for instance, another minimal horizontal decomposition is
obtained by combining the trains leaving from platform 4 and 5 on the one hand, and the
trains leaving from platform 6 on the other. Step 3 of the algorithm is thus non-
deterministic; I will shortly describe a satisfaction measure that can be used to select an
appropriate minimal horizontal decomposition.
With multi valued dependencies not only the third step of the algorithm is non-
deterministic, but also the second. Consider again the train schedule in Table 8.5: all
trains leave every hour except the 8:57 intercity train to Zwolle. If this train is taken out
H M Direction Type Platform
8 07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
9 07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5
10 07 Utrecht/Amsterdam intercity 5---
8 57 Utrecht/Zwolle intercit;r 6----
8 12 Utrecht stopping train 4
9 12 Utrecht stopping train 4
10 12 Utrecht stoI2I2ingtrain 4---
8 09 Tilburg /Den Haag intercity 6
9 09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercity 6
10 09 Tilburg/Den Haag intercit;l 6---
8 16 Tilburg stopping train 4
9 16 Tilburg stopping train 4
10 16 Tilburg stopping train 4
Table 8.6. A horizontal decomposition of the schedule in Table 8.5, imposed by the
functional dependency Direction.Type=Platform.
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of the schedule the multivalued dependency 0-+-tHour is satisfied; thus, the 8:57 train
can be seen as an exception to this dependency, and separating it from the other trains
represents a minimal horizontal decomposition imposed by the mvd 0 -+-tHour.
However, another minimal horizontal decomposition imposed by 0-+-tHour consists of
the eight o'clock trains on the one hand, and the nine and ten o'clock trains on the other
hand. This indeterminacy becomes apparent in the second step of the algorithm (the first
step results in a trivial partition, since there are no antecedent attributes).
ALGORITHM 8.17. Construction ofa minimal horizontal decomposuion'T:
Input: a relation scheme R, a relation rover R, and a dependency Dover R
with antecedent attributes X;
Output: a minimal horizontal decomposition induced by D.
I. partition r into the set of subrelations {al> ... ,an} such that the tuples in
ai have the same X-value;
2. partition each ai into a set of subrelations {ail, ... ,aimj} as follows:
2a. find a pair of tuples in ai contradicting D;
2b. remove one of those tuples from ai and go to 2a;
2c. if ai does not violate D, repeat step 2. for the removed tuples;
3. combine blocks aij for different i into a minimal decomposition.
In the INDEX system the indeterminacy in step 3 of this algorithm is handled with help of
an oracle, while the indeterminacy in step 2 (only for mvds) is handled heuristically.
Evaluating dependencies and decompositions
The basic idea is to measure the minimum number of tuples that must be removed from
the relation in order for a dependency to be satisfied; such tuples are called exceptions. The
satisfaction degree of a dependency is then given by
Sat = 1 - weighted fraction of exceptions
The number of exceptions is determined as follows. Suppose for ease of notation that each
partition {ail"" ,aimi} constructed in step 2 is ordered in decreasing size, then each biggest
subrelation we can construct has the same number of tuples as allv ...vanl; let this
number be denoted by Nn. The number of exceptions is then NJ?-Nn. If mj'Q for l~i~n,
then all these exceptions can be collected in one subrelation; if some m, is larger than 2
the exceptions need to be distributed over different subrelations. For instance, if we add a
9:27 train to Utrecht/Zwolle that is leaving from platform 6 to Table 8.5, then it can be
combined with the 8:57 train without violating the fd Direction.Type-o Platform; if
however this added train is leaving from platform 4 it should be stored in a separate
relation. In general, if m is the maximum of {mj Ilg~n}, then the number of exception
relations is m-I (note that if m=! the dependency is satisfied). To indicate that 'similar'
exceptions are preferred over 'non-similar' exceptions, the fraction of exceptions is
I03This algorithm assumes that all tuples in the relation r are completely defined, i.e. there
are no null-values. When null-values are present it may be possible, depending on the interpre-
tation of the null-value, to instantiate some of them such that the dependency becomes satis-
fied. For an overview of null-values and their interpretation see (De Troyer, 1993, pp.18-22).
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weighted with the number of exception relations. This yields the following formula:
NR-NnSat = 1 - (m-l) *-*--"N'--R-.!!:
As an illustration, for the fd Direction.Type-sPlatform we have Sat=12l13=O.92 in Table
8.5; if we add a 9:27 train to Utrecht/Zwolle leaving from platform 6 we get
Sat=12114=O.86, but if this train is leaving from platform 4 we get Sat=10114=O.71.
A second heuristic employed in the INDEX system measures the average size of blocks
in the antecedent partition, to prevent the generation of dependencies that are very weak
(i.e. have many antecedent attributes).
The INDEX system
The main algorithm implemented in the INDEX system can now be described as follows.
ALGORITHM 8.18. The INDEX algorithm.
Input: an extensional relation r;
Output: an intensional definition of r in terms of a number of subrelations.
1. determine the strongest attribute dependencies that are (almost) satisfied
by a given relation r, and select a dependency D;
2. construct a minimal horizontal decomposition {r\, ... ,rn} induced by D;
3. construct the vertical decomposition induced by D for each of rb" .,rn.
Step 1 is implemented by performing a top-down search for dependencies in the spirit of
% train (Hour,Minutes,Direction, Type, Platform)
train(8,07,utrecht,intercity,5) .
train(8,09,tilburg, intercity, 6) .
train(8,12,utrecht,stopping_train,4) .
train(8, 16,tilburg, stopping_train, 4) .







train(9, 37,utrecht, intercity, 5) .
train(9,39,tilburg,intercity,6) .
train(9,42,utrecht,stopping_train,4) .
train(9,46, tilburg, stopping_train, 4) .
Table 8.7. An extensionally specified train schedule.
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the algorithms discussed earlier; the user can select between a non-incremental approach as
in Algorithm 8.11, or an incremental approach in which queries are asked (Algorithm
8.14). The difference with these algorithms is that in the INDEX system search also stops at
dependencies that are almost satisfied, with a user-definable threshold for the satisfaction
measure Sat (typically ~O.75). The user can also choose the consequent attributes in
which she is interested. INDEX presents the dependencies it found to the user, who should
make the final selection.
Step 2, construction of a minimal horizontal decomposition, has been discussed above
(Algorithm 8.17). A certain amount of user interaction is required here also, in order to
put the non-conflicting blocks from different antecedent blocks together in a meaningful
way. After completion of this step, the user can indicate for each subrelation whether she
wants the imposed vertical decomposition to be constructed, which is typically the case
for the normal tuples but not for the exceptions. Note that the construction of such
vertical decompositions is deterministic and straightforward (see Definition 8.15).
For a complete and annotated session with the INDEX system the reader is referred to the
appendix; I will confine myself here to presenting the results. The input to the system is
given in Table 8.7; this train schedule is the same as the one at the beginning of the
chapter (Table 8.1), with an extra irregular train at 8:57. The selected dependency is
0-+-')Hour, which has 3 exceptions (Sat=12115=O.8). After horizontal and vertical
decomposition the resulting restructured knowledge base is as in Table 8.8. The first two
clauses indicate that the original train relation is the union of the new relations












hourlytrainl (42,utrecht, stopping_train, 4) .
hourly trainl (46,tilburg, stopping_train, 4) .
hour (8).
hour (9) .
irregtrain(8,12,utrecht, stopping_train, 4) .
irregtrain(8,16,tilburg,stopping_train,4) .
irregtrain(8,57,utrecht,intercity,6) .
Table B.B. The same train schedule as in Table 8.7, represented as a knowledge
base with explicit indication of hourly trains.
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been vertically decomposed'P' into hourlytrainl and hour (the names of the new
relations have of course been supplied by the user).
§34. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Unlike explanatory induction, which has the explicit aim of inferring explanations of
observations, confirmatory induction does not have a predefined goal. In this chapter I
have explored the idea of using confirmatory hypotheses to restructure a given database
relation. The resulting knowledge base explicates the implicit structure indicated by
attribute dependencies. This approach has been implemented in a prototype system called
INDEX, and can be classified under the heading knowledge discovery in databases, a rapidly
growing research field (Piatetsky-Shapiro & Frawley, 1991).
Work on this subject has only just started, and much remains to be done. Attention
needs to be devoted, in particular, to the development of better heuristics; to a model for
evaluating the performance of systems such as INDEX; to decrease the amount of user
interaction by making use of domain knowledge; and to study other classes of integrity
constraints that can give rise to restructuring of extensional information. As for the last
point, a possible direction is to study properties like transitivity of binary relations: if we
know that an extensionally specified relation is transitive, it can be compressed into a
smaller relation of which the original relation is the transitive closure. Like a horizontal
decomposition, such a 'transitive decomposition' 105 can be achieved in many ways - if,
in addition, we would know that the relation is irreflexive, the minimal transitive
decomposition is however uniquelO6. One can envision a catalogue of such integrity
constraints, with associated decomposition operations and confirmatory induction
strategies.
A related point is that such decomposition approaches may provide the key to a better
understanding of the relation between confirmatory and explanatory induction. Consider
again the knowledge base in Table 8.8, which consists of a few extensionally specified
subrelations B, and a few intensional definitions H by means of which the original
extensional relation E can be derived: BAH FE. Another way to view this relation
between B, Hand E is by noting that H forms an explanation of E given B. In other
words, an explanatory induction system should be able to induce H from E given
background knowledge B. This observation hints at a certain relationship between
explanatory and confirmatory induction: investigating this relationship is, in my opinion,
a major research topic in the logical theory of inductive reasoning.
* * * ** * * *
lD4nIat is, this clause expresses that hourly train is the join of hourly train 1 and hour
over the empty set of attributes - i.e. the cartesian product.
I05Here I use the term 'decomposition' informally as the inverse of an integrity constraint,
i.e. 'transitive decomposition' is a restructuring operation imposed by the integrity constraint
of transitivity.
I06In this respect one can think of the ancestor relation, which is transitive and irreflexive,
the minimal transitive decomposition of which is the parent relation. For (strict) partial orders
this relation corresponds to the set of vertices in the Hasse diagram.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
- in which the main contributions of this thesis pass the
review, and in passing the main open problems and
opportunities for future work are indicated -
§35. PHILOSOPHY
ISTARTED MY investigations with an overview and analysis of the philosophy ofinduction. The by now infamous 'Problem of Induction' has a long and confused
history in philosophy. Confusions are usually caused by misconceptions, and the case of
induction is no exception in this respect. The chief misconception in many philosophical
studies of induction is, I believe, the idea that we should be looking for an infallible
'inductive logic'. A related misconception, which I shall deal with in the next section, is
that logic is the study of 'correct' reasoning. If we liberate ourselves from these and related
misconceptions, we see that it is both possible and desirable to have a precise logical
account of induction, without falling into the trap of the 'deductivist' approach.
The first step towards a logical account of induction, a step whose significance cannot
be overrated, has been made by Charles Sanders Peirce when he distinguished between the
process of inductive hypothesis formation on one hand, and the process of evaluating or
justifying a chosen hypothesis on the other. The process of forming an inductive
hypothesis is a logical process, not in the sense that the hypothesis is obtained by
mechanical inference, but in the sense that there are certain necessary conditions imposed
upon the logical relation between the hypothesis and the evidence leading to that
hypothesis. Those, like the late Sir Karl Popper, who argued against inductive hypothesis
formation as being non-logical, were barking up the wrong tree: they wrongly identified
logic with the study of reasoning procedures, rather than the study of reasoning forms.
Peirce built his analysis of the logical form of inductive hypothesis formation around
the notion of explanation: the hypothesis should be such that it explains the observations,
in the sense that the latter are deductive consequences of the former. I have argued that a
more comprehensive view of inductive hypothesis formation can be obtained by viewing
the logical relation between evidence and hypothesis as a parameter, that can be
instantiated to explanation by deductive entailment as proposed by Peirce, but also to, for
instance, explanation by plausible entailment, or to quite different logical relations, such
as the relation of confirmation studied by Carl G. Hempel.
Even if the statements 'this evidence is explained by this hypothesis' and 'this
evidence confirms this hypothesis' can both give rise to a logic of induction, they have
very different logical characteristics. The most significant difference is that explanations
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may be strengthened without ceasing to be an explanation, while confirmed hypotheses
may be weakened without being confirmed. Clearly, combining these two opposite
characteristics (together with some starting point like 'the evidence itself is a possible
hypothesis') leads immediately to a situation in which any hypothesis is logically
possible given arbitrary evidence. This phenomenon has been characterised as 'paradoxical'
by many philosophers of science, starting with Hempel - the viewpoint defended in this
thesis is that, insofar it is conceived as a problem, it can be solved quite simply by clearly
separating the intuitions pertaining to only one of these statements from the intuitions
arising only from the other.
Should we, then, take recourse to an extreme relativist position and conclude that the
logic of induction is fully dependent upon the viewpoint one prefers? Certainly this would
be much too liberal a position, but the conclusion I do draw is that the logical
characteristics of inductive hypothesis formation should be studied relative to the goal
with which the hypothesis is sought. 'Peircean' or explanatory induction, on the one
hand, aims at finding explanations of the observations, while 'Hempelian' or confirmatory
induction, on the other, seeks to find generalisations expressing implicit, non-explanatory
regularities displayed by the observations. I will return to this issue in section §37 below.
§36. LOGIC
The boldest deviations of common views voiced in this thesis are probably concerned with
the aims and scope of logic. From the perspective put forward in this thesis, logic is
much more than the study of correct (deductive) reasoning: it is the study of reasoning
forms. As such, it has much more of a descriptive than a prescriptive or normative nature,
one of its main aims being to provide a catalogue of different reasoning forms and their




one or more logical schemes;
instantiations of these schemes, each meant to formalise a certain form
of reasoning;
(iii) proof- and metatheoretical characterisations of these instantiations.
Historically, logic as we know it today has mainly evolved by developing instantiations
formal ising deductive reasoning in different logical languages (propositional, predicative,
modal, temporal, and so forth). The logical scheme that has emerged as a result of these
instantiations is the scheme of satisfaction-preserving semantics originally proposed by
Tarski. Even if this scheme has developed considerably over the years (cf. Kripke's
possible worlds semantics), the message stayed the same: the scheme, and its
instantiations, limits attention to non-defeasible forms of reasoning.
The recent developments of so-called 'non-monotonic' logics formalising aspects of
plausible reasoning indicate that logicians feel an increasing need to liberate themselves
from the restrictions imposed by the non-defeasible reasoning scheme. The framework of
plausible consequence relations pioneered by Gabbay and Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor
indicates that the modifications to the non-defeasible scheme needed to model e.g.
preferential reasoning are relatively modest, requiring not more than the addition of a
§36. Logic
preference relation over classical models, and defining entailment over the minimal models
of the premises under this preference relation, rather than over all models of the premises .
.Philosophically speaking however, this modest modification represents a drastic departure
frOID the deductive foundations of logic. It is now time, I believe, for logic to start
approaching the question from the other end: to reflect upon the essence and nature of
reasoning schemes, rather than of some more or less arbitrarily chosen instantiations.
In this thesis I have proposed preservation semantics as a reasoning scheme, which is
even more radical in that it strictly subsumes Kraus et al.'s preferential semantics. The
basic idea is that from the set of semantic objects assigned to the premises of the
argument one constructs another set of semantic objects, which need not be included in
the first set, such that everyone of these is among the semantic objects assigned to the
conclusion of the argument. Admittedly, this proposal has not been analysed very
thoroughly, since it merely served to reach the right frame of mind for the subsequent
logical analysis of inductive hypothesis formation. Nevertheless the proposal has some
potential, witnessed by the fact that one can conceive instantiations formalising such
different reasoning forms as plausible reasoning, inductive (generality-preserving)
reasoning, and counterfactual reasoning. The development of this and similar logical
schemes is seen as the major challenge for the field of logic in the years to come.
For deductive logic the semantics offers, besides indicating what semantic quality is
preserved, a second function: it estimates the truth of the conclusion of an argument. I
have argued that, in the non-deductive case, this second function is performed by a
different kind of semantics, viz. a truth-estimating semantics. Unlike a preservation
semantics, a general truth-estimating semantics, such as Carnap's 'inductive logic', does
not give rise to a proof-theory, and is therefore not tied to a specific form of reasoning.
Preservation semantics and truth-estimating semantics have complementary roles, only to
coincide in the case of deductive reasoning.
Truth-estimating semantics usually give numerical estimates for the probability of the
truth of the conclusion, given the truth of the premises, while preservation semantics are
commonly couched in qualitative, non-numerical terms. This triggers a fundamental
question as to the relation between qualitative and numerical approaches to semantics.
Carnap seems to have believed that qualitative approaches like Hempel's relation of
confirmation are derivations of the full-fledged numerical approaches, but Idoubt that the
relation is so straightforward. Both qualitative (i.e. preservatory) and numerical (i.e. truth-
estimating) approaches abound in the literature dealing with non-deductive reasoning, and
it appears to me that the relation between these two types of semantics establishes a
major research area in the field of logic.
§37. ARTIACIALINTELLIGENCE
The research question which ignited my investigations was not at all concerned with the
philosophical underpinnings of inductive reasoning, nor with the aims and scope of logic.
The original research question was to investigate the applicability of approaches to
computational induction, as developed in the field of machine learning, to the large
collections of data stored in databases. The main problem seemed to be that some of the
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tacit assumptions underlying these approaches didn't quite fit in the database framework,
but at the same time it was hard to get a handle on those assumptions.
In retrospect, a lot of those issues have been clarified, not just through my work but
also through the work of Luc De Raedt. Both of us started to work on systems inducing
integrity constraints from a collection of data. What an integrity constraint is, is perhaps
best explained by stating what it is not: a classification rule. What I am stating here in a
few words is a fundamental insight that slowly took shape over a number of years, and it
was well after that insight had emerged that I discovered almost the same distinction in the
philosophical literature. The philosophical and logical elaboration of an issue that is very
relevant for the theory and practice of inductive machine learning is what I view as the
main contribution of this thesis.
But amidst of all this logico-philosophical weightiness, what are the gems a practical
machine learner should bring home? The first message is that there's more to logic than
just syntax. Many early 'logical' approaches to machine learning did not employ much
more logical apparatus than a logic-based description language. Inductive logic
programming acquired the taste of proof procedures, and even added a flavour of (Herbrand)
semantics - however, it is still mainly doing logic programming inductively. My thesis
can be seen as a contribution to the semantics of programming in inductive logic.
However, as there is hardly any logic program in the whole thesis, its significance
extends beyond inductive logic programming to inductive machine learning in general.
The concept of a conjectural consequence relation that I introduced in this thesis allows us
to reason about different learning situations and to formulate the main characteristics of
those learning situations in an unambiguous manner. I have provided a catalogue of such
characteristics, and the representation results provide further insights as to how these
characteristics interact. Finally, the analysis that has been carried out in this thesis may
help us to understand the relation between inductive learning and other approaches to
representing and reasoning with knowledge, and hopefulIy contributes to the development
of artificial intelligence into a mature science.
* * * * ** * * *
APPENDIX
A SESSION WITH INDEX
INDEX is a prototype system for inductive data engineering, implemented in Quintus
Prolog. Starting from a given extensional database relation it suggests attribute
dependencies that could result in a meaningful decomposition. After the user has chosen a
dependency the decomposition is carried out, also with some help from the user. The main
algorithms have been described in chapter 8; below follows an annotated session,




[train3 consulted 0.100 sec 1,608 bytes]
? get pos train.












train(8, 16,tilburg, stopping_train, 4)
train(8,37,utrecht,intercity,S)
train(8, 39, tilburg, intercity, 6)
train(8,42,utrecht,stopping_train,4)





train(9,39, tilburg, intercity, 6)
train(9,42,utrecht, stopping_train, 4)
train(9, 46, tilburg, stopping_train, 4)
Appendix












After starting INDEX the user reads a file consisting a relation scheme and a number of
positive tuples into Prolog. The positive tuples are then read into the INDEX database, and
the user tells INDEX to construct the strongest attribute dependencies (here generically called

























The operation of INDEX can be controlled by setting a number of switches. The cwa
switch tells INDEX to use the Closed World Assumption rather than querying the user
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A session with INDEX
about the indicated tuples (i.e. to perform non-incremental rather than incremental
induction). The debug switch can be used to make INDEX more talkative. The eval
switch tells INDEX to use heuristics to find dependencies that are almost satisfied, rather
than to find the set of strongest dependencies that are satisfied; this switch is now off to
illustrate the latter process, and will be switched on for the rest of the session. Finally,
the horn switch can be used to display integrity constraints in Horn form, i.e. as definite
clauses.
The above list of integrity constraints found by INDEX consists of all non-trivial
attribute dependencies that hold for the given relation; apart from the fd Platform-e'Type
(and consequently the mvd Platform-e+Type) these dependencies are contingent, caused by
the circumstance that no two trains happen to leave at the same moment.
? switch eval.
eval is now on.
? del ics all.








? show ics all.
integrity constraints:
train: [mins]--> [direction, platform, type]










? check ics train: []->->[hour].
train: [)->->[hour) looks promising: sat 0.8
The search for dependencies is performed again, this time with the eval switch for
heuristic evaluation turned on. The reader can verify for herself that the dependencies that
weren't found previously, i.e. the ones that are almost but not completely satisfied, are
the third fd Type Direction-el'latform, the first mvd 0-HHour, and the last three mvds.
The user chooses to take a closer look at the mvd 0-HHour and asks for its satisfaction
degree, which is 0.8 (i.e. 3 exceptions out of 15 tuples; see below).
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? decomp train: []->->[hour] •
partl ---
train(8,7,utrecht,intercity,5)
train(8, 9,tilburg, intercity, 6)
train(8,37,utrecht, intercity, 5)
train(8,39,tilburg, intercity, 6)




train(9, 37,utrecht, intercity, 5)
train(9, 39,tilburg, intercity, 6)
train(9, 42,utrecht, stopping_train, 4)






The user is satisfied with this satisfaction degree, and asks INDEX to construct a
decomposition (note that INDEX finds out that the decomposition should be horizontal,
since the dependency is violated). INDEX now constructs a horizontal decomposition and
asks the user whether she wants to proceed. The decomposition is rather trivial in this
example: since there are no antecedent attributes the antecedent partition trivially consists
of the whole relation, and the second step of the algorithm separates the relation into two
non-contradicting blocks, for which the reader only has to supply names. I will illustrate a






train(8, 42,utrecht, stopping_train, 4)
train(8, 46,tilburg, stopping_train, 4)
train(9,7,utrecht, intercity, 5)
train(9,9,tilburg,intercity,6)
train(9, 37,utrecht, intercity, 5)
train(9, 39,tilburg, intercity, 6)
train(9,42,utrecht,stopping_train,4)
train(9, 46,tilburg, stopping_train, 4)
relation name? hourly train.
A session with INDEX
tuples:
train(8,12,utrecht,stopping_train,4)














The user recognises the first set of tuples as the hourly trains, and the remaining three as
irregular trains. Since both of these new relations now satisfy the mvd 0-+,;Hour, the
user is asked whether she wants to construct the corresponding vertical decomposition for
them. The user decides to do this only for the hourly trains, resulting in two new
relations, one listing the possible hours, and one listing the values of the remaining







hourlytrain1 (37,utrecht, intercity, 5)
hourlytrain1(39, tilburg,intercity, 6)
hourlytrain1 (42,utrecht, stopping_train, 4)
hourlytrain1 (46,tilburg, stopping_train, 4)
irregtrain(8, 12,utrecht, stopping_train, 4)
irregtrain(8, 16,tilburg,stopping_train, 4)
irregtrain(8, 57,utrecht, intercity, 6)
negative tuples:






horn is now on.











The composition rules are included as integrity constraints, and are displayed above in
relational form and as clauses.
I will now illustrate a more elaborate horizontal decomposition of the same relation,
imposed by the fd TypeDirection=Platform. This fd has only one exception, as indicated
by its satisfaction degree.
? check ics train: [type,direction]-->[platform].
train: [type,direction]--> [platform] looks promising:
sat 0.933333

















segrnent2 --- part2 --- :
train(8, 57,utrecht,intercity, 6)
Proceed? yes.
A session with INDEX
In this non-minimal horizontal decomposition, segments roughly correspond to antecedent
blocks, and parts correspond to non-contradicting blocks within antecedent blocks. The
first segment actually consists of several antecedent blocks, which can be seen from the
fact that there are several Type,Direction-values within this segment - it consists of all
non-contradicting antecedent blocks: i.e. the Tilburg intercity trains, the Utrecht stopping
trains, and the Tilburg stopping trains. Only the fourth antecedent block, consisting of the
Utrecht intercity trains, contradicts the fd and is split into two non-contradicting blocks.
The user can now decide to keep all these blocks separate (this would be a non-
minimal decomposition), or to combine the first segment with either the first or the
second part of the second segment, by assigning a name to each of these blocks.
tuples:
train(B, 9,tilburg, intercity, 6)
train(B, 12,utrecht,stopping_train, 4)
train(B, 16,tilburg, stopping_train, 4)
train(B,39,tilburg,intercity,6)
train(B, 42,utrecht, stopping_train, 4)
train(B,46, tilburg,stopping_train, 4)














The user chooses the minimal decomposition with the smallest number of exceptions.


























regtrainl (8,39, tilburg, intercity}
regtrainl(8,42,utrecht,stopping_train)














horn is now on.









The user might now proceed to induce dependencies for regtrainl such as0-HHour,
and separate the regular trains into hourly trains and non-hourly trains.
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GLOSSARY
- explanations of the most important terms and logical rules used in this thesis-
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
A word in SMALL CAPITALS indicates a cross-reference.
a-deductive reasoning reasoning
that is very different from DEDUCTION,
such as INDUcnON.
abduction the process of forming an
explanatory hypothesis; usually referred
to as 'explanatory reasoning'.
adequacy condition term used by
Hempel for a condition to be satisfied by
any material definition of CONFIRMATION.
admissible a formula is admissible if
it allows itself as a possible conclusion,
i.e. if it is compatible with the BACK-
GROUND KNOWLEDGE.
argument a pair of premisses and con-
clusion, an element of a CONSEQUENCE
RELATION; the set of premisses is usually
treated as a conjunctive formula.
attribute dependency a statement
indicating the existence of a certain rela-
tionship between attributes in a database.
attribute-value language a propo-
sitional language in which each proposi-
tion is an attribute-value pair.
background knowledge any knowl-
edge used for drawing conclusions with-
out being explicitly represented in an
ARGUMENT; formalised as a restricted set
of models.
closed-world reasoning a form of
reasoning based on the assumption that
everything that is not explicitly stated in
the premisses is false.
compatible two formulas are compat-
ible if their conjunction is CONSISTENT.
concept learning the process of in-
ferring the definition of a concept from
descriptions of instances and non-in-
stances.
confirmation a qualitative relation
between EVIDENCE and certain HYPOTHESES
(Hempel); a quantitative function defined
for every pair of evidence and hypothesis
(Carnap).
confirmatory consequence rela-
tion a CONSEQUENCE RELATION that satis-
fies the rules of Confirmatory Reflex-
ivity and Right Weakening.
confirmatory reasoning the pro-
cess of forming a confirmed hypothesis.
conjectural reasoning the process
of forming conjectures.
conjecture a DEFEASIBLE statement; the
terms 'conjecture' and 'hypothesis' are
used interchangeably.
consequence relation a set of pairs
of formulas in a logical language, for-
malising the behaviour of an agent per-
forming a certain REASONINGFORMon the
basis of certain BACKGROUNDKNOWLEDGE.
consistency-based confirmatory
reasoning a weak form of CON-
FIRMATORYREASONINGrequiring satisfia-
bility of evidence and hypothesis,
possibly over a restricted set of models.
consistent a formula is consistent if
it does not both entail another formula
and the negation of that formula,
consistent consequence relation
a CONSEQUENCER LATIONis consistent if it
satisfies the rule of Consistency, i.e. if
for every ARGUMENTthe premisses and the
conclusion are COMPATIBLE.
convex a consequence relation is con-
vex if it satisfies the rule of Right
Interval, i.e. if the set of possible con-
clusions of given premisses is convex
wrt. the ordering of logical entailment.
cumulative reasoning a weak form
of PLAUSIBLEREASONING,axiomatised by
the KLM system C.
deductive reasoning non-DEFEASIBLE
reasoning.
defeasible an ARGUMENTis defeasible
if it is possible for new knowledge to
contradict (defeat) the conclusion without
contradicting the premisses.
descriptive logic the formal study
of REASONINGFORMS.
discovery procedure a procedure
that infers only formulas that are poten-
tially useful wrt. a certain goal; realised
by equipping a PROOFPROCEDUREwith a
heuristic.




examples as classifications in
CONCEPTLEARNING:adding the description
of an instance to the background knowl-
edge, and treating the classification of the
instance as a premiss in the inductive
argument.
examples as implications in
CONCEPTLEARNING:treating the implica-
tion from description to classification of
an instance as a premiss in the inductive
argument.
explanation mechanism a PROOF
PROCEDUREused to build explanations.
explanatory consequence relation
a CONSEQUENCER LATIONthat satisfies the
rules of Explanatory Reflexivity,
Admissible Converse Entailment, and
Additivity .
explanatory power the set of obser-
vations a formula can explain; approxi-
mated by the set of consequences of the
formula using an EXPLANATIONMECHANISM.
explanatory reasoning the process
of forming an explanatory hypothesis;
synonymous with 'abduction'.




satisfying the rule of Right And.
hypothesis a DEFEASIBLEstatement;
the terms 'conjecture' and 'hypothesis'
are used interchangeably.
incremental a form of INDUCTIONis
incremental if hypotheses are only re-
jected on the basis of known observa-
tions. not on the basis of assumptions;
formalised by the rule of Incrementality
(Left Weakening).
induction the process of inferring a
general rule from specific observations.
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Glossary of terms
inductive data engineering the
process of RESTRUCfURING a database after
inducing INTEGRJTY CONSTRAINTS.
inductive logic Carnap's term for
his truth-estimating semantics based on a
degree of CONARMATION.
integrity constraint a non-classifi-
catory statement; in logic, a clause with
no or more than one positive literals.
KLM-framework the DESCRIPTIVE
THEORY of PLAUSIBLE REASONING developed
by Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor.
logic the formal study of REASONING.
logical system a system consisung
of semantics, proof procedure, and
metatheory .
monotonic synonymous with 'non-
DEFEASIBLE' .
non-deductive reasoning DE-
FEASIBLE reasoning; further divided into
QUASI-DEDUCTIVE REASONING and A-
DEDUCTIVE REASONING.
observation a premiss in an inductive
ARGUMENT; 'evidence' and 'observations'
are used interchangeably.
Peircean consequence relation an
EXPLANATORY CONSEQUENCE RELATION that
satisfies the rule of Admissible Right
Strengthening; this requires an EX-
PLANATION MECHANISM which is
MONOTONIC.
plausible reasoning reasoning with
general cases and exceptions.
preferential reasoning a form of
PLAUSIBLE REASONING, axiomatised by the
KLM system P; the name derives from
the fact that the semantics employs a
preference ordering on semantic objects.
preservation semantics a generic
model for the semantics of various
REASONING FORMS.
proof procedure a set of axioms and
inference rules.
quasi-deductive reasoning reason-
ing that approximates DEDUCTIVE REA-
SONING by making assumptions about
missing information, such as PLAUSIBLE
REASONING.
reasoning form informally, a dis-
tinguished way of reasoning, such as de-
ductive, inductive, and plausible rea-
soning; the subject of DESCRIPTIVE LOGIC.
reasoning informally, the process of
drawing conclusions from premisses; the
subject of LOGlC.
regularity-based confirmatory
reasoning a form of CONFIRMA TOR Y
REASONING in which the hypothesis is re-
quired to be satisfied by certain regular
SEMANTIC OBJECTS constructed from the
premisses.
restructuring the process of making
the implicit structure of a database
explicit.
rule system a set of formal properties
of CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS.
satisfaction-preserving a seman-
tics is satisfaction-preserving if every in-
terpretation satisfying the premisses also
satisfies the conclusion; such a semantics
is necessarily TRUTH-PRESERVING.
satisfiable a formula is satisfiable if
it has a model.
semantic object generic term for the
entities assigned to formulas by the se-
mantics, such as interpretations or
STATES.
state a SEMANTIC OBJECT in the K L M
FRAMEWORK.




GENERALITY relation for clauses.
truth-estimating semantics a pro-
cedure for assessing the truth of the con-



















truth-preserving a semantics is
truth-preserving if the truth of the con-
clusion follows from the truth of the
premisses, where truth is defined as satis-
faction by the intended model.
Version Space in CONCEPT LEARNING:
the set of possible concept definitions or






l=a-7p , a I< a
a I< p
l=y-7 P , a I< p , y I< Y
a I< y
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evidence for an explanatory
hypothesis can be accumulated
admissible evidence confirms
either a hypothesis or its nega-
tion (closed-world reasoning)
if a is explained by p then -,p
is explained by -.a, provided
-,a is admissible
an admissible hypothesis
entailing the evidence is
explanatory
a hypothesis entailed by admis-
sible evidence is confirmed
an explanation can be logically
strengthened, provided it
remains admissible
the set of confirmed hypotheses
does not decrease when
confirmed observations are
added (cJVerification)
representing examples as im-
plications is as strong as repre-
senting them as classifications
if some admissible evidence
does not confirm a hypothesis,
its negation must be
admissible (contraposition:
arbitrary admissible evidence




























av~ I< Y , ~ i,I:: y
al<y
Fal\~---*y , a I< ~
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al\~ ~ fa 1s e
'7'
evidence and hypothesis share a
model
any explanation can be
extended with the negation of
something it doesn't explain
at least one of the disjuncts of
disjunctive confmning evidence
confirms the hypothesis
if an admissible hypothesis does
not explain certain evidence-the
negation of the evidence must be
admissible (contraposition: an
arbitrary admissible hypothesis
explains the negation of any
inadmissible formula)
an observation, the negation of
which was predicted, falsifies
the hypothesis
the set of possible hypotheses is
monotonically non-increasing
with the observations
the set of explained
observations is consistent
the logical form of the evidence
is immaterial





evidence does not allow any
hypothesis)
evidence and hypothesis share a
partial model in which both are
verified
partial version of Left Logical
Equivalence
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partial version of Predictive
Right Weakening
partial version of Verification
equivalent to the combination of
Verification and Incrementality
equivalent to the combination
of Right Extension and Right
Weakening
the set of confirmed hypotheses
is itself confirmed
the set of confirmed hypotheses
is consistent
Right Excess F a/\ p ~Y , a I< p no hypothesis can be extended
a ~ p/\---,y with the negation of a prediction
Right Extension Fa/\p~y, a I< p any hypothesis can be extended
a I< p /\ Y with a prediction
Right Interval F p ~ Y , F Y ~ 0 , a I< p , a I< 0 the set of possible
a I< y hypotheses is convex wrt
















Fa/\p~y , a I< p
a/\y I< p
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the logical form of the
hypothesis is immaterial
the disjunction of two
explanations is an explanation
any hypothesis allowed by
some evidence is admissible
(contraposition: inadmissible
formulas are not allowed by
any evidence)
a logical consequence of a con-
finned hypothesis is confirmed
a predicted observation verifies
(ie does not refute) the
hypothesis
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SUMMARY
THIS THESIS deals with induction: deriving general rules from specific cases. As a form of reasoninginduction is frequently applied, for example when generalising observed facts and situations in
daily life, but also for drawing up experimental scientific theories. Furthermore, induction is nowadays
being applied in computer systems that learn from examples, in order to find out, for instance, how a
physician arrives at her diagnoses, or to construct computer programs (which turns the programmer
into a teacher).
Although induction is a fruitful and widely used form of reasoning, there is a problem: we don't
know how it works. How many crows should one observe in order to conclude that all crows are black?
After all, not all swans are white, and the same hand that feeds the hen day after day ultimately
wrings her neck. The justification of inductive conclusions is a notorious philosophical problem, and
every inductively inferred rule is, at its best, a plausible conjecture, for which however every next
example may turn out to be a counterexample (as the hen discovered to her disgrace).
There is, however, another problem: a general theory as to which inductive conjectures are
refuted by the observed instances, and which are still possible, does not exist. What is the logic of
conjectures? This problem of 'conjectural reasoning' forms the subject of my thesis. Starting from earlier
work in philosophy, computer science and logic, I have tried to reduce the problem to manageable
proportions, and to suggest the beginnings of a solution.
The principal result of this attempt is twofold. First of all, I claim that the logic of induction is not
essentially different from, for example, deductive logic, as long as we are prepared to broaden the usual
conception of logic somewhat. This frees the way for the application of a recently developed
description method - put forward to aid the analysis of reasoning with general rules and exceptions -
to inductive reasoning. The second result of my thesis is a distinction between and logical
characterisation of two different forms of induction: explanatory induction, which aims at explaining
observed cases, and confirmatory induction, where the inductive conjectures are confirmed by the
observations, however without explaining the latter. I show that this distinction can be traced back to
philosophical work of half a century and a century ago, respectively, making furthermore use of recent
work in the field of artificial intelligence.
What follows is a brief overview of the different chapters.
After an introductory chapter I discuss in chapter 2 the philosophical backgrounds of induction,
thereby restricting attention to the work of Peirce on abduction or explanatory reasoning, and
Hempel's logical analysis of the notion of 'confirmation' in statements like 'this hypothesis is confirmed
by that evidence'. As Hempel noticed, the unconcerned combination of intuitions about 'explanation'
and 'confirmation' leads to paradoxes; the solution I propose is simply not to combine, but rather to
discern between them. Carnap's 'inductive logic' is also discussed sideways; it does not, however, play
a Significant role in the rest of the thesis, since Carnap was not so much concerned with the nature of
inductive arguments, but rather with the question how plausible an arbitrary hypothesis is, given the
observed facts.
Chapter 3 deals with practical induction methods as applied in the field of artificial intelligence. I
demonstrate that the distinction between explanatory and confirmed hypotheses occurs here also:
the usual classification rules are explanatory hypotheses, while integrity constraints, which can be
found, for example, in databases, are confirmed by the data without being powerful enough to explain
them. In chapter 4 I discuss the method, initiated by Gabbay and further developed by Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor, for analysing plausible reasoning. According to this method, a form of reasoning
is abstracted into a so-called consequence relation. Since this method makes little presuppositions
about the nature of the reasoning form in question, it is equally suitable for analysing other forms of
reasoning such as induction: it is in fact a methodology.
The next three chapters form the core of the thesis. In chapter 5 I investigate whether it is at all
possible to speak of a logic of induction, what components such a logic is built of, and its scope and
limits. The key result of this analysis is a generalisation of the truth-preserving semantics of deductive
logic into an abstract preservation semantics. The semantic objects that are to be preserved depend on
the reasoning form at hand. In this respect one can think of 'explanatory power' in the case of
explanatory induction, and 'regularity' of interpretations in the case of confirmatory induction; this is
further elaborated in chapter 7.
The following two chapters contain a logical analysis of conjectural consequence relations, in the
spirit of the work of Kraus et at. Chapter 6 presents an overview of possible structural properties of
conjectural consequence relations, and in chapter 7 three distinct systems of such rules are proposed
and semantically characterised. Furthermore, in this chapter a preliminary partial semantics for
confirmatory induction is given.
Finally, the theory developed in the previous chapters is applied in chapter 8 to the problem of
inducing integrity constraints in databases, aimed at making explicit the structure that is implicitly
present in the data. The constraints thus discovered can be used, with some help of the user, to re-
organise the data in a more meaningful and less redundant way.
SAMENVATTING
D IT PROEFSCHRIFT gaat over inducrie: het afJeiden van algemene regels uit specifieke gevallen.Inductie is een veel toegepaste redeneervorm, bijvoorbeeld wanneer we, in het dagelijks leven,
waargenomen feiten of siruaties generaliseren, maar ook bij het opstellen van experimentele
wetenschappelijke theorieen. Daarnaast wordt inductie tegenwoordig toegepast in computer-
system en die leren van aangeboden voorbeelden, bijvoorbeeld om na te gaan hoe een arts tot haar
diagnoses komt, of om computerprogramma's op te stellen (waarbij de rol van de programmeur
verandert in die van leraar).
Hoewel inductie dus een nuttige en veelgebruikte redeneervorm is, is er een probleem: we weten
niet hoe het werkt. Hoeveel kraaien moet je gezien hebben om te mogen concluderen dat aile kraaien
zwart zijn? Per slot van rekening zijn niet aile zwanen wit, en draait dezelfde hand die de kip dag na
dag gevoerd heeft, haar uiteindelijk de nek om. De rechtvaardiging van inductieve gevolgtrekkingen is
een berucht filosofisch probleem, en elke inductief afgeleide regel is op z'n best een aannemelijk
vermoeden, waarvoor echter elk volgend voorbeeld een tegenvoorbeeld kan blijken te zijn (zaals de kip
tot haar schande heeft moeten vaststellen).
Er is echter nog een probleem: er is geen algemene theorie die antwoord geeft op de vraag, welke
inductieve vermoedens door de waargenomen gevallen worden uitgesloten, en welke nog mogelijk
zijn. Wat is de logica van vermoedens? Dit probleem van 'vermoedelijk redeneren' vormt het
onderwerp van mijn proefschrift. Uitgaande van eerder werk van filosofen, informatici en logici heb ik
getracht het probleem tot hanteerbare proporties terug te brengen, en een aanzet tot een oplossing te
geven.
Het voornaamste resultaat van deze poging is tweeledig. Allereerst stel ik dat de logica van
inductie zich niet wezenlijk onderscheidt van bijvoorbeeld deductieve logica, mits we bereid zijn om de
gebruikelijke visie op logica enigszins te verruimen. Dit maakt de weg vrij voor het toepassen van een
recent ontwikkelde beschrijvings-methode - opgesteld ten behoeve van de analyse van het redeneren
met algemene regels en uitzanderingen daarop - op inductief redeneren. Het tweede resultaat van
mijn proefschrift is een onderscheid tussen twee verschillende vormen van inductie: verklarende
inductie, waarbij het gaat om het verklaren van waargenomen gevallen, en bevestigende inductie,
waarbij de inductieve vermoedens bevestigd worden door de waarnemingen, zonder even weI de
laatsten te verklaren. Ik laat daarbij zien dat dlt onderscheid teruggevoerd kan worden tot filosofisch
werk van een halve tot een hele eeuw oud, en baseer me daarnaast op recent werk op het gebied van
kunstmatige intelligentie.
Wat volgt is een beknopt overzicht van de verschillende hoofdstukken.
Na een inleidend hoofdstuk ga ik in hoofdstuk 2 in op de filosofische achtergronden van inductie.
Ik beperk me daarbij tot het werk van Peirce over abductie, ofwel verklarend redeneren, en Hempels
logische analyse van het begrip 'bevestigen' in beweringen als 'deze hypothese wordt bevestigd door
die gegevens'. Zoals Hempel al opmerkte leidt het onbevangen combineren van intufties over
'verklaren' en 'bevestigen' tot paradoxen; de door mij voorgestelde oplossing luidt simpelweg dat deze
begrippen niet gecombineerd, maar juist gescheiden dienen te worden. Ook Carnaps 'inductieve
logica' komt zijdelings aan bod; deze speelt echter in de rest van het proefschrift geen rol van
betekenis, aangezien Carnap zich niet zozeer bezighield met de vraag naar het wezen van inductieve
argumenten, maar veeleer met de vraag hoe betrouwbaar een willekeurige hypothese is, gegeven de
waargenomen feiten.
Hoofstuk 3 gaat over practische inductie-methoden, toegepast in het vakgebied der kunstmatige
intelligentie. Ik laat zien dat her onderscheid tussen verklarende en bevestigde hypothesen ook hier
opgeld doet: de vertrouwde classificatie-regels zijn verklarende hypothesen, terwijl
integriteitsbeperkingen, zoals die bijvoorbeeld in gegevensbanken te vinden zijn, geen
verklaringskracht hebben maar wei bevestigd worden door de feiten. In hoofdstuk 4 behandel ik de
door Gabbay geinitieerde en door Kraus, Lehmann en Magidor verder ontwikkelde methode voor het
analyseren van plausibel redeneren, waarin een redeneervorm wordt geabstraheerd tot een
zogenaamde gevolg-relatie. Aangezien deze methode hoegenaamd geen beperkende aannamen doet
over de aard van de onderzochte redeneervorm, is zij in feite een methodologie, evenzeer geschikt voor
de analyse van andere redeneervormen, zoals bijvoorbeeld inductie.
De hieropvolgende drie hoofdstukken vormen de kern van het proefschrift. In hoofdstuk 5
onderzoek ik in hoeverre gesproken kan worden van een logica van inductie, waaruit zij opgebouwd
zou moeten zijn, en wat haar reikwijdte en beperkingen zouden zijn. Het voornaamste resultaat van
deze analyse is een generalisatie van de waarheids-bewarende semantiek van deductieve logica tot een
geabstraheerde bewarings-semantiek, gebaseerd op een per redeneervorm verschillende, te bewaren
semantische grootheid. Zoals nader uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 7 valt daarbij te denken aan
'verklaringskracht' in het geval van verklarende inductie, en 'regelmatigheid' van beschouwde
interpretaties in het geval van bevestigende inductie.
De volgende twee hoofdstukken geven, in de geest van het werk van Kraus et al., een logische
analyse van inductieve gevolg-relaties. Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een overzicht van mogelijke structurele
eigenschappen van inductieve gevolg-relaties, en in hoofdstuk 7 worden drie verschillende systemen
van zulke eigenschappen voorgesteld en semantisch gekarakteriseerd. Ook wordt in dit hoofdstuk een
begin gemaakt met het ontwikkelen van een partiele semantiek voor bevestigende inductie.
In hoofdstuk 8 tenslotte wordt de ontwikkelde theorie toegepast bij het induceren van
integriteitsbeperkingen in gegevensbanken, met als doel het expliciet maken van impliciet in de
gegevens aanwezige structuur. De aldus ontdekte beperkingen kunnen gebruikt worden om, met
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1. De leuze Conjectures and Refutations zou, als samenvatting van de wetenschaps-
filosofische bijdragen van Popper, aan adequaatheid winnen wanneer ze wordt
afgekort tot 'Refutations'. (Hoofdstuk 2, dit proefschrift.)
2. De zogenaamde 'bevestigings-paradoxen', die schijnbaar inherent zijn aan een
logische analyse van het proces van wetenschappelijke hypothesevorming, kunnen
eenvoudig vermeden worden door een duidelijk onderscheid te maken tussen de
uitspraken 'deze hypothese wordt bevestigd door die gegevens' en 'deze
hypothese verklaart die gegevens'. (Hoofdstuk 2, dit proefschrift.)
3. Wanneer logid de term 'niet-monotoon redeneren' hanteren, wardt normaal
gesproken gedoeld op plausibel redeneren, dar wil zeggen: het redeneren met
globale regels en uitzonderingen. (Hoofdstuk 4, dit proefschrift.)
4. Het onderzoek van Kraus, Lehmann en Magidor naar strukturele eigenschappen
van gevolg-relaties, dat doorgaans wordt beschouwd als een systematische studie
van verschillende varmen van plausibel redeneren, dient in de eerste plaats re
worden opgevat a1seen aanzet tot een beschrijvende logische methodologie.
(Hoofdstuk 4, dit proefschrift.)
5. De Heilige Graal van de logica is niet het geldigheids-begrip, maar het bewarings-
begrip. (leanings, Chan & Dowad, 'Generalised inference and inferential
modelling', Proc. l]CAl'91; Zadrozny, On rules of abduction, IBM Research
Report, 1991; hoofdstuk 5, dit proefschrift.)
6. Carnap's zogenaamde 'inductieve logica' is in feite geen logisch systeem, maar een
waarheids-schattende semantiek. (Hoofdstuk 5, dit proefschrift.)
7. a. Het hanteren van kwantitatieve maatstaven bij de kwaliteitsbeoordeling van
wetenschappelijk onderzoek, dat op universiteiten meer en meer in zwang
raakt, vergroot de voorspelbaarheid, en daarmee de beheersbaarheid, van het
gedrag van wetenschappelijk onderzoekers.
b. De eerste universiteit die een aanvraag tot certificering volgens 150-9000
indient zal dan ook niet lang meer op zich Iaten wachten.
c. Het verloop van goed wetenschappelijk onderzoek is ten enenmale
onvoorspelbaar.
8. De tragedie die zich afspeelt in het voormalige [oegoslavie maakt duideliik dat
morele verontwaardiging weliswaar leidt tot betrokkenheid, maar niet noodzakelijk
tot de politieke wil om in te grijpen. Het is daarom op zijn minst dubieus om bij
oorlogen in het algemeen, en bij de Tweede Wereldooriog in het bijzonder, aan
een van de partijen overwegend morele drijfveren toe te schrijven.
9. Met het invoeren van de stem computer is de kiezer beroofd van de mogelijkheid
om een ongeldige stem uit te brengen. Het verdient aanbeveling om deze moge-
lijkheid, waarmee de kiezer, zonder een voorkeur uit te spreken voor een bepaalde
politicus of partij, uitdrukking kan geven aan haar betrokkenheid met de
democratie in het algemeen, in ere te herstellen. Daamaast zou het van werkelijke
politieke moed en realiteitszin getuigen wanneer het parlement zou besluiten om
aan de dubbelzinnigheid van een dergelijke stem een eind te maken, door het
invoeren van twee alternatieven: de instem en de tegenstem.
10. Met Die Kunst der Fuge (1749) schiep Johann Sebastian Bach het eerste
conceptuele kunstwerk.
11. In deze tijd van uitersten is dringend behoefte aan verrijking van de Nederlandse
taal met de volgende woorden:
pessimaal' bn. minst, ongunstigst: de parallelle vij/de
baan is uit milieu-oogpunt bet -male alternatief
pessimalise'ren -seerde, b gepessimaliseerd pessimaal
(trachten te) maken, het ongunstigste trachten te
bereiken: bet kabinet bezondigt zicb aan bet - van de
opuang van asielzoeeers; ook -izeren.
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Conjectures: an inquiry.concerning the logic of induction investigates the
logical mechanisms underlying the process of inductive hypothesis formation.
Combining perspectives from philosophy, logic, and artificial intelligence
it gives precise characterisations of different kinds of hypothesis formation,
such as explanatory and confirmatory reasoning.
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